Engaging the Nigerian Niger Delta Ex-Agitators: The Impacts of the Presidential Amnesty Program to Economic Development

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**Abstract**

On June 25, 2013, in Abuja Nigeria, the Federal Government of Nigeria Niger Delta Amnesty Programme under the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta (OSAPND) headed by Hon. Kingsley Kuku marked the 3rd anniversary of the implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP). The OSAPND is mandated with the initiation, planning and implementation of the first ever nation-managed Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme for the 30,000 ex-agitators (822 females) who handed in weapons and signed up for the PAP. These ex-agitators – called ‘delegates’ at the OSAPND, receive a monthly stipend of N65, 000 ($400 USD) and are undergoing different vocational and academic training in Nigeria and across the globe. This program is the first of its kind in Africa.

Livelihood strengthening through trainings as well as empowering these delegates have thus emerged as legitimate social policy goals for the ex-agitators by the OSAPND. It is an essential and complimentary part of a wider OSAPND strategy to secure a lasting economic empowerment, including concerted measures to promote job creation, and engagement of the delegates is deemed crucial in the entire program. A strategy for empowering the PAP ex-agitators brought into being the implementation of either academic training, or vocational/entrepreneurial training skills, and also engaging in either jobs or business setups.

How this DDR program has impacted on the economy and peace of the Nigeria Niger Delta region is of great importance in this work. After the disarmament & demobilization programs, the OSAPND has engaged the project with trainings (academic or vocational), and engagement/empowerment programmes for the delegates as the framework for the reintegration packages. The focus is for transformation, which supports studies, in that academic training improves individual performance and this had a positive influence on economic development. However, does the acquired training possess impact for sustainable economic development? Four questions are important in assessing the concept of Nigerian Amnesty DDR packages. First, how does it differ from the work of donor/UN piloted DDR program? Second, what does it add to our understanding of DDR? Third, does it increase global capacity for home-made-DDR program? Finally, could the increase in economic development in the Niger Delta be a source of transformative mechanisms to respond to the legacies of long-term structural and historical social exclusion that triggered the conflict?

**Keywords**

DDR, Ex-agitators, Economic development, Niger Delta, OSAPND
INTRODUCTION

Local actors' involvement in post-war reconstruction/peacebuilding is receiving global attention as an essential element in DDR programs and the works of scholars such as Robert MacGinty and Oliver Richmond have greatly supported this hypothesis. The Nigeria home-grown DDR is one of such kind in Africa where the Federal Government Amnesty Program through the OSAPND is being championed for success and history. Members of the amnesty beneficiaries are from the nine (9) states of the Niger Delta region – Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers States. It is important to note that of all the Sub-Saharan African countries Nigeria has emerged as the most infamous for difficulties related to oil production and oil companies, and pollution resulting from oil spills is more difficult to manage in the Niger Delta than in other environments due to the low-lying nature of the region, which reinforces the rapid spread of oil spills (Baumuller et al, 2011: 18-19). It is important to note that despite the vast deposit of oil and gas in the Niger Delta region, the region is also geographically located in the mangrove swamp ecological zone of Nigeria with natural resource base like creeks, lakes, rivers, forest resources, aquatic life, raffia palm, and oil palm, etc (Ariyoh et al 2013:14).

According to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) websites, oil and gas account for about 70% of Nigeria’s fiscal revenue with about 2.4millions barrels per day (bpd). The oil conflict that rocked the Niger Delta region in the 1990s and 2000s ultimately affected the economy. This motivated the amnesty program that was launched by late President Umaru Yar-Adua in June 2009. In 2005, Nigeria’s crude production was at 2.2m bpd, but this drastically reduced at the peak of the oil conflict in 2009. Statistical records of the Monthly Petroleum Information (MPI), depicts that from January 2004 to June 2013, Nigeria recorded its lowest production of barrels of crude oil and condensates in April 2009, with a total monthly production at 55.82m barrels and 1.86m bpd. With the amnesty program in place, however, hostilities have gone down in the region, and productions levelled back to 2.4m bpd. In 2013, the Nigerian government budgeted crude oil production was 2.53m bpd (Salami 2013:5).

The DDR trends generally have been managed by donors like UN or other organizations. The Nigeria DDR has been home-grown for a 5year-term, with 2015 as its exit date. Out of 30,000 delegates, over 14,000 have so far been deployed to various Universities and vocational training centres within the country and abroad. 5,000 are undergoing different skills acquisition programs, such as marine technology, automobile technology, boat building, oil & gas technicians, agriculture,

1 See Map appended.
2 The project is likely to be renewed by the Federal Government of Nigeria for another 5year term for the completion of all the on-going reintegration projects, evaluations & reports.
fashion designing, catering, etc. About 3,330 are undergoing various academic studies in different fields. It is important to note that a total of 11,700 have so far graduated from different training programmes out of which 238 have gained employment. Also 3,610 are being empowered through business set-ups\(^3\) for the 2013 target (data culled from the Amnesty News: 2013a&b). In Africa, most DDR programs are piloted by the UN or AU, such as in Burundi, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), etc.

**BACKGROUND OF THE NIGERIA DDR PROGRAM**

How is the Nigeria DDR program home-grown\(^4\)? The development of the Amnesty program emancipated from the pronouncement of the amnesty program by the then President of Nigeria which was followed up by the initiation of a planning and design committee. This committee comprised of a pool of consultants from different backgrounds with skills in development and security projects, key stakeholders, and government officials. The Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta (SAPND) is the Chairman of the Amnesty Committee. Through the committee, a working plan was developed and the project is designated as an intervention project where amendments to its components are regularly reviewed and updated as its standard operating procedures (SOP). It should be noted here that this committee stands as the consensus building platform of the DDR project. Ejovi and Ebie (2013:132) recorded that the presidential panel on amnesty and disarmament of agitators in the Niger Delta was held on May 5\(^{th}\), 2009; and the panel set out the terms, procedures and processes for the amnesty implementation. The amnesty granted by former President Yar’Adua was in pursuant of section 175 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.

