



EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTES

EADI Policy Paper Series

THE MDGS AND BEYOND: PRO-POOR POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD

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EADI Policy Paper March 2010

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What have the MDGs achieved?

The MDGs have had a significant impact so far at a global level, but national level impacts are less clear and need more exploration. There is strong evidence of MDG impacts at a global level and in many countries (in the recent UNDP study of 30 countries, no fewer than 25 countries had added, expanded or modified indicators and 10 had added local goals), and there is good evidence of MDG impacts on social sector budget allocations.

What should the 2010 MDG review do?

The 2010 MDG review should assess the MDG experience and lessons learnt, build an MDG global action plan, and lay the political groundwork for a global commission on 2015 and beyond. Key issues for the 2010-2015 MDG 'big push' are cross-cutting ones: We need more focus on a stronger linking of the Rights agenda in the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs; more focus on gender (and the new UN agency), more focus on poor people's adaptation to climate change, and more focus on equity and social justice issues (and the poorest). We urgently need answers on some of the political questions: Why is there clear evidence in some countries of national 'ownership' of the MDGs and little in others? Can the global political momentum that led to the MDGs be maintained and renewed in an uncertain world with aid and public expenditure under pressure?

How is the context changing further for global development 2010-2020?

The MDGs were an approach born of a benign era of relative stability, stronger economic growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets. We now face a very different world. Changes sparked by increased uncertainty and a growing sense of multiple insecurities not only have the potential to impact adversely on levels of poverty, but also there is already emerging evidence that the economic crisis itself is leading to significant changes in the context for development. There are broadly three options on the table in terms of post-MDGs as follows:

- Build on the MDG approach – a universal inner core of indicators (extended or trimmed down set of indicators/goals), plus a locally/nationally defined outer core indicators (as originally intended by MDG architects);
- New indicators/targets/architecture, etc – new dimensions such as measuring causes and solutions to vulnerability, discrimination, exclusion and inequality; new concepts, process and outcome indicators; wellbeing, legal empowerment of the poor, etc; new architecture (finance/climate taxes) and mechanisms (to trigger policy responses);
- More of the same – the same MDGs and new timeline (or no timeline).

1. INTRODUCTION

1. The September 2010 high-level MDG summit will be the climax of numerous meetings and papers in the 2010 MDG review process which will ask questions about what needs to be done the same or differently in terms of policy actions, institutional reforms and resourcing in order to sustain and accelerate MDG progress.
2. Much has changed since the Millennium Declaration in 2000. The global economic crisis itself marks the end of a relatively benign period for development cooperation of buoyant aid budgets in the OECD-countries (“the North”) and strong commitments to public expenditures on social sectors in the South, reasonable economic growth in many developing countries, relative stability and a consensus on policy parameters and instruments in the MDGs and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).
3. The forthcoming period is likely to be far less certain. Such uncertainties not only have the potential to impact adversely on levels of poverty, but also change the context for doing development cooperation. In light of this new context and with the September summit on the horizon, questions for donors and for European Development Cooperation are:
 - What have the MDGs achieved?
 - What should the 2010 MDG review do?
 - How is the context changing further for global development 2010-2020?

2. WHAT HAVE THE MDGS ACHIEVED?

2.1 The Purpose of the MDGs

4. The MDGs have been defined as ‘human development meets results based management’ (Hulme, 2009: 2). The broader Millennium Declaration (that all UN Member States agreed to) consists of six ‘fundamental values’ (some of which are only partially represented in the MDGs): freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility.
5. The UN General Assembly took a decision to hold a high-level plenary meeting in September 2010 with the participation of Heads of State and Government. The proposed outcome of the 2010 review will be a ‘bold action-orientated political declaration’ to renew existing commitments and galvanize coordinated action.
6. The MDGs (which are not formally endorsed by the UN membership but described as ‘a useful guide’) were produced by the UN Secretary General in 2001 and updated in 2005, and consist of 8 goals, 21 quantifiable targets (originally 18) and 60 indicators (originally 48). Updating has been carried out by the ‘Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the MDG Indicators’.
7. Research on the MDGs to date has tended to be polarized between ‘rejectionists’ (those who throw out the MDGs for various reasons) and ‘technicians’ (those who have focused on how to make the MDGS happen) around the question of what the MDGs are for. This is because the MDGs have been generally viewed as a set of indicators to either critique or assess how to attain development. However, the MDGs are more than indicators - they are also an idea or ‘global norm’ as well as an incentive structure for pro-poor policy.
8. The MDGs are undeniably a set of indicators to assess progress on poverty reduction and some of its constituent parts, such as education and health. However, many have suggested it is the ‘MDG

package' that matters (not the individual indicators) because the 'MDG package' represent an 'idea' or 'global norm' on development and poverty reduction. The purpose of the MDGs is then two-fold: First, as an idea or 'global norm' to mobilize resources from donors in particular (which many think the MDGs have been successful in doing). Second, as an incentive structure - based on results based management - to hold country governments and donors to account on delivery of poverty reduction against the MDG benchmarks (on which there are very divergent opinions as to if the MDGs have done this, especially at country-level).

