THE REPORT

on the workshop “The Rise of New Periphery in the World/
La croissance de la nouvelle périphérie mondiale”, Kyiv, September 20, 2013

The workshop was jointly organised by the WG “Transformations in the World System – Comparative Studies of Development” and the Faculty of sociology of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv being hosted by the latter. The working language was English.

Photo 1. The building of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (new campus) where the workshop was held.

The session was opened by Andrii Gorbachyk, Dean of the Faculty of sociology, who welcomed the workshop’s participants. He marked how the workshop is important for understanding the processes evolving in the world at the macro- and microlevel of societies and underlined the role of contacts with the international academic communities for training and research activity of the university.

Photo 2. Andrii Gorbachyk, Dean of the Faculty of sociology (standing in the centre)
Victor Krasilshchikov, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Russian Academy of Sciences), Moscow, convener of the working group, thanked the workshop’s hosts on behalf of EADI for good organisation and marked a theoretical and practical significance of the workshop’s topic. In his opinion, this significance is conditioned by the processes occurring in the contemporary world. In particular, the processes of destruction of the old social-economic systems inherited from the XX Century overtake the pace of the new systems’ growth whether we call them as post-industrial society or treat as the emergence of East-centred (Asia-centred) world. The rise of new periphery is the direct effect of destructive tendencies which have to be carefully scrutinised.

Photo 3. Victor Krasilshchikov (in the centre) with Olga Kutsenko (on the left) and Andrii Gorbachyk (on the right)

V. Krasilshchikov proposed to distinguish the recently emerging social-economic mechanism of peripheralisation from the old one described by such prominent scholars as H. Singer, A. Pinto, R. Prebisch, I. Wallerstein or S. Amin. Those scholars explained a division of the world economy into the centre (core) and periphery by the specific character of economic ties between the industrially developed North and the agrarian South. Today, it seems to be relevant to broaden the mentioned explanation to a set of the internal factors, for example, such as the anti-developmental state that operates being destructive force and does not allow some countries to approach to development. In opinion of Krasilshchikov, the post-Soviet space together with some formerly “socialist” countries of Eastern Europe makes up the new world periphery and will hardly become a part of the developed, advanced world in the next decades. A weakness of the proper impulses, as well as a lack of social actors who are capable of initiating modernisation, dooms this space to be supplier of raw materials and passive “globalisation-taker” in the world. Study of the factors and causes of such mournful phenomenon looks as one of the most prospective directions of development (and anti-development, too) studies as a whole, Krasilshchikov concluded.

Yuriy Saveliyev, senior research fellow of the Faculty of sociology, Taras Shevchenko National University, presented the paper “Social inclusion and forms of participation in assessment of development and prospects for modernisation of East
European Societies. He observed the processes that evolved in the world economy over the first decade of the new millennium and succeeded in the crisis of 2008-09. In particular, the speaker marked such phenomena as the rise of new global players (BRIC) and the rapid growth of East European countries. However, this development was uneven and, in some cases, truncated, as the crisis has demonstrated. For example, GDP of Ukraine has fallen by 15 per cent in 2009 whereas the indicators of some other East European countries (Poland, for instance) have undergone only insignificant decrease.

The speaker underlined that the growth of economy does not always mean the successful development as well as development and modernisation is not the same process as the rise of innovative economy. Meanwhile, in practical policy these concepts have not been distinguished from each other. For example, political elites in Ukraine and Russia speak about “prosperous societies” (like in the West) as the goals of their policies but they ignore a significance of democratic institutions and civil society’s engagement into the process of development.

Saveliyev rejected all attempts to reduce modernisation and/or catching up development to technological innovations and economic growth. On the contrary, he noted that technological innovations cannot be realised without respective social environment which creates the internal impulses for endogenous development (development from within) independent on the foreign capital and other external factors.

The author focused on the social-cultural dimension of modernisation. He scrutinised the system of values in society and marked that neither Russia nor Ukraine experienced the revolution of values in spite of their fast economic growth before the
Great Recession (2008-09). Moreover, he treated modernisation as the process of empowerment – the rise of social actors capable of initiating endogenous development. Saveliyev considered development as the enlargement of human capabilities, according to approach of A. Sen to this issue. In this connection, he attracted attention of the workshop’s attendants to the problem of inclusive development. The latter can be measured by a set of indicators which characterise a participation of people in political and social life. He presented the results of sociological polls on 32 European countries. Those polls demonstrate a degree of people’s participation in political and social life of Western and Eastern Europe. In fact, the speaker performed the new approach to the well-known division of the world into the centre and periphery, namely, not from the point of view of “purely economic” indicators but in social-cultural dimension.