One of the interesting elements that make up this committee is what the OSAPND call ‘the leaders’. The so-called leaders are the key stakeholders, also included are the warlords and militia commanders. Inherently, there is a typical form of social capital on which the members of the Niger Delta youths base their positions and this is referred to as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). IYC plays a dominant role in the amnesty program hence majority of the delegates or leaders are also strong members or previous office-holders of the IYC. IYC provides a play ground for future Ijaw leaders as well as offering access to wider circle of influential people and their impact on the amnesty consensus building committee must be acknowledged. It is important to note that the home-grown elements that make up this committee is what the OSAPND call ‘the leaders’. The so-called leaders are the key stakeholders, also included are the warlords and militia commanders. Inherently, there is a typical form of social capital on which the members of the Niger Delta youths base their positions and this is referred to as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). IYC plays a dominant role in the amnesty program hence majority of the delegates or leaders are also strong members or previous office-holders of the IYC. IYC provides a play ground for future Ijaw leaders as well as offering access to wider circle of influential people and their impact on the amnesty consensus building committee must be acknowledged. It is important to note that the home-grown

\(^3\)Business set-up is a means by which delegates are empowered by the provision of shop/business location and all the necessary business start-up equipments for such business. It also involves registration of such business with the government regulatory authority – Corporate Affairs Commission, securing of Tax certificate/pin, and opening of business bank account. All related expenses for this business set-up are paid by the OSAPND and handed over to delegate without any re-payment plan.

\(^4\)That is, initiating, planning and implementing the DDR program in the Nigeria way.
DDR program development originated from the mutual cognition and recognition of inputs from different key stakeholders and ministries in the PAP committee to form the SOP.

The emphasis is on Nigerians designing the DDR project for fellow Nigerians. The DDR project is currently managed by Nigerians with 80% of the staff coming from the Niger Delta States – a strategy of owner-based model in the implementation style. The SOP forms the baseline for the amnesty implementations. It will interest you to note that the Nigeria DDR home-grown is completely funded by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and comes under the Presidency projects and budgets. However, the OSAPND through the SAPND will directly defend the amnesty budget before the National Assembly so as to receive approval as part of the year budget; its disbursement is made directly from the Central Bank of Nigeria to OSAPND. At a recent press briefing by the SAPND, Hon Kingsley Kuku stated that a total of N234,133,917,560 (USD$14,233,064,89.72) budgetary allocation has been spent since its actual implementation programme began in March 2010 (Kuku 2014a&b). This budget spending involves overhead cost for staff, delegate’s stipends, and DDR project cost. A typical example of 2014 budget summary is illustrated in the table one (1) below.

### Table1. Nigeria DDR Budget Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Naira</th>
<th>USD$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stipends &amp; Allowances of 30,000 Ex-agitators</td>
<td>23,625,000,000</td>
<td>$144,098,813.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Operational Cost</td>
<td>3,699,933,814</td>
<td>$22,567,452.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reintegration of Transformed Ex-agitators</td>
<td>35,409,859,972</td>
<td>$215,979,631.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Reinsertion/Transition Safety Allowances for 3,642 Ex-agitators (3rd phase)</td>
<td>546,300,000</td>
<td>$3,332,113.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>63,281,093,786</strong></td>
<td><strong>$385,978,011.25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Budget Office for 2014 and currency conversion by the author

From the outset, it is important to acknowledge that the Nigeria Government decided to manage the DDR programmes by themselves. The possible reason might be that experiences from the Africa countries DDR programme is a case study of itself for review and analysis, and it has not been so good. In addition, there were already emerging researchers with strong argument for local actors’ involvement in peacebuilding. Another possible reason might be that the FGN has already

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5 Currency conversion rate based on USD$1 = N163.95 (Naira) accessed on 03/03/2014
established sustainable structural transformation agencies or Act at different periods and these include

a) Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in the 1960s,
b) Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) in the 1980s,
c) The Revenue Act by the National Assembly in 1991. This law made provisions for more funds to the region for more development with 1.5% derivation fund (Eteng et al 2013:423),
d) Presidential implementation Committee (PIC) in 1987,
e) Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1992,
f) Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000

The programme structures of these agencies provided a backlog of experiences and lessons learnt which will obviously play a dominant role in the amnesty decision making and framing of the DDR project in 2009. Relevant to this discussion is that out of these four (4) development agencies in the list above, only NDDC is functional today with OSAPND but with different mandates and responsibilities in the Niger Delta region. Given the implication of the likely DDR project cost and the issues of the conflict – all, the FGN is confident of funding the DDR programme without assistance.

It is particularly interesting to note the introduction of new trend by the Nigeria DDR project – that is, the incorporation of 1,000 people from the Impacted-Conflict-Communities (ICC) into the DDR training programmes. The local actors/implementers extended the training opportunities to people whose communities were immensely affected by the decades of oil conflict in the region. These categories of people form the second cohort of amnesty project beneficiaries. Of importance to note is that these 1,000 people never carried arms during the conflicts but were directly affected by the destructions of lives and properties.

Challenges with Nigeria DDR Programme and possible overcoming strategies

OSAPND (2014) narrated the most significance examples of the challenges with the Nigeria DDR, and its possible overcoming strategies which include the following:

I. Payment of USD$400 monthly stipends to ex-agitators by the Federal Government. The question that remains un-answered is what happens with this payment after the expiration of the DDR project? Will these ex-agitators accept the fact that this stipend was not meant to be a life-time-salary? Will the government be able to overcome the after-effects of the drama that might come out of it? Obviously, many ex-agitators now live on this stipend like a life-line wages and the issue of adjusting to its shortfall in their basic needs after DDR might pose problems. Nevertheless, there has been substantial change in the empowerment
packages of the ex-agitators by the OSAPND. The purpose is to create enhanced economic opportunities for the delegates that will sustain their needs at the expiration of the project.