9. Advocates of the MDG approach believe it provides a rallying call for placing multi-dimensional poverty reduction at the centre of development efforts. The MDGs are thus viewed as a set of indicators for guiding poverty reduction and for holding international agencies and governments accountable to citizens. Those less convinced see the MDG approach, however, as a donor-led, reductionist agenda that pays little attention to locally defined and owned definitions of progress and development. Some of these perceptions might help to explain why academic writing has often tended not to take an explicit MDG-lens to poverty and policy discussions (of course there is much writing that is about poverty but not via an MDG-lens).
10. There is an enormous amount of writing on the MDGs from the UN and wider a field. There is the UN's Annual *MDG Report* and National *MDG Reports* as well as the main report and numerous sub-reports of the UNMP (2005), and the IMF/World Bank's *Annual Monitoring Report*. Most recently, Sanjay Reddy and others at Colombia have conducted a multi-country study of 30 countries (UNDP, 2009).
11. Academic writing on the MDGs has been dominated by discussion of MDG concepts, costings and feasibility. There is a body of literature that simply critiques or outright rejects the usefulness of the MDGs to a greater or lesser extent for the choice of indicators or how the MDGs seek to frame or conceptualise (or not) or distort 'development' (see for a range, Biccum, 2005; Black and White, 2003; Easterly, 2009; Gaiha, 2003; James, 2006; Saith, 2006; Satterthwaite, 2003). In contrast, there is a body of literature that is more practical and concerned with asking 'how to do it?' or more fundamentally 'is it possible to do?' For example, there have been numerous discussions on MDG costings and the feasibility (or tracking) of the MDGs (see for a range of discussions, Atkinson, 2004; Bourguignon *et al.*, 2009; Chakravarty and Majumber, 2008; Clemens *et al.*, 2007; Demery and Walton, 1999; Hanmer *et al.*, 1999; Hanmer and Naschold, 2001; Nelson, 2007; Reddy and Heuty, 2005; Roberts, 2005). The main critiques of the MDGs are that they are donor-driven, use a one-size-fits-all concept, focus on quantity rather than quality, and do not address issues such as risk and vulnerability that are seen as increasingly important looking ahead (European Think-Tanks Group, 2010).
12. More recently, there has been the emergence of an 'MDG impacts' literature (e.g. initially, Fukuda-Parr, 2008; Hulme, 2008; Manning, 2009) about the MDG impacts to date – in terms of adoption (in policy), allocation (of resources), adaptation (to locally defined goals, indicators and targets), and what the impacts mean looking forward. Important recurring questions include: What have the MDGs actually achieved, and for whom? Have the MDGs significantly changed the policy or practice of development? If yes, at what level and what might this mean for MDG momentum and looking further forward? What can we learn from them about how the international community can best play a role in national processes of development and poverty reduction? Will the MDGs prove to reflect an international commitment to poverty reduction that goes beyond 2015, or are they the product of a specific moment, unlikely to be repeated?
13. Key conclusions so far are as follows: The MDGs have had a significant impact so far at a global level, but national level impacts are less clear and need more exploration - there is strong evidence of MDG impacts at a global level and in many countries (in the recent UNDP study of 30 countries,

no fewer than 25 countries had added, expanded or modified indicators and 10 had added local goals), and there is good evidence of MDG impacts on social sector budget allocations. Key issues for the 2010-2015 MDG 'big push' are cross-cutting ones: We need more focus on a stronger linking of the Rights agenda in the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs; more focus on gender (and the new UN agency), more focus on poor people's adaptation to climate change, and more focus on equity and social justice issues (and the poorest). We urgently need answers on some of the political questions: Why is there clear evidence in some countries of national 'ownership' of the MDGs and little in others? Can the global political momentum that led to the MDGs be maintained and renewed in an uncertain world with aid and public expenditure under pressure?

14. There is also the 'after 2015' debate. This is the debate around what, if anything can and should succeed the MDGs? This is still in its very early stages and many fear talking about this will derail the momentum for the MDGs. There is a lack of empirical evidence around the impact of the MDGs thus far on which to base any conclusions, and the parameters of what we want the MDGs to do, and for who, are not yet set. It is also a debate which may prove to be purely theoretical unless strong political momentum develops behind the assertion that there is a need for any successor agreement to the MDGs.