Olga Kutsenko, professor of the Faculty of sociology, Taras Shevchenko National University, presented the paper “East European Peripheries: Post-Imperial Legacy?” on behalf of herself and Andrii Gorbachyk. She continued considering the problem of division into the world centre and periphery in its social-cultural respects.

The starting point of the authors’ consideration was the idea about survivability of the imperial relics in culture and mass consciousness. Presenting the paper, Kutsenko put the question: Do globalisation and marketisation wipe out the old imperial dependences? As she affirmed, replying to this question, a heritage of any empire in mass consciousness, customs of people, interpersonal ties, etc. survived over longer time than empires existed. Since the social-cultural effects of empire continue existing after the collapse of empire, Kutsenko formed the two following hypotheses: 1) each empire shapes a strong cultural legacy which has been reproducing in post-imperial
order in the former imperial area over time; 2) post-imperial areas differ from each other on the basic cultural dimensions, such as attitudes to social order, social trust, religiosity, identity, and incline to inherit the basic cultural features of the former empire’s centre.

Referring to Johan Galtung, Kutsenko distilled some essential features of the post-imperial area(s): 1) the former imperial centre (core) has been characterising by higher national proud, human and institutional development, consolidated identity; 2) the former peripheries have been distinguished by dependency on the core, instability and lesser level of social-economic development. The authors used the European Values Study database to verify how these features are performed in East European countries. According to the polls’ results and the well-known facts, including such tragic events as wars, the former peripheries of empires, German, Austrian, Russian and Turkish (Ottoman), continue demonstrating some essential features which were adherent to them in the past. Namely, their level of social-economic and human development is lower than in the former cores, they are more authoritarian from the point of view of their political and institutional construction, their population is less mobile and their citizens’ activity is notably lower than, for example, in Germany or Netherlands. All this allowed to make the following principal conclusions.

1) A pertinence of one or another country to the world economic and political periphery has not only economic but also cultural dimension. 2) Differences in the basic culture and social development between countries which belong to different post-imperial areas are more significant than between countries inside the same areas. 3) Differences between the ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ post-imperial nations are essential. The post-imperial areas reproduce the three-component inner structure: a) the post-imperial centre (with strong social, cultural and institutional attraction, high social activity and national proud); b) the centre-associated periphery with dependent centre-oriented development; c) the post-imperial periphery with dependent chaotic development, more authoritarian political system, more religious population and lower level of identity than in the former centre. 4) There are significant differences between the two post-imperial macro-areas (macro-clusters) in Central and Eastern Europe; these differences are rooted, respectively, a) in culture of the former Holy Roman Empire (Austrian and German), which is more democratic and less authoritarian; b) in traditions of the former Byzantine, Ottoman, and Russian Empires. 5) Development of the post-imperial peripheries depends on development of the former imperial centers. The post-imperial centres can be the centres of development for corresponding areas. 6) Ukraine is divided into the three post-imperial areas that have different chances for further development. However, the belonging of all Ukrainian regions to the second post-imperial macro-area determines, to a big degree, week chances for the west-oriented development of the country.

Ruslan Dzarasov, leading researcher, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (Russian Academy of Sciences), Moscow, has approached to the contemporary Russian economy from the point of view of Andre Günder Frank’s conception of development of underdevelopment. In his presentation titled “Post-Soviet Russia: Development of Underdevelopment in Making” he considered the decline of Russian economy at the recent, “capitalist” stage. This decline has been expressed in a
lack of investment and in industrial equipment aging whereas the new “proprietors” of capital are not interested to alternate this situation.

The author explained their irresponsible behaviour by operation of two factors: 1) financialisation of global capitalism when investment in financial sphere often becomes more profitable than one in manufacturing industries; 2) degradation of the former Soviet bureaucracy. He performed the statistical data illustrating the growth of financial sector in the world and US economy. Simultaneously, Dzarasov has shown the roots of contemporary Russian capitalism that lay in the dismantled Soviet system with the leading role of nomenklatura. The speaker presented the recently existing model of this capitalism in details, focusing on such its feature as a huge concentration of the formerly state assets in few hands of big insiders, stakeholders who take the main decisions due to the control over the firm’s finances. The rights of outsiders’ property are not guaranteed, and many decisions have been conditioned by informal, interpersonal relationships. Often the top-positioned officials who are formally not the proprietors of assets under their control influence on those decisions. They interfere into the business activity of enterprises, and this informal involvement of bureaucrats into business is very important for functioning of the Russian economy as a whole.