II. Delegate’s exiting the Programme based on social ills. There have been a small proportion of the ex-agitators who have been exited from the DDR programme due to gross misconducts. For instance, on October 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2013, the PAP through the OSAPND announced the withdrawal of six (6) out of 24 delegates who were studying at the Peoples University Russia. This exit action made news headlines. The OSAPND said ‘for going on rampage and violently attacking the Nigerian Mission, these students breached the Code of Conduct for delegates on scholarship that they all signed before their departure from Nigeria. It is also a gross misconduct, which the Nigerian government cannot tolerate. SAPND expressed shock that the delegates invaded the embassy, destroying properties and attacking the Mission officials over unpaid allowances. SAPND described the action as totally unacceptable’. This kind of social ills does not favour the DDR project because all the ex-agitators are legally expected to be reintegrated and failure to incorporate all will pose a limitation to the project overall output. Despite the exits, the OSAPND has maintained strict adherence to the code of conduct in the programme.

III. Engagement/employment opportunities. There are issues with stereotyping the ex-agitators by the society during engagements. Even after their training, prospective employers still look at these ex-agitators as militants, ex-convicts, etc. This invariably hinders their possible chances and opportunities in the crowded Nigeria labour market. In this regard, the OSAPND employs town hall meetings and briefings to inform the public of the transformation that has taken place among the ex-agitators. Labelling is always preached against. For instance, in the past, they were usually labelled as ex-militants but currently they are named as ex-agitators. In addition, OSAPND organises job fairs and also participate in public and private job fairs in the country where our trained delegates are showcased. One of such job fairs is scheduled to hold on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of May 2014 at Lagos state.

IV. Continuous agitation for new list inclusion in the DDR programme. On this regards, there has been some court cases against the Federal Government of Nigeria/OSAPND to include new delegates into the DDR programme. These groups of people didn't sign up during the amnesty registration period. Their argument was that, initially they did not trust the sincerity of the Government at the time of amnesty registration. OSAPND has refused to accept their inclusion appeal arguing that the period had lapsed, that is, the 60days sign up period of August 6\textsuperscript{th} to October 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2009. In view of the on-going, the FGN remained
adamant in her decision not to accept further inclusion. This FGN insist is a guide against further agitations.

V. Luxury expectation by the ex-agitators from the OSAPND. Most ex-agitators see the DDR programme as their own personal share of the national cake. They came into the programme with very high expectations (from the FGN). Pre-amnesty period witnessed large sum of money from the oil companies to the environmental activists. With this in mind, these ex-agitators who may have received thousands of dollars from the multinational companies believe that the FGN should as well lavish them with such luxury provisions. Unfortunately, government spending is accounted for in approved expenses. In contrast to their expectations, the OSAPND has continued to utilize their benchmark in project budget and executions.

VI. Project end-time. There has been a wider argument on when the amnesty program should end? The SAPND gave the project timeline as 2015 based on the current programme exit outline. However, there are numerous ex-agitators and scholars from the impacted community project who will still be undergoing their programmes beyond 2015: therefore what will be their fate? Moreso, there will be need to develop a final report on the Nigeria DDR project and overview of its programme achievements. This can only be possible when the exit time is confirmed. From the proceeding analysis of the DDR programmes, it is evident that there will be need for project extension. The request likely be made to the FGN in 2015.

VII. Politicking of the amnesty project by opposition members. Indeed, differences were often evident in how opposition politicians tended to talk about the amnesty project within the Nigeria society. Queries are always raised about the project’s spending. Recently as analysed in chat 1 of this article, the SAPND gave a press briefing of the spending of the amnesty project since its inception. The statistics differed from what was stated by the opposition politicians. Therefore, regular press briefing has been adopted to inform the public. In addition, the FGN budget is now published online for public access.

VIII. Societal assumption if violence should be the new trend of agitation for economic needs in Nigeria? Given the implications of amnesty offer in the society and the fact that unemployment among the youths is high, and the noticeable media showcase of the amnesty training programmes; certain groups are reviewing the option of violence as a way of attracting sympathy and attention from the FGN. Recently, the terrorist group - Boko Haram which is operating in the Northern Nigeria has raised argument if amnesty should be given to its members as a way of ending their deadly bombings in the region or not. There
was a societal condemnation to this debate. These dynamics can help to explain the challenges that the country could face in future.

IX. Dependants of ex-agitators not included in the main DDR programme. In many DDR projects, dependants of the ex-agitators or ex-combatants are included in the DDR programme. But the case of the Nigeria home-grown DDR is different. They are not included. This exists as a pitfall because the immediate family members could potentially bridge the gap in future conflict motivational drives by the ex-agitators. However, what the OSAPND did introduce is a strategy to overcome this gap. OSAPND developed a new trend that allotted training opportunities for 1,000 delegates from the conflict-impacted communities. This category of training group never carried arms. They were selected from Niger Delta communities – the areas that were mostly affected by the oil conflicts.

**Partner Organization in the Nigeria DDR Project**

In relation to the entrepreneurial skills building of the post-training and engagement package of the DDR project, twelve (12) multinational companies in oil and gas industry came up to set up the ‘Oil and Gas Industry Foundation’ (OGIF). OGIF agreed with the OSAPND to train a small proportion of the delegates in specific skills and would thereafter empower them. It is a project similar to OSAPND empowerment/business setup programmes for the ex-agitators. The OGIF is funded by the following oil companies – NAOC, ADDAX, OANDO, NIGER DELTA PETROLEUM RESOURCES, CHEVRON, EXXON MOBIL, SHELL, TOTAL, NLNG, SLB, PAN OCEAN, and NPDC. The project is managed by the donors. There exist some programme evaluation meetings between the OSAPND and OGIF staff on a regular basis to review and monitor progress of activities. OGIF establishment was an arrangement by these companies and not by the compulsion of the FGN. Thus, OGIF is regarded as a vendor in the empowerment project. The difference is that, they do not receive funding from the OSAPND budgets. However, the OSAPND provides laptops for all ex-agitators as a working tool including the OGIF trainees.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND HYPOTHESES**