15. Much of the polarisation between rejectionists and technicians of the MDGs actually related to the question: what are the MDGs for? Are the MDGs a set of indicators, an idea or an incentive structure? Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2009) have discussed how the 'poverty norm' became a 'new international norm'. They are concerned with what was the nature of normative shifts and what and who drove them and how did they evolve? They contend that the MDGs embody global poverty eradication as an ethical, moral imperative and an international norm emerged, 'cascaded' and became internalised. However, although the norm internalised, it was not acted upon. They draw upon Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998:7) *Life Cycle of an International Norm*, which has three stages (see Table 1) that they summarise as: (i) 'norm emergence', in which a norm begins to receive domestic and international attention that culminates in a 'tipping point' – when a critical mass of states adopt the norm; (ii) 'norm cascade', when the norm diffuses throughout the international community; and (iii) 'internalisation', when the norm changes behaviours. Each stage is characterised by a particular set of actors, motives and mechanisms of influence... though it must be noted that there is no guarantee that a norm will complete the life cycle and these processes can go into reverse. Fukuda-Parr and Hulme argue that the MDGs reached stage three. There was an emergence in the 1990s of a poverty norm propelled by ideational commitments and promoted by 'norm entrepreneurs' since the 1970s, (for example, 1970s – McNamara, Mahbub ul Haq; 1980s – civil society (women's movement, environment and sustainable development, anti-globalisation movement); 1990s – Mahbub ul Haq, Jim Grant, Nafis Sadiq, Clare Short, the Uttstein group, etc.; 2000's – MDGs as a poverty norm - Tony Blair (pro-MDG), Jeff Sachs, etc.). What followed was the 'norm cascade' – the norm morphed into MDGs as message, propelled by 'message entrepreneurs' motivated by search for consensus over a fractious development community. Finally, the norm was internalised with widespread adoption by bureaucracy, used by habit, institutionalised in development talk.

Table 1. The lifecycle of an international norm

16. The MDG 'paradigm' (if one accepts it as a Kuhnian 'worldview' of the 'development community') itself can, as noted above, be seen as a broader 'human development meets results-based management' (see Hulme, 2009; 2010) consisting of the quantitative targets of the MDGs, but be extended to the much broader Millennium Declaration. However, the MDGs are different things to different people. The MDGs are a set of indicators, but they are also an idea or 'global norm' for poverty reduction, an incentive structure for pro-poor development, and a view of 'development' in themselves. Perhaps the defining question is how global agreements and conventions change poor

people's lives? For example, Manning (2009; 2010) argues that the MDGs should be taken 'to encourage sustainable pro-poor development progress and donor support of domestic efforts in this direction'. Hulme (2009; 2010) argues that the MDGs are a 'global norm' institutionalising poverty reduction but what is needed now are 'strategies to shift international norms so that the citizens of the present rich countries and future rich countries find the existence of extreme poverty in an affluent world morally unacceptable'.

2.2 The MDGs and poverty reduction

17. Our assessment in this section is based on the locally owned, national MDG reports written by country governments in partnership with UNDP. If we accept the quality of these reports and ambiguities in defining on/off track and data quality/availability, the key messages are: The MDGs are achievable – indeed numerous countries on track for each MDG; Some of the poorest countries are making progress including a number of fragile states; There are significant regional disparities and an alarming lack of data coverage.

Table 2. Countries on/off track according to national MDG Reports by MDG and region

Table 3. Countries on track according to national MDG Reports by MDG

18. In terms of the overall picture, there are significant regional similarities and differences. Again, if we accept the data in the national MDG reports, in Africa for the key MDGs between 11-31 of 53 countries are on-track depending on which indicator taken. The most off-track indicator is hunger/nutrition, whereas the most on-track one is primary schooling. However, for many of the key MDG indicators, there is insufficient data in a third of countries or more. In Asia for the key MDGs between 6-19 of 27 countries are on-track depending on which indicator taken. The most off-track indicators are nutrition/hunger, maternal mortality, access to contraception, and combating malaria and other diseases. The most on-track indicators are primary schooling, gender equality in schooling, reducing under 5 mortality, and access to improved water sources. Data coverage is much better, but for some indicators a third or more of countries have insufficient data. In Latin America and the Caribbean for the key MDGs between 9-20 of 30 countries are on-track depending on which indicator taken. The most off-track indicators are maternal mortality and HIV prevalence. The most on-track are primary schooling, gender equality in education, and under 5 mortality. Data coverage is reasonable, but for some indicators a third or more countries have insufficient data.