Dzarasov used the concept of insider rent that signifies “an income appropriated by big insiders due to their control over the firm’s financial flows”. This income has ambivalent social-economic character, namely, it is semi-feudal and semi-capitalist by its origin. As the speaker demonstrated, an appropriation of insider rent by small privileged groups erodes incomes of workers, ordinary managers and minor stakeholders; it spoils, too, resources for investment. Moreover, big insiders in the fuel-energy, metallurgy, transport and foodstuff industries redistribute a part of incomes of manufacturing industries for the proper advantage by means of monopolistic prices. It
deteriorates the technological structure of Russian economy, as the author concluded. He called a group of big insiders as “lumpen-bourgeoisie” using the term introduced by A.G. Frank about forty years ago for Latin American countries. A dominance of this group in Russian economy and political life dooms the country to drifting to the world periphery. This main conclusion was illustrated by the international rankings of the former Soviet republics by human development indices and GDP per capita.

The next presentation was logically linked to the paper by Dzarasov. Rustem Nureev, Head of Department of Macroeconomics, Financial University, Moscow, member of the WG, presented the paper “Political Economy of Russian ‘Vertical-of-Power’” written in the co-authorship with Sergey Shulgin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for applied economic studies affiliated with Russian Academy for National Economy and Public Administration under aegis of the President of the Russian Federation. He proposed to use the concepts of ‘Asiatic mode of production’ and ‘power-property’ as the methodological foundations for assessment of the contemporary Russian realities.

Nureev observed the historical roots and conditions of the power-property system's genesis. They consisted in monopolisation of: a) distribution functions; b) production conditions, including an access to resources; c) control and management. The author compared some essential features of the systems based upon power-property and private property, respectively, to each other. He focused on the main similarities between the ancient oriental social-economic systems based on the Asiatic mode of production, on the one hand, and the Soviet society, on the other. A gradual
disintegration of the latter, according to the speaker’s opinion, succeeded in its transformation into the recent post-Soviet system. The top positions in the latter, either in government or in big business, have been occupied by the persons who originated from the former nomenklatura. They have the late-Soviet mentality and consider the world through lenses of their habits and their education. Hence, as Nureev demonstrated, it is not occasional that the post-Soviet system, involuntarily borrowing the main character features of power-property societies from the past, excludes any competition in economy and politics as well. He performed the electoral data that illustrated how a field of political competition had been narrowing in Russia over the first decade of the new century. At the same time, Nureev underlined that political monopoly is undistinguishable from monopolism in economy, and both make up the fundament for ‘vertical of power’ under which elections have become sham. The data on electoral falsifications in favour of incumbent were performed, too. As the author concluded, elections in Russia today, when the system of power-property continues existing, though in modified forms, are not means for citizens to influence on the executive power. They are the best route for regional elites to acquire the financial transfers from the federal budget according to the principle “more votes for the upper power – more transfers for regional authorities”.

Dmitry Zavorotny, post-graduate student, State University of Management, Moscow, titled his presentation “Economic Policy Errors that Brought Russia to the World Periphery”. According to his opinion, Russia’s drift to the world periphery can be illustrated by comparison of the real economic development (development of underdevelopment? – V.K.) results reached in 2010-2011 to the indicators that could potentially be obtained in the ratio to the 1990 level. However, the corporate system existing in Russia today cannot provide the other results distinct from those factually acquired because of its hyper-monopolisation, excessive bureaucratisation, corruption, exploitation of cheap labour (hence, labour of poor quality), and disregard to the implementation of new technologies.
Zavorotny called the following principal errors of economic policy that led to the recent situation: fraudulent privatisation which appropriated the criminal character; radical price liberalisation in the conditions of super-monopolised economy; uncontrolled opening of the domestic market to foreign capital. One of this policy’s effects was decline of industrial production, particularly in machinery and equipment. It means, as the author concluded, that Russia has ceased to be one of the sovereign actors of the world economy.