Before the PAP/DDR program, the Niger Delta communities were torn apart by armed conflicts resulting from the management of their natural resources – oil and gas. Suffice it to say that the conflict in the Niger Delta mobilized along pathways of different group membership of ex-agitators through their socio-ethnic networks and this invariably, is a component of social capital. Putnam (as cited in Sisaiainen Martti 2000, p.2) describes the concept of social capital in three components as – ‘moral obligations and norms, social values (especially trust) and social networks (especially
voluntary associations). Martti further explained (p.4) that social capital is a sociological essence of communal vitality and its forms are general moral resources of the community through which a solution to the problem of common action and opportunism presuppose the development of voluntary collective action. Similarly, reflecting the findings on social capital, Francis (2002:79-88) largely suggests that all social structures which contribute to the solution of public or collective action problems represent social capital. He argued further that social capital can be used in the sustainable livelihood approach to rural development policy, as well as in work on conflict and post-conflict situations. The violent activities of the delegates in the Niger Delta were a public problem in Nigeria. Its Amnesty program became the social capital to that effect.

However, what is DDR? DDR, according to the United Nations (UN websites 2014), is an integral part of post-conflict peace consolidation, which entails:

1. Disarmament - the collection, documentation, control & disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives & light and heavy weapons from combatants & often from civilian population;
2. Demobilisation - the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups; and
3. Reintegration - the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.

In addition, Ball and Goor (2006:1-2) refers DDR as to the process of demilitarizing official and unofficial armed groups by controlling and reducing the possession and use of arms, by disbanding non-state armed groups and rightsizing state security services and by assisting former ex-combatants to reintegrate into civilian life. Ball and Goor added that DDR can be seen in five-stage process such as weapon surrender, assembly, discharge, short to medium term reinsertion and long term reintegration. Despite the impact of social capital in the conflict mobilization period and the on-going DDR project, this section will focus on three concepts such as the local actors’ participation in peacebuilding, the differences and similarities with donor funded DDR and Nigeria DDR, and the economic developmental impacts of the amnesty program in the Niger Delta region.

Nigeria home-grown DDR project and the work of donor or AU/UN piloted DDR program

According to the United Nations (2005), about 25 Africa countries were engaged in armed conflict or were experiencing political crisis. Most of these countries have experienced UN/AU led DDR programs and this included countries like Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Republic of Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, etc. To the UN, each of the DDR process is unique especially in the reinsertion, reintegration, resettlement, and repatriation
(Rs) programs (2005:11). Furthermore, about seven African countries in the Great Lake Regions benefited from the MDRP with a target of 400,000 combatants, and the project was financed by the World Bank and thirteen (13) other donors which included 12 European Countries and the EU (MDRP:2008). Nevertheless, the MDRP project closed in June 2009 with about 300,000 ex-combatants demobilised and 232,000 ex-combatants reintegrated (MDGRP websites). Nigeria DDR project has not commenced at the period of MDRP – 2002 to 2009, therefore, the author cannot suggest if Nigeria would have participated in the project or not. However, this section will examine closely the differences and similarities of Nigeria DDR program with the Angola hence both countries share similarities in oil conflicts.

In the Angola DDR program for instance, its reintegration implementation which started in 2003 was through the Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration for Ex-Combatants (IRSEM) and its program execution were carried out by NGOs both national and international; whereas the Nigeria DDR is being implemented by OSAPND under the Presidency. It will be of interest to note that the Nigeria DDR project is characterised with learning by doing with regular amendments to the SOP as a result of lessons learnt. But the UN (2005) hinted that lessons learnt in most of their DDR projects are not always incorporated into planning and design of subsequent DDR programmes. This exists as a pitfall to sustainability of the donor funded project. In similar terms, in May 2001 in Nigeria – the DFID, the World Bank, USAID and UNDP was supported by the then President Obasanjo to produce a national strategic conflict assessment (SCA). In this project, OECD (2007:57) reported that this multi-donor approach experienced challenge for a more effective co-ordination in harmonising disbursement; accounting and reporting systems hence donors used their separating funding regulations and procedures.

Put simply in the table 2 below are the major similarities and differences between the Nigeria home-grown DDR and the UN/AU/MDRP funded Angola DDR for our clearer analysis.
Let us begin with the impacts of local actors’ involvement in the post-conflict consolidation. It should be emphasized that local actors involvement has what Collier (2007:216) described as hopeful and cautionary implications because of them being viewed as rational economic agents. In Collier’s analysis, the former sees them with the likeability to respond to incentives while the later suggest that it may be of little avail to buy rebel groups off. However, both implications are not considered in this article, rather the positive impacts will be of focus. MacGinty (2010:402) believes that local

| Differences/Similarities between Nigerian DDR and Angola Government/Donor Piloted DDR |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| DDR Features                                  | Angola          | Nigeria         |
| Period under review                           | 01/09/2003 +    | 01/03/2010+     |
| Nature of actors                              | UNITA Soldiers/ex-combatants | Environmental activists/ex-agitators |
| Population                                    | 91,127 ex-combatants registered | 30,000 ex-agitators registered |
| Setting                                       | 35 Quartering areas set up for the project | Only in 1 Quartering area in Obubura but disarmament done in different locations |
| Type of offer                                 | General amnesty to all UNITA soldiers in 2002 after death of leader | Amnesty to all who signed up |
| Registration                                  | Reception for both UNITA soldiers & dependants | Amnesty to only ex-agitators |
| Dependants                                    | 288,756 family members registered | None |
| Admitance to National Force                   | 5,000 integrated into National Army | None |
| Reintegration                                  | Training Types  | Angola          |
| Implementation Agency                         | Ministry of Ex-combatants & Motherland Veterans and IRSEM managing the DDR project | OSAPND |
| Duration & speed                              | between 2003 - 2005; over 20,000 ex-combatants benefiting from Reintegration | 11,700 have received reintegration packages between 2010 & 2013 |
| Funding                                       | Donor and National Government funding: received USD$22,950,865 from MDRP & UNDP as of July 2008 | Only Nigeria Government funding: USD$14,233,064, 89.72 spent till date |
| Ministry                                      | Ministry of Ex-combatants & Motherland Veterans | Ministry of Niger Delta (but not managing the DDR project) |
| Stipends                                      | None | USD$400 monthly |
| New Trend                                     | None | Introduction of training opportunities for 1,000 people from the conflict impacted communities |