19. A relatively small number of countries, many of which are fragile states and/or populous developing countries, account for considerable proportion of, for example, child or maternal deaths. Fragile states are more off-track on the MDGs than other developing countries. Indeed, on the MDGs for hunger and maternal mortality, estimates show that the group of fragile states are actually going backwards. A third of the world's poor under the dollar-a-day live in 43 fragile states most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. The oft-cited estimate is that these countries account for half of all under 5 mortality (U5M) and a third of maternal mortality (OECD, 2007). Just six countries account for 50% of under 5 deaths (over 5 million children). These are (fragile states bolded) India, **Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Pakistan** and China. Forty-two countries account for 90% of U5M and 51% of child deaths occur in Africa, while 42% occur in Asia (Bryce *et al.*, 2005; UNICEF, 2007). Causes differ substantially from country to country, with key issues being 'under-nutrition as an underlying cause of child deaths associated with infectious diseases, the effects of multiple concurrent illnesses, and recognition that pneumonia and diarrhoea remain the diseases that are most often associated with child deaths' (Black *et al.*, 2005:2226). The Bellagio Study Group on Child Survival costed the elimination of 90% of global child deaths in 2000 at US\$5.1 billion or US\$887 per child with a package of interventions shown to reduce mortality from the major causes

of death in children younger than 5 years (Bryce *et al.*, 2005). Similarly, maternal deaths are concentrated in 11 countries, which account for 65% of all maternal deaths (348,400 women). These countries are India, Nigeria, DRC, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Niger, Tanzania and Angola. Half of maternal deaths (276,000) occur in sub-Saharan Africa and more than a third (188,000) occur in South Asia. Furthermore, 14 countries (13 in sub-Saharan Africa) have maternal mortality rates (MMRs) of over 1000 deaths per 100,000 live births (compare this to the MMR of Ireland which is 1). These countries are Sierra Leone (2100), Niger (1800), Afghanistan (1800), Chad (1500), Somalia (1400), Angola (1400), Rwanda (1300), Liberia (1200), Guinea Bissau (1100), Burundi (1100), DRC (1100), Nigeria (1100), Malawi (1100), and Cameroon (1000) (WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA/ World Bank, 2007).

3. WHAT SHOULD THE 2010 MDG REVIEW DO?

3.1 The 2010 Review

20. The July 2009 UN General Assembly made a decision to hold a high-level plenary meeting at the opening of the 65th General Assembly in 2010 with the participation of Heads of State and Government. A sub-committee, led by Senegal (HE Paul Badji) and Denmark (HE Carsten Staur) as co-chairs, held consultations on the meeting's format and preparations. It agreed on the scope, timing and duration, structure and format, participation, preparatory activities including participation of civil society and the private sector, background documentation, and the outcome of the meeting. The sub-committee recommended that the high-level plenary will be 20-22 September 2010, and the general debate on 23-27 September 2010, and that the focus will be on a comprehensive review of 'development for all' with development goals and MDGs as core; that there will be prior to June 2010 a civil society/private sector preparatory meeting for two days; and that in March 2010 the secretary-general will launch a special comprehensive report in addition the usual UN annual MDG report and MDG taskforce report. There is broad agreement that the aim of the meeting is 'for a comprehensive review of the development agenda as defined in UN, with a strong focus on the MDGs'.
21. There will be six Roundtables held in parallel with plenary meetings (where heads of state/government) will make statements. Each roundtable will have two co-chairs at head of state/government level. The high-level meeting will be co-chaired by the incoming and outgoing Presidents of the General Assembly. The sub-committee noted that it is 'more important than ever' to bring in civil society and private sector as well as the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organisation in addition to the UN funds, programmes and specialised agencies. Several delegations have highlighted the importance of a regional dimension and it may be that regional preparatory meetings will be held.
22. The proposed outcome of the 2010 review will be a 'bold action-orientated political declaration' to renew existing commitments and galvanise coordinated action. The SG resolution 55/162 mandates the preparation of a five-year comprehensive report on the implementation of the entire Millennium Declaration. The above consultation so far has suggested that this might be modified. A report focused on the development commitments of the Millennium Declaration has been requested.
23. There are two scenarios for the end of 2010. First, and ideal, is a credible five-year plan to achieve the MDGs. Alternatively, and less ideal, would be to focus on 1-2 goals (but choosing which ones would be difficult - education may be one possibility - noting Hillary Clinton's education summit on the eve of the World Cup in South Africa), and try and make real progress on plans to attain the 1-2 goals with real money and policy coherence.