The next presentation “Russian State Corporations in the Conditions of Periphery of the World Capitalism” deepened the analysis of power-property and ‘vertical of power’ issues. It was performed by Alexander Sokolov, post-graduate student, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Moscow. He focused on the rent-seeking behaviour of Russian tycoons who personify the called above unity of property (which is the result of fraudulent privatisation) and administrative/political power. One of the direct effects of the power-property unity is the high level of corruption and shadow, informal economy; the volume of the latter reaches 40 per cent of the total economy, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ estimations to which the author referred. Another important effect is the rate of oligarchisation or the so-called oligarchic coefficient of economy: the ratio of wealth concentrated in hands of the richest 1 per cent of population to the country’s GDP. It was equal in Russia to 20.5 % in 2012 and only 6.7 % – in the USA, 4.9 % – in China, as the author asserted.

Using the concept of insider’s rent mentioned by Dzarasov, Sokolov considered the activity of Russian state corporations organised by the government “on the base of property contribution for implementation of development, social, administrative and
other publicly useful functions”. As the speaker noted, the called entities have been regulated by the special law and are not subjugated to the common rules of regulation for “ordinary” business enterprises. They stay out of any public and parliamentary control; they cannot be bankrupted according to the bankruptcy law. Really, state corporations are similar to the special economic zones where the favourable conditions for informal activity of big insiders are artificially created, and this activity is, in essence, a kind of rent-seeking. It is undistinguishable from the widespread corruption and dilapidation of the national assets. Therefore, as the author argued, the state corporations’ activity is very far from the proclaimed “implementation of development”.

Sokolov performed schemes that illustrate the chains of offshore and fictitious companies which are key elements of the insider control’s tools. In fact, state corporations have become “roofs” that cover the regular withdrawal of insider rent to various offshore zones outside of Russia. Strictly speaking, the presentation by Sokolov has had a big value not only for a scientific research but also for a police investigation (which were initiated in the country if the normal, but not the cleptocratic state would exist). It convinces any observer that Russian state corporations are the actors of “anti-development”, and their activity is incompatible with the strategic task of modernisation. This activity plays important role in the process of Russia’s drift to the world periphery.

Svetlana Mareeva, senior research fellow, associated professor considered the social aspects of Russia’s peripheralisation. She presented the paper “Poverty and Inequalities in Contemporary Russian Society: the Formation of New Periphery” on behalf of herself and Nataliya Tikhonova, leading research fellow, professor, both are affiliated with Institute of Sociology (Russian Academy of Sciences) and National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Moscow.
Mareeva approached to the problem of poverty and new periphery in Russia from the point of view of the four main aspects that characterise poverty today and distinguish poor population from non-poor. These are: employment, quality of life, human capital, and specifics of behavioural norms and values. Defining poverty, Mareeva did not reduce it to the absolute, income-based poverty which has been treated as deprivation of material goods, i.e. as income below the minimum subsistence level. She used the so-called relative approach in its deprivation version which allows us to get the data on the share and number of poor people which notably differ from the official data. The speaker proposed to take into account the following aspects of poverty in contemporary Russia: 1) a shortage of durable goods or impossibility to buy new goods instead of old ones; 2) a poor quality or lack of owned real estate; 3) an inaccessibility of educational, medical or recreational services; 4) a lack of access to paid out-of-home leisure activities. In other words, the called aspects of poverty are deprivations that are not customary for a majority of the country’s population, being associated with poverty. Such an approach corresponds to the worldly accepted concepts of poverty in interpretation of the UN and the World Bank whereas the Russian official authorities treat the poverty line as the level of consumption below the minimal subsistence. In this case, indeed, the share of poor people has decreased two times in Russia, from 24.6 % in 2002 to 11.0 % in 2012. However, according to the contemporary view on the poverty issues, the share of poor people in Russia today is much higher; it reaches 30-35 per cent of the total population. As Mareeva said, one of the main factors of poverty in Russia is the low level of wages (salaries) of employed people. Another important factor is a number of children. In particular, the share of households with children and teenagers under 16 years is 34 per cent in the total number of households but the share of this group among all poor families reaches 60 per cent even if we calculate the poverty line according to the official approach (i.e. as income-based level only, not taking into account relative aspects of poverty). It is worth to note, too, that the high level of education, according to the author, does not prevent from poverty.

It was demonstrated how the gap between poor (in the large sense, not only income-based poor) and non-poor widened in Russia, and this trend did not alternate over the last years. Moreover, as Mareeva underlined, a big part of poor in Russia is accustomed to live in poverty; this custom determines their values. Poor are mostly adherent to traditional, paternalistic values as well as to egalitarianism. It is not surprising that they conceive the recent situation as inequitable. At the same time, non-poor agree with them in this respect, according to the concrete data presented by the speaker. Thus, a vast majority of the country’s population recognises the intolerably wide gap between rich and poor in Russia.