Source: Author’s compilation from UN (2005), MDRP (2008), Amnesty News Publications (2013a&b), Kuku (2014a&b), OSAPND (2014), and Lamb (2013)
actors are capable of influencing the extent to which peace might be hybridized since they can resist, ignore, subvert or adapt liberal peace intervention. Theorizing on hybrid third generation approach to peacebuilding (Richmond 2008:106) put forward the argument to focus on self-sustainability rather than merely on external forms of guarantee. Also, Richmond stipulates that peacebuilding is technically believable when constructed by external actors in cooperation with local actors and thus can eventually be freestanding. At present, in common with Richmond’s view, the Nigeria government is committed to funding the DDR programme. This is done with no external actor’s construction.

Similarly, the work of Abazie-Humphrey (2008:14) on building sustainable peace in the Niger Delta stressed that the involvement of both lower stakeholders (local actors) and upper stakeholders (government/oil company officials) would undoubtedly promote peacebuilding. MacGinty equally argued that the ability of local actors to resist or subvert the liberal peace include the extent which they retain power during the liberal peace transition. To Freedman (2007:248), interveners pushed in the direction of containing conflict or brokering a settlement should be dynamic in the interaction with the interest of the local people and that intervention should be part of a process with defined stages. Generally, an impactful interest is undoubtedly, the interest presented by the owner. In the author’s view, a yam ban is best maintained by the farmer-owner, and harvesting the yam is not enough, but your style of preservation determines the volume of your income. Therefore, it is not enough to have representatives in peacebuilding projects such as DDR, but getting the local actors involved in the process will speak greater volume of the peace harvested at the end.

Moreso, Thomas-Lermer et al (1999:22) suggest that a credible consensus building group must involve participants that represent full range of interests and views relating to the issue or dispute, and that the stakeholder group must identify their own spoke-people to take part. By logical implication, the amnesty leaders, delegates, OSAPND staff, and IYC are the local actors in the amnesty project, and OSAPND involvement of these actors in the planning and implementation stages of the PAP is a current trend in hypothesis. Just like MacGinty buttressed that locally inspired alternative forms of peace do not usually copy approved models from the global north and is often labelled as illiberal or illegitimate (2010:403), the case of Nigeria home-grown DDR will invariably open up a new discussion on this. In Hall and Midgley (2004:73), they argue that community development is based on local people and that they can implement programmes that significantly reduce the extent of poverty and social deprivation. There was a marked convergence of local actors in the Nigeria home-grown DDR. Permit this article to suggest that if local people can implement development programmes to reduce poverty and social deprivation which have been widely argued
to contribute to conflict mobilizations in the world, that same local people are vital in DDR projects implementation.

A striking example from local actor’s involvement in peacebuilding with positive impact is featured in the works of Aall (2007:484) using the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum in Plateau State of Nigeria. In this case, the founding fathers of the dialogue forum were militants in the interreligious conflicts and their interest in the dialogue grew from their religious beliefs through which they continued to pursue the goal of understanding each other’s perspectives and of identifying the common elements of Christianity and Islam. These dialogue leaders utilized their communities-relations to encourage Muslim-Christian dialogue in a highly charged inter-communal conflict to bring about a peaceful resolution. It will be worthwhile to note that the effects of this settlement yielded further peace accords in other northern states thereby increasing the local capacity for conflict resolution. This Muslim-Christian dialogue success is indeed one of the most evident proofs that peace cannot be foisted on others by external actors. With this in mind, this article therefore seeks to assess Richmond (2008:114) view on whether Liberal peace allow for local participation or instead leads to the cooption of local actors. Richmond supports indigenous peace practices and processes, working from the bottom up, and founded upon local cultures and traditional practices. Moreso, example can clearly be found in Sierra Leone where a rebel leader was appointed into the government as minister of mining in an attempt to give rebels a greater interest in peace (Collier 2007:215). Furthermore, the involvement of leaders in the amnesty programme design and implementation packages of the Nigeria DDR programmes for ex-agitator supports Richmond (2008) hypothesis that local actors involvement in peacebuilding revolved around a tendency to romanticise the indigenous contribution hence their consent, participation and cooperation are vital to peace.

Citing on lessons learnt, Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program -MDRP (2010:43) reported that the experience of the MDRP affirms that a regional multi-partner coordinated response to DDR was the most appropriate hence the counterfactual and fragmented response would likely led to duplication, inefficiencies, and gaps in programming. This view gained support from Lamb (2013:3) and UN (2005:13). The former found that a large number of individuals that underwent demobilization in Angola were actually surrogates for authentic UNITA combatants; and the later stipulates that recycling of ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized in previous DDRs was a challenge to Angola DDR. In these circumstances, while these social indicators reveal the extent of the problem with Angola DDR, the author argues that the commitment of the local actor’s involvement in the DDR will minimize the issue of duplications and surrogates hence the interveners will be able to identify such issues quickly than external actors. There is a common slang in Nigeria
that ‘we know ourselves’; this phrase will continue to play a dominant role in local peacebuilding participations. Generally in Africa, people seem very careful with their own inputs than with aided inputs that is, local funding are well managed and accounted for than foreign aids.