3.2 What should the 2010 Review Cover?

24. The review itself is likely to ask questions about what needs to be done the same or differently in terms of:
- The content of the indicator set; real-time poverty monitoring (and linking to the UN Global Poverty and Vulnerability Alert system platform as currently MDG data is at least 2-4 years out of date); the continuing relevance and utility of the indicators in a changing world (especially climate change adaptation that may take the policy space in 2010 from the MDGs unless the two can be linked explicitly); and greater MDG localisation (especially in Africa, following critiques by Easterly that the MDGs are 'unfair' to Africa). A key question will be whether the set of indicators needs (yet) more indicators or 'tweaking' to incorporate equity and gender in particular.
 - The implementation plans or strategies for achieving each MDG. On this UNDP is preparing improved country level implementation plans and an MDG index of policy effort. Linked to this will be discussion of the role of different actors, as well as the funding gaps.
 - How to maintain the global political momentum on the MDGs in difficult times for aid/public expenditure will be important as will be some further assessment of the impact of the MDGs at a national and even sub-national level (and thus the MDGs as a set of incentives for pro-poor development);
25. The 2010 review should focus on several aspects in particular: Assess the MDG experience and lessons learnt, build an MDG global action plan, and lay the political groundwork for a global commission on 2015 and beyond.
26. The review should take stock by assessing the impact of the MDGs so far – good and bad – and assess the continuing relevance of the MDG indicators. The MDGs have had significant positive impacts, but faced criticisms. There is clear evidence of the impact of the MDGs at a global level (e.g. in G8 statements, numerous global MDG reports, etc.), and amongst donors (take for example DFID's Public Service Agreement with the UK Treasury), but at country level impacts are less clear. In the recent UNDP (2009) study of 30 countries, 25 countries had added, expanded or modified indicators and 10 had added local goals. However, other studies (such as that by Fukuda-Parr, 2010) have found the MDGs less systematically integrated into national development strategies (and donor country plans) than one might expect. There is good evidence of the increase of funding to MDG-related social sector budget allocations, but it appears at the expense of funds to productive sectors such as agriculture and employment creation (and the positive links between these 'two sides of the coin' have not been emphasised). The 2010 review should address the content and monitoring of the MDGs and the continuing relevance and utility of the indicators in a changing world and the need for real-time data (and thus the MDGs as a set of indicators to incentivise pro-poor development). There are a number of cross-cutting issues that have risen in prominence since 2000 as a result of changing discourses such as climate, gender, and equity (see respectively, Urban, 2010; Jones *et al.*, 2010; and various on equity - Jahan, 2010; Fukuda-Parr, 2010; Vandemoortele, 2010). Although these issues were around in 2000, they were less prominent and therefore less integrated into MDGs than they might have been expected, and many authors have been asking how to bring these cross-cutting issues in. In relation to gender, Jones *et al.* (2010) argue that lack of disaggregation can not only reduce the life chances of women and girls, but also result in less effective development policy if social factors such as the gender division of labour in agriculture are not taken into account. Jahan (2010) also argues the importance of disaggregation of data along a number of lines, to get a true picture of the impact of policy on outcomes. Vandemoortele (2010) focuses on inequalities at the national level and suggests a practical way of incorporating an equity dimension into any new indicators of poverty, and illustrates how this could work with reference to

USM rates. A cursory look at the MDGs reveals one further highly significant shift in thinking between then and now - climate - and the importance of achieving development within a given level of carbon emissions is notably absent from all the goals apart from the rather poorly defined Goal 7. As both Solheim (2010) and Urban (2010) note, any future thinking will have to give much greater attention to the importance of low-carbon development, and related issues around equity, financing and future access to technology that form the heart of international negotiations in this area. A final, yet important issue is that of poverty tracking. In 2015, we won't know if the MDGs have been met because data for many indicators might not be available until 2017-2019. As the UN (2009) MDG report noted in 2009, data for primary enrolment is to 2007; under five mortality to 2007; and maternal mortality and dollar-a-day to 2005. Furthermore, the base line for 1990 is missing in many countries. There is, however, certainly a general perception within the development community that development data is getting better (especially so with major initiatives such as the World Bank's Demographic Health Surveys and UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys although whether these data make their way through to the MDG indicators which are often based on official statistics is unclear). The problem is, for baseline data, which is, of course, essential for assessing if the MDGs with percentage reduction targets are met. Only a short while ago the *Human Development Report* (2003:35) noted even for some of the main MDGs, 50-100 countries had no real survey trend data (2 points, 3 years apart in the 1990s), and 20-50 countries had no data at all. On the dollar-a-day measure, 100 countries had no trend data for the 1990s and 55 countries had no data at all (between 1990-2001). However, UNDP (2003: 35) noted that relatively few countries had no child malnutrition data, no net primary enrolment data, and no 'improved' water access data since 1990. Trend data (two data points between 1990-2001) in contrast were not available for up to 100 countries depending on the indicator chosen. Things are improving on data availability, but if there is no 1990 baseline figure, the achievement of the MDG targets will, of course, be open to question. The good news is that the global crisis has led to the establishment of the UN Global Poverty and Vulnerability Alert system – the GIVAS platform which will seek to provide faster real-time data to policy makers drawing on innovations in survey techniques and technologies such as SMS and community based monitoring. There are also significant activities in community based monitoring and rapid-qualitative appraisal (see methods discussion book of Hossain *et al.*, 2009) and UNICEF's poverty and vulnerability tracking around nutrition and food using SMS and Google.org, and Grameen Foundation's rural information services, to name just a couple of initiatives.