At last, Mareeva concluded that poverty has become the stable phenomenon in Russia. A big part of the formerly lower-income group of the population is steadily transforming into the large stratum permanently existing in the conditions of poverty. Therefore, the existence of new social-economic periphery is now the essential feature of contemporary Russian society.

Pavlo Kutuev, professor of sociology, National Technical University of Ukraine, Kyiv, scrutinised the problem of power relationships in Ukraine today. He presented the paper “Is the Developmental State Possible in Post-Leninist Ukraine?”. As the author
announced, he intended to consider the recent Ukrainian political system from the point of view of the developmental state theory and practice.

In his opinion, the contemporary Ukrainian political system can be categorised as the oligarchic regime dominated by the president. Instability within political process combined with the general stagnation is one of its essential features. The permanent reconfiguration of different political forces when political persons and/or groupings change their allies has become almost the everyday, routine practice according to the principle “to be together with those who can give more”. All this allowed to Kutuev to define the base of political system in Ukraine as the network of clientelistic, patrimonial relationships. The super-presidential republic established in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries is explainable outcome of patrimonialism at all levels of society. It is also necessary to add that, according to the author, the super-presidential regime “can be defined as an encouragement of personalism and patron-client relations and as a debasement of impersonal institutionalisation”. In other words, a destruction of political institutions or their transformation into a sham if they previously existed, at least in embryonic forms, is one of the character features of those political regimes.

At the same time, the speaker did not exclude a possibility of the developmental state’s rise under a domination of the patrimonial relationships. He referred to the experience of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan for approving his idea. According to Kutuev, the Ukrainian state can potentially become the developmental state but rather as a kind of “polity of Indian type – proclaiming mammoth developmental tasks and capable of only modest undertakings”.

Sabrina Regmi, fellow of Ochanomizu University, Nepal, has approached to the problem of new periphery from the point of view of the processes evolving at the social-economic micro-level. She presented the paper “Gender and Politics of Micro-enterprise
Development in Rural Nepal. As Regmi marked in introduction to her presentation, a huge multitude of small and microscopic business entities in the rural area makes up a solid part of the Nepalese economy. Hence, it is impossible to comprehend the general development tendencies in Nepal ignoring the micro-level of this development.

According to Regmi, rural women represent a big part of the social periphery, and their factual exclusion from development has been conditioned not only by the economic factors but also depends on obsolete traditions which maintain the gender inequality. Regmi attracted attention of the workshop’s attendants to one interesting fact: since the 1970s the main goal of micro-credit and micro-enterprises development was the economic growth as itself whereas the gender equality was treated as something of the secondary importance. However, the efficiency of such policy was very low and did not succeed in desirable results. It did not allow to reduce notably the rural poverty. On the contrary, a re-orientation of development policy to the gender equality/inequality problems provided good results. As Regmi demonstrated, the special projects of micro-credit and micro-enterprises development for women helped to involve a significant number of women, about 70 per cent, into development and facilitated to the rural poverty reduction. Thereby, the partial resolution of such social problem as the gender inequality inherited from the past appeared as important factor favourable to the growth of economy as a whole.

It was underlined that development policy should be directed from the bottom, grass-roots level of society to the top, not vice versa, as it had been previously occurring, and only then it would be possible to hope for the abolition of periphery. At the same time, Regmi emphasized on the increased role of NGOs, including feminist organisations, which can be the new intermediaries between poor at the grass-roots level and the state, various development agencies, etc.
Meanwhile, the real outcomes of the development policy oriented to the microeconomic level, such as micro-credit and support of micro-enterprises, appeared as the practice contradictory in itself. Indeed, this policy seemingly aimed at attaining the gender equality strengthened the gender inequality in some cases because of the original men’s domination in small businesses, mostly in the rural areas. Any support of micro-enterprises as a tool of development policy may be advantageous for men who prefer to keep women being occupied in households, not in entrepreneurial activity. Obviously, it leads to conservation of the internal periphery and traditional, pre-bourgeois relationships, as it could be concluded from the presentation by Regmi.

**Chris Weston**, PhD student, the Higher School of Economics, Warsaw, focused on the difficultly visible processes occurring in North Korea. He titled his paper “North Korea: Last Holdout Standing or Candidate for Transition?”.

The author considered the past and present situation in North Korea in light of the world-system theory, taking into account the internal and external factors of the country’s development. Simultaneously, he applied the main ideas of institutional economics in its Northian (because of Douglass North’s authorship) interpretation to the given case study.