Narrowing the DDR implementation to local actors in Africa will be the most ideal. For instance, the OECD (2007:58) citing on lessons learnt from implementing the Nigeria SCA, international actors (donors) need to leave room for local ownership hence the experience gathered demonstrated the need to leave room for ownership by in-country partners. It is therefore necessary to consider the options of liberal peace thinking which emphasizes peacebuilding from bottom-up rather than from top-down. Most relevant to this analysis is the work of Richmond that sees orthodox international relations to combine outside-in construction of peace whereby outside actors import specialised knowledge, procedures and structures, with an inside-out approach whereby disputants’ attempts to re-negotiate this process according to their own interests, culture and frameworks (2008:106). The MDRP project is one of such example with varied imported specialised skills and procedures. As we have seen with the example from the work of MDRP in their final report (2010: 1), over 40 nationals and international partners were involved for a period of seven (7) years and succeeded in demobilising 300,000 and reintegrating 232,000 ex-combatants giving it an average of 7,500 and 5,800 ex-combatants per nation respectively. When you compare the success with that of only one nation -Nigeria demobilising 30,000 and reintegrating 14,029 ex-agitators in 3 year, the later success far outweighs the former. Therefore, the author strongly suggests that local actors’ involvement is indeed a welcome trend in DDR projects.

Moreso, the operational budget of the Nigeria DDR project in 2014 proposal is USD$22,567,452.77 and with 80% of the staff coming from the Niger Delta region, this will inherently contribute to the economic development of the region through employment generation. It is important to acknowledge that the PAP project also has created employment opportunities for over 100 staff working as consultants/interveners in the DDR project. It could be argued also that, the high running cost as well as expatriate fees associated with external actors in DDR projects could have huge implication on the project cost. By drawing reference to this discussion, previous studies on MDRP (2010:10) reported that USD$ 500million was the project budget cost. Out of this total, USD$446.5 was budgeted for national programs, and USD$37.5 was for special projects. Moreso, the secretariat’s management cost totalled USD$24.9million or approximately 9.9% of the MDTF (MDRP201:33). Such findings on huge management cost are consistent with those from Winter (2010:36-7) that in aid programmes, a relatively small portion of OEDC gross national product (GNP), usually less than half a percent, and much less than private sector flows to a handful of middle-income countries hence the donor countries are also building supranational bodies (WTO,
EU, NAFTA, NATO, etc) to maintain prosperity, setting the pace of globalization and writing rules of intervention of the Security Council. Winter added that donor countries are committed to the relief of the victims of war without a more serious commitment to discourage wars and control the arms trade and build peace. Suffice it to argue that 9.9% of the MDRP USD$500million would have contributed to pilot-countries feasible human and economic capital if local actors/implementers were the beneficiaries of the management cost indicated in the project, an approach that is the opposite in the Nigeria home-grown DDR project.

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AMNESTY PROGRAM IN NIGERIA

To Midgley and Hall (2004:x), empowerment refers to ‘the acquisition of power to control or influence the course of events, often assumed to be a sine qua non of authentic development, especially at grassroots level’. The value that the Nigeria amnesty business setups attach to increased industrialization in the region is assumed by the OSAPND to reduce poverty, dependence on subsistence agriculture, and social ills. Furthermore, Winter (2001:37) describes empowerment as a component of education which is likely by its nature to subvert established interest. Winter added that project implementers could try empowering communities by funding local assemblies, train local leaders and hold warlords to account, invest in schools, start adult education classes and so on. Generally, DDR is a development intervention that is meant to transform the Niger Delta oil conflicts, build sustainable peace, and foster resilience.

One striking benefit of the amnesty program is stability in the oil and gas revenue as against the pre-amnesty period. Stability brought back the oil production at 2.4million bpd which is the main source of revenue in the country. Decreasing militancy which is demonstrated in Ariyol et al (2013:15) remains vital economic element which assumes far greater importance in the post-amnesty period in Nigeria. Ariyol et al found the Niger Delta to appear peaceful and this is a pre-condition for sustaining a long term and sustainable growth in the artisanal fishing business. In addition, this stability has also brought about speedy completion of infrastructures by both the Federal and State Governments in the region. This process brings about industrialization and creation of jobs which overall brings about wealth generation and employment thereby impacting on the economy of the region. Similarly, (Eteng et al 2013:424) found that the issue of post-amnesty in Nigeria have led to some developmental activities around the Niger Delta states hence the peaceful state improved oil exploration which brings in revenue to the government.

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6Such as kidnapping, oil theft, violence/conflicts, etc.
Thus, from Ariyoh et al (2013) view, the amnesty policy intervention has yielded progressive impacts on artisanal fishing agribusiness based on field works conducted in ten (10) different rural riverine communities in the Niger Delta region during which data collection was distinguished between pre and post amnesty periods. For Ariyoh et al (2013:14) fish out-put among fisher-folks have increased significantly with average income from USD$17.46 (pre amnesty) to USD$63.227 per week\(^7\). This means that fish farmers could earn an average of USD$242.51 per month instead of USD$69.84 which leaves a generous surplus of USD$172.67. Linking this fish-output finding to the economic developmental impact of the PAP project; one would argue that amnesty program contributes to increase in productivity. Given the more encompassing analysis that fishing is an important livelihood activity in most villages in the Niger Delta region because of its geographical nature that favours small scale fisher-folks; its impact to local community internal revenue cannot therefore be overemphasized. Setting up five-point training agenda, Kuku placed agriculture as among his priority areas (Amnesty News 2013a:1). To emphasis this, in the Amnesty News (2013b:9), skills acquisition in field of agriculture is part of the training programs for the 4,608 delegates both in onshore and offshore. This demonstrates the position agriculture occupies in the country.

Nagpaul (1991:189) suggest that ‘it has become a universally accepted fact that vast inequalities in incomes, opportunities and levels of living continue to exist between the rural and urban sectors in almost every society in the Third World’. Nigeria happens to be among the Third World countries, and the vast beneficiaries of the Nigeria Amnesty project dwell in the rural areas whose ultimate impact will contribute immensely to rural reconstruction of Niger Delta region. The Amnesty program sees education and training, and engagement/empowerment as upper toolkits for the reintegration of ex-agitators. This approach agrees with Nagpaul who stipulates that human development and mobilization through education and employment is one of the strategic programs that will promote reduction and resolution of conflicts (1991:193).