Table 4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs?

27. The review should develop a credible, funded, five-year plan with clear roles and mechanisms at country level – policies to make the MDGs 'unmissable'. President Obama has said, 'We will support the MDGs, and approach next year's summit with a global plan to make them a reality. And we will set our sights on the eradication of extreme poverty in our time'. This is exactly what the 2010 MDG review must do. Far less ideal, would be to focus on 1-2 goals and try and make real progress on plans to attain those goals with real money and policy coherence. The contents of that plan should include:
- Real-time poverty monitoring systems via the UN GIVAS platform - currently MDG data is at least 2-4 years out of date; this also needs to take much more account of equity and the poorest groups, and gender equality systematically.
 - Clear mechanisms for much greater MDG country-level localisation - in governments in public expenditure planning, in policy formation and implementation, and so on. In this regard, the UNDP is preparing improved country level implementation plans and an MDG index of policy effort.
 - Clarity on global and national roles and the division of labour - who's going to do what and what is the role of different actors; who's funding what, and so on.

- A focus on the accumulated evidence of what works: There is some reasonable agreement on the kind of policies that work judging by a review of the published research literature from academic journals and development agency reports on the policy commonalities in countries making progress on the hunger, health and education MDGs. Our review is not a systematic review, rather a sweep of the literature to make some assertions on policy commonalities contributing to MDG progress by policy actions, institutional reforms, and resource issues. For each MDG, a number of effective policy actions, institutional reforms and resourcing issues can be identified. Evidence associating social protection is very strong; gender empowerment too is essential; and cross-sectoral multipliers with MDG progress are highly evident across a nutrition-education-health nexus. Growth and higher levels of public expenditure in the general sense (rather than targeted pro-poor spending via social protection), although both providing resources, are not as closely associated with the health and education MDGs as one might expect – associations with nutrition are stronger and progress on the hunger/nutrition, health and education MDGs has strong feedback loops into higher growth.

Table 5. The MDGs and the most important policy actions, institutional reforms, and resourcing issues

Table 6. Studies on the effectiveness of social protection for hunger/nutrition and health-related MDG outcomes

Table 7. Studies on the effectiveness of social protection for education MDG outcomes

28. The review should create a global process for a new development consensus via the establishment of an independent global commission. The MDGs took ten years – a decade of momentum – and a small group of ‘insiders’ backed by powerful actors to get off the ground. Also, the context has changed: there are more middle-income countries and much greater range of funders (new funders such as China and Gates Foundation) and opportunities to raise funds (alternative/innovative sources of finance), and so the MDGs do not just have to play to an audience of OECD DAC donors; a rise in the importance of the G20; a difficult context post-crisis for aid/public expenditures; the risks of climate change to achievement of many MDGs; demographic change; and a growing recognition of both the benefits and the challenges posed by technology; among others. If there is to be a framework for after 2015 that is based on a global discussion, its development needs to start soon. There is scope for an independent global commission to bring all of this together (such as the Brundtland or Brandt Commissions, or the Commission on Human Security or Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor) led by someone like Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (post-presidency). We need a truly global participatory process which might have several strands. The Lula Global Commission on Poverty and Development in a Changing Climate would:

- Co-ordinate a genuinely global process of roundtables, voices of the poor, blogging, and multimedia communications of critical issues - think of Ravi Kanbur’s *World Development Report 2000/1* consultations/pre-process, plus Voices of the Poor, and Web 2.0.
- Convene an international meeting on a 'new development consensus' that would become an evidence-base for what works and how to proceed with global poverty reduction in a changing climate in a much more holistic way.
- Conduct a Stern-review on the economics or cost of global poverty - the narrative would be that it’s cheaper to address the causes of poverty now than the cost of its consequences later.

4. HOW IS THE CONTEXT CHANGING FURTHER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 2010-2020 AND WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS FOR AN MDG-PLUS GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE?