**Weston** reminded of Wallerstein’s ideas about a possible moving of one or another country from the world periphery to semi-periphery and vice versa. According to **Weston**, the story of North Korea over the five decades is the case of such drift from semi-periphery, to which the country pertained by its social-economic indicators from 1945 to the late-1960s, to periphery. The speaker marked such factors of the North Korean evolution or, rather, involution (besides the previously existed economic base inherited from the Japanese colonial rule) as culture, ideology, the cult of leader’s personality, the strong army with its specific interests, privileges and worldviews, the
permanent tension ("neither war nor peace") in the Korean peninsula. All these factors and circumstances predetermined the specific choice of economic policy with its emphasis on heavy and military industries while the personal private consumption had been restrained.

Weston underlined the role of violence and, respectively, the role of authority bodies that apply violence, in the economic life of North Korea. In fact, violence and compulsion to any economic activity have been the key elements of the North Korean economic system in which power and property make up a unity.

The author observed the different stages of involution in North Korea. This involution began still in the 1970s and accelerated after fall of the Soviet Union. This event has had serious consequences for North Korea. Weston performed the data that characterised an acuteness of that event’s effects: bilateral trade with the USSR fell from US$ 2.56 billion in 1990 to US$ 0.14 billion in 1994. In the 1990s the country underwent the natural disasters (floods), famine, the increased reliance of foreign aid, deindustrialisation, the collapse of the public distribution system (because it ceased to be something to distribute), and the rise of spontaneous, shadow markets with horrible corruption. The volume of goods’ output in 2010 was equal to 60 per cent of the level attained in 1980. Nevertheless, North Korea approached to constructing own A-bomb spoiling all scarce resources for this project.

As the speaker demonstrated, the devastating economic policy succeeded in the full dependence of North Korea on the trade with China and South Korea. The country’s trade with them accounted for 88 per cent of its total trade in 2010, according to the performed data. North Korea exported mainly commodities and imported manufactured goods; in fact, the country appropriated all character features of the world periphery. In this connection, Weston concluded that there are two roads to transition of North Korea from the recent mournful situation to another state: either to move gradually towards unification with South or to become a tributary state of China. An alternative to both is perdition of the country.

The general conclusions
The presented papers and discussion around them allowed making the following conclusions.

1) The classical theory of the world-system and subdivision of the latter into the centre (core) and periphery has to be revised. Today, it is insufficient to explain such subdivision referring to the trade between developed and underdeveloped countries, unequal exchange and other properly economic factors only. Now, there are strong negative, destructive impulses for peripheralisation that came not from abroad but from within. In other words, they are mostly conditioned by the internal factors, and a pertinence of one or another “newcomer” to the world periphery from the point of view of the external trade indicators is an effect of the called internal factors.

2) The large space of new periphery in the world has risen over the last twenty years. This new periphery embraces a huge part of the former USSR, in particular, the two former Soviet republics with the biggest economies, Russia and Ukraine, not speaking about the other post-Soviet countries. Losing the originally existed chances for modernisation, these countries are obliged to be involving into the world-system in quality of periphery, although Russia and Ukraine still have some fundamentals for
development corresponding to the contemporary level of economy, technology, education and science. However, there are not social actors capable to initiate modernisation whereas various social forces interested in status quo are numerous and influential. Therefore, the recently observable trends in Russia and Ukraine are the long-term tendencies.

3) The process of peripheralisation has not only economic but also social-cultural and institutional dimensions. It means that apparently good economic indicators can be combining with the mass poverty of people, obsolete and even archaic values of mass consciousness, the revival of patrimonial relationships and personalistic (or even sultanistic) regimes of power. Evidently, all these and other non-economic elements and factors put insurmountable obstacles to economic development or, at best, truncate it. The extreme case of such phenomenon is North Korea, the country that is probably moving to the complete collapse and perdition.

As the speakers and comment-makers who attended the workshop concluded, it would be useful to continue scrutinising the issues that were in focus of discussion in Kyiv.

Due to efforts of the Faculty of sociology staff, all presentations and discussions around them are recorded and available online:


The oral records of the presentations, questions replies and discussion (without video) are available online:


Part 4: Regmi – Weston – discussion about the deadline of submitting the updated papers for further work aimed at paper publication of the workshop proceedings: http://www.soc.univ.kiev.ua/sites/default/files/newsfiles/the_rise_of_new_periphery_in_the_world_-_part_4.mp3

Convener of the working group “Transformations in the World System – Comparative Studies of Development”

Victor Krasilshchikov.