A strong livelihood activity is most likely to improve the community development. If the communities in the region through the amnesty program are witnessing a relatively peaceful environment for their daily economic activities, ultimately, the business output will increase which will obviously strengthen the livelihood activities. There has been relatively systematic research on community development by Midgley and Hall (2004:73-6), and they present local community as a vital resource for development effort. They also posit rural community development programmes as making a major contribution to agricultural production, and that small scale community development projects also contributes to poverty eradication because they generate human capital through development of skills, literacy and job experience. According to Amnesty News (2013b:9)

\(^7\) Currency conversion by the author on USD$1 = N164.94 (Naira): accessed on 12/03/2014
4,608 delegates are on skills acquisition, 2500 delegates on formal education, 2000 delegates on entrepreneurial skills/business empowerment, and 222 delegates on direct employment totalling 9330 delegates. This figure represents 31% of the 30,000 delegates that have received a reintegration package which habitually reinforces human and socio-economic capitals of the beneficiaries’ communities. In Ejovi and Ebie (2013: 136) research, they argue that the Amnesty programmes skill acquisition packages promises a better future for both local populations and the oil companies. Looking at 2014 budget for instance, a total of USD$ 385,978,011.25 has been budgeted for the 2014 amnesty programmes, a sum most likely to impact on the development of skills and wealth creation in the region.

Kuku (2014a&b) in a press briefing stated that OSAPND is currently ‘setting-up 2,000 of the graduates of skills acquisition programme in small scale businesses’. It should be noted here that small scale businesses are elements of private sector. According to Hall and Midgley (2004:17), private sector comprises areas of activity in formal economy of firms and enterprises, and the informal sector in the south have social policy implications to the extent that they creates employment, generates wages, salaries and other benefits. Hall and Midgley added that people in the private sector engage in activities that have other profound economic, social, and environmental impacts. Therefore, the outputs of the PAP project help to engage people on activities that have profound economic, social and environmental impacts in the Niger Delta region. In addition, Ejovi and Ebie (2013) added that the trained ex-agitators in oil related skills should be engaged in the oil industry through the reservation of employment quota as this will make the locals operating in the region to feel themselves as stakeholders. Obviously, this is favourable to conflict prevention. There is much to believe that constituting the ex-agitators into the oil company workforce will create company-ownership mentality among them thereby reducing the issues of conflict escalation that are associated with oil companies-local-communities precarious relationship.

There has, thus, been a shift in the thinking of Nigerians towards what some see as a new economic development in the Niger Delta region aiming at achieving amnesty program objectives that will strengthen social and cultural capacities to economic empowerment. The varied training programmes in the reintegration packages are linked to develop trust, safety, and social cohesion within and between communities which will improve business relations in the region. Furthermore, the business setups by the OSAPND are structured in such a way that once an ex-agitator is empowered; there is a tendency that it will create jobs for at least five (5) apprentices or family members.
Below are chart 1 and 2 which clearly illustrate the spending pattern by the amnesty office and the nine (9) Niger Delta States on education.

**Chart 1: Federal Government of Nigeria budgetary allocation from 2010 - 2014**

**Nigeria Presidential Amnesty Budget Allocation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Years</th>
<th>Year 2010</th>
<th>Year 2011</th>
<th>Year 2012</th>
<th>Year 2013</th>
<th>Year 2014</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Abia</td>
<td>$-$20,000,000.00</td>
<td>$40,000,000.00</td>
<td>$60,000,000.00</td>
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<td>$100,000,000.00</td>
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<td>$120,000,000.00</td>
<td>$160,000,000.00</td>
<td>$200,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>$-$60,000,000.00</td>
<td>$120,000,000.00</td>
<td>$180,000,000.00</td>
<td>$240,000,000.00</td>
<td>$300,000,000.00</td>
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<td>Cross River</td>
<td>$-$80,000,000.00</td>
<td>$160,000,000.00</td>
<td>$240,000,000.00</td>
<td>$320,000,000.00</td>
<td>$400,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>$-$100,000,000.00</td>
<td>$200,000,000.00</td>
<td>$300,000,000.00</td>
<td>$400,000,000.00</td>
<td>$500,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>$-$120,000,000.00</td>
<td>$240,000,000.00</td>
<td>$360,000,000.00</td>
<td>$480,000,000.00</td>
<td>$600,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
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<td>$560,000,000.00</td>
<td>$700,000,000.00</td>
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<td>$480,000,000.00</td>
<td>$640,000,000.00</td>
<td>$800,000,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
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<td>$540,000,000.00</td>
<td>$720,000,000.00</td>
<td>$900,000,000.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilations from Kuku (SAPND) press briefing, and Federal Government of Nigeria Budget Office. Currency conversion by the author on USD$1 = N163.95 (Naira) accessed on 03/03/2014

**Chart 2: Showing the 2012 Education Budget Allocation by the Nine (9) Niger Delta States**

Source: Author’s compilation from the 8 Niger Delta government websites & Niger Delta Citizen Platform websites. Currency conversion by the author from USD$1 =N164.65 (Naira) accessed 14/03/2014