29. The MDGs were an approach born of a benign era of relative stability, stronger economic growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets. We now face a very different world. Changes sparked by increased uncertainty and a growing sense of multiple insecurities not only have the potential to impact adversely on levels of poverty, but also there is already emerging evidence that the economic crisis itself is leading to significant changes in the context for development. For example:

- Global governance: The G8 to G20 shift means more representation and power for large developing nations, but changes in the IMF and World Bank will be crucial for wider changes in governance;
- New economic policies: There is likely to be a greater tendency for developing countries to explore new development models; approaches from China, the 'Beijing Consensus' are more likely to be taken up than Western prescriptions;
- Greater social protection: The scale of food and financial crises has made a powerful case for better social protection systems. But building ownership in governments and civil societies remains a challenge in securing long-term budget allocations. Barrientos (2010: v), states that, 'the likely impact on poverty and vulnerability of the extension of social protection under way in developing countries is not in doubt'. Social protection has emerged as a successful policy framework, which provides a policy map - linking interventions to an understanding of poverty and vulnerability as multidimensional and persistent. There are four categories of social assistance programmes: pure income transfers; income transfers conditional on work; income transfers conditional on investment in human capital; and integrated poverty reduction strategies. The biggest constraint to social assistance programmes is finance, and therefore to implement such programmes, alternative forms of resource mobilisation are required in developing countries.

30. Looking further ahead, there are some major 'game changers' beyond the crisis:

- Environment - e.g. climate change leading to greater volatility in weather and agriculture production, water scarcity, and resource conflicts;
- Governance - e.g. changes in global governance, the decline of US and Western global influence, changes in aid architecture, new donors and policy actors such as China and the private philanthropic foundations;
- Markets - e.g. greater volatility in international markets for finance, fuel and food; reconfiguration of the global economy with the rise of China and India, and other emerging economies, rising oil prices due to 'peak oil';
- Demographics - e.g. population growth, differentiated demographic transitions, evolving age structures and changing labour markets;
- Technology - e.g. the spread of existing technologies such as biotechnology and the development of new(er) technologies such industrial biofuel, ICTs and nanotechnology.

Table 8. Initial mapping of major drivers and the changing context for 'development'

31. The financial crisis has changed the political context within which MDG debates will happen. As Jones *et al.* noted (2009:51) 'the era in which the seven major industrial economies could meet with Russia and act collectively to solve global problems is over'.

32. The rise of the G20, and its institutionalisation at the G20 Pittsburgh summit as the global body for economic coordination, marks a fundamental shift from the era in which the MDGs were agreed – where the OECD countries were the primary drivers and decision makers in global economic affairs. The shift from the G8 to the G20 is certainly a positive one in terms of representation of developing countries, but it's less clear that the impact on development itself will be immediately positive. While the G8 has in recent years had Africa and the MDGs as a permanent item on its agenda, it has been harder to get issues relevant to the poorest countries, such as the MDGs, into the G20's discussions. Further, many issues appear to be narrowing to a G2 consisting of the US and China.
33. The G20 is a 'steering committee' on global and systemic issues which could expand to climate, health, and other issues likely to be high on the future international agenda. As noted, a shortcoming is the absence of representation of low-income countries and Africa in particular in contrast to the strong representation of the Asia-Pacific countries (10 of the 19 countries). Indeed the G20's structures may evolve too. There are suggestions the G20 should move towards a constituency-based system, which would in turn resemble the Bank/Fund boards' model.
34. Much will depend on how developing country blocs operate politically within these new international fora and governance reform at the IMF and World Bank with G20 deadlines in 2010 and 2011. There is consensus that the two heads of the institutions should be selected in an open and transparent process not restricted to candidates from one country or region. Contention remains on the composition of quotas and boards as these reflect voting strength and access levels to resources.
35. The economic context has also been shaken by the crisis – both because of the uncertainties created by the unexpected shocks to finance and trade, and their knock-on effects on millions of lives, and the shaking of confidence in what were previously thought to be the certainties of economic theory and practice. The crisis was different for three reasons: its origins in the industrialised countries; the speed of global transmission; and the size of the shock. However, not all that was expected actually happened.

Table 9. The global economic crisis: What happened? What didn't?

36. What does this all mean for the MDGs - lower per capita growth rates, aid and public expenditure under pressure? The claim that there is no immediate need to worry about social spending from the IMF led to a spat with CEPR's review of claim and counter claim on both organisation's homepages. Weisbrot *et al.* (2009:4) argue that in 31 of 41 countries, the IMF's crisis agreements contain pro-cyclical fiscal or monetary macro-economic policies (and both in 15 countries) that might be expected to worsen recessions. In sub-Saharan Africa, although IMF crisis agreements have included expansionary fiscal policy in 4 countries (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Niger), there has been contractionary fiscal policy in a further 9 (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Mali and Senegal - *ibid.*:9). Whilst it may be true that public expenditures in sub-Saharan Africa are not immediately being reduced in most of sub-Saharan Africa as public spending management is planned over several future years, the medium-term outlook over the next two years is far less rosy and this has major implications for the MDGs (see review of Sumner, 2009).
37. At the same time, as a result of the crisis, aid is under pressure. Irish and Italian aid has already been cut and an estimated a US\$30 billion financing gap to meet the Gleneagles promise of 2005 to raise aid levels by US\$50 billion by 2010. The size of the 'financing gap' for Africa is large; it's estimated that US\$50 billion is needed to maintain pre-crisis growth and US\$117 billion to reach MDG growth (Africa Progress Panel, 2009:22).