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8 Statistical table description appended
9 Statistical table description appended.
This article brings together information gathered on the budgetary allocations on education by the nine (9) Niger Delta states in 2012. The reason is that the amnesty project is a classified social service program majoring in the education of the amnesty delegates. Perhaps the description of education by Wikipedia will widen our understanding of the term education. Wikipedia (2014) describes education as a form of learning in which the knowledge, skills, and habits of group of people are transferred from one generation to the next through teaching, training, or research, and that any experience that has a formative effect on the way one thinks, feels, or acts is educational and these stages include schools, college, university or apprenticeship. In Amnesty News (2013b:25), Kuku stated that all the amnesty delegates have been fully disarmed and demobilized, and that they are currently in training or have been trained with a view of adding to the national GDP and improving themselves and their families. It was recorded that over 14,000 delegates have been deployed to either academic or vocational certified training. Most relevant to this analysis is that in 2012, a total of USD$1,180,540,975.14 and USD$403,637,774.40 was spent on education by the 9 Niger Delta states and the Amnesty Office respectively. This gives us a grand total of USD$1,584,178,749.54. The implication of this is that an additional average of USD$44,848,641.60 was added to human capital development spending in the year 2012 per state in educational sector through the DDR programmes. Obviously, the social and economic assumption of USD$44,848,641.60 input in a state is undoubtedly a positive impact. This view accords directly with Ejovi and Ebie (2013:133) who argue that the ‘Amnesty programme is expected to improve human capital development of the country’. An exploratory interview study of the impacts of amnesty programmes as narrated by amnesty delegates in Amnesty News (2013b:12-13) describes the benefits of acquiring your own livelihood activity, hence delegates interviewed have received training and currently engaged with economic activities.

CONCLUSION: SUCCESSES IN HOME-GROWN DDR AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE NIGERIA ECONOMY

Research of Waldman (2008:13) revealed that people in Afghanistan ranked community shura second as agents to employ in resolving and managing their conflicts. The people understand themselves – their culture, economy, politics, and their identities. The author’s view is that as conflict erupts, the immediate population are the first recipients of the consequences; therefore, they will strategize a way out if they weigh the gains and losses. In shopping for solution, new trends are likely to develop. Just like Waldman emphasizes, peacebuilding is not about imposing solutions, or preconceived ideas or processes. It involves self-analysis and helps support communities to develop their own means of strengthening social cohesion and of building capacities to reach solutions that are peaceful and just. (p. 15). Similarly, Ball and Goor (2006:7) suggest that DDR
should be approached as a process, not a program, and these programs should be embedded in a broader dynamic, integrated process such as developing adequate human and institutional capacity. In this context, it is instructive to note that OSAPND thematic activities are based on different integrated processes that will develop human and institutional capacities in the Niger Delta region. As a backup analysis, over 14,000 trained delegates have been equipped in different human capitals and over 2,000 delegates are empowered in different small-scale businesses. All these categories of people possess the potentials for the socio-economic development of the region through their individual set-skills contribution to the regional institutions.

Therefore, the opportunity to encourage peacebuilders to start developing solution in their own ways should be a welcome trend. As already indicated, MacGinty (2010:404-5) cited instances with European new comers conforming to local methods of peacemaking and dispute resolution in North Americans in the 16\textsuperscript{th} -17\textsuperscript{th} centuries; and also the incorporation of warlords and militia commanders in government in post-Taliban Afghanistan. These are hybridized peace and a success record in our DDR discourse.

The case of Nigeria DDR programme has provided the DDR community with the new inclusion of people from the conflict-impacted communities in the reintegration packages. Remarkably, Addison (2003:1) posits that community needs must be a focus of attention hence war fractures communities, destroying human and social capital. Generally, focus on DDR projects has been centralized on the primary stakeholders which are usually the combatants/agitators and their dependants. There has been an obvious neglect on the people living in that war-torn communities who did not carry arms but lived in fear and experienced destruction of family lives and properties. They are indirect primary stakeholders of conflict and should be attended to. The inclusion of 1,000 people from the impacted conflict communities in the Niger Delta DDR programme is a success to reckon with.

It is also important to note, that the inclusion of 1,000 people from the impacted communities is only achievable because the local actors were involved. Take for instance, the issue of duplication, and surrogates that were highlighted in Angola DDR works would not survive in Nigeria DDR. This is because the local implementers will discover such anomalies. Thus, external implementers will find it difficult to select the recipients of the impacted communities without duplications and surrogates.

In the accounts of Ubhenin (2013:182-3), the FGN lost N500 billion (Naira) in 2006 on account of restiveness in the Niger Delta, USD$6.3 billion in 2008 in oil stolen, and another USD$28 billion in oil not explored which translates to a revenue loss of USD$40 million per day in the region. These losses were due to the high oil conflicts which triggered high oil theft in the region thereby reducing the oil exploration and production in the region. Nigeria depends more on oil income and
an attempt to limit its production is a national attack on national economy. Moreso, Ejovi and Ebie (2013:132) reported that the pre-amnesty period which was filled with conflicts brought about a total loss of USD$21.5 billion from the multinational oil companies outputs in 2003. Therefore, to have the amnesty programme in place is a factor to our national stability.

It will be important to acknowledge the work of Jeroen (2001:21) on the DDR experiences from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Angola which demonstrate that full-scale enforced disarmament is only feasible if the security concerns of the parties are credibly assessed and met by the monitoring mission. Jeroen added that there have to be sufficient economic and political incentives to encourage the former combatants to look for alternative means of employment. Drawing on this findings by Jeroen, the Nigeria DDR took into consideration the financial importance attached to arms by the ex-agitator and negotiated for a monthly stipend of USD$400 per ex-agitator as their economic gain – an amount which is higher than a graduate civil servant monthly earnings. Perhaps, the author suggests that this monthly stipend was a consideration that paved way for the success of the amnesty DDR implementation packages. Considerations were also made on higher sustainable livelihood packages by the OSAPND through sustainable trainings and empowerment packages. Contrary to this, the MDRP (2010) reported that the reintegration packages for the Angola ex-combatants was pegged at USD$700 per ex-combatant – an amount which is less than 2months stipends of the Nigeria ex-agitator. Possibly if this financial package was similar to Nigeria DDR, it would have had strong challenges and short-falls. Therefore, the huge sum spent by Nigeria government as well as the use of local actors as its implementing mission contributes to the success of amnesty DDR program.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Map of nine (9) Niger Delta States

Appendix 2: Statistical Description of FGN Presidential Amnesty Budget Allocation

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<th>Months</th>
<th>2010</th>
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exchange rate USD$1 = N163.95 accessed on 03/03/2014
### Nine Niger Delta States Education Budget 2012

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<td>Rivers</td>
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<td></td>
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