38. Whitfield (2009) argues that aid debates need to be reframed, in order to identify solutions as 'the debate is drowning in dichotomies' (2009:5). The debate should not be between more or less aid, but rather how aid is given and what its objectives are. Whitfield argues that aid needs to be more honest, more pragmatic, and that donor organisations need to be rethought, and the numbers of donors in a country reduced. The key point is that the aid discussion about poverty and Africa must be shifted back to one about agriculture and industrialisation, i.e. how can we increase productivity and what role can aid play? (Whitfield, 2009:9). Changes need to be made in donor countries, and the World Bank and the IMF should be re-sized; these changes require strong leadership.

39. On a broader policy note, the Washington consensus has been declared dead (again), but the nature of the shift to a 'Beijing Consensus' or model (meaning a greater role for state-led or state managed global integration) and policy experimentation is, as yet, unclear. The IMF (2010a; 2010b) most recently has questioned inflation targeting and capital controls. Further, the discussion of 'global economic imbalances' at the G20, and the resulting agreement that governments have a role in directing markets in order to avoid 'imbalances' would have been an unthinkable break with the orthodoxy just a few years ago. If it opens up discussion of a wider range of policy instruments for development, then this has potentially huge implications particularly for expanding the range of any future agreement beyond the social sectors and to thinking how to promote development of infrastructure and the productive sectors. But as noted above, it's far from certain that the change in language in G20 declarations and the pages of the Financial Times will have any long-term impact on policy.

A further change is the continuing economic uncertainty caused by the crisis itself - it's not clear when, or if, growth rates in the poorest countries will start to pick up, and whether the poorest people will benefit in time to prevent permanent damage to livelihoods and erosion of assets. Economic uncertainty in donor countries is also leading to declining public support for aid budgets. This is an immediate concern for policy makers over the next few years, but the impact of the crisis is likely to continue to frame the discussions over the next five years, and will be critical in determining the economic and social environment.

40. However, it is climate change that presents arguably the biggest MDG challenges. Stern (2009a: 75) suggests thinking of 'development in a more hostile climate'. Poor countries and poor people living within them tend to be more seriously affected, yet have reduced assets and capacities with which to cope with and adapt to impacts (Kates, 2000; Stern, 2007; Tanner and Mitchell, 2008). For example, some of the most widely cited trends for Africa, where fragile states are most concentrated, include (e.g. Boko *et al.*, 2007; Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub, 2010; Stern, 2007): a drop in agricultural yields by as much as 50% by 2020; an additional 70-250 million Africans at risk of increased water stress from climate change; an extra 40-60 million Africans exposed to malaria; and rising sea levels that may severely affect mangrove forests as well as coastal fisheries, and lead to increased severe flooding.

41. This has prompted a flurry of activities to integrate adaptation within development and poverty reduction programmes, often linking to communities of practice in disaster risk reduction, sustainable livelihood approaches, and vulnerability assessment (Yamin *et al.*, 2005) and impacts can effect the poor who have done least to contribute to the problem - thus framing adaptation as an equity and rights issue (Tanner and Mitchell, 2008).

42. There are two important climate change impacts on the MDGs:

- Increased variability in agricultural production as a result of increased variability of weather including more frequent and intense droughts. This will mean changes in wage rates, income and seasonality in income and consumption. 'Hunger seasons' may become more pronounced.

Some relatively well-populated areas already with semi-arid climates are likely to become drier, such as Southern Africa, North-East Brazil, and northern Mexico. Water scarcity in such cases will be exacerbated.

- More frequent and more severe disasters such as storms and tsunamis. The poor often live on marginal land with limited resilience to extreme weather. Homes and other assets such as livestock and possessions may be lost, and also in the aftermath of major events there are high risks of water-borne and insect-borne diseases. Changed climates are in turn likely to affect ecosystems, with changes in the range and distribution of flora and fauna. In some cases, this may mean that insects as disease vectors spread to previously unaffected areas as may occur with an advance of malaria into higher altitudes.

43. The likely impact of the above is significant migration particularly urban migration, natural resource conflicts and changing livelihoods. Given the clear impacts on poverty it is perhaps surprising that climate change does not feature centrally (yet) in the MDGs. This is in part because in 2002, climate change was still seen mainly as a longer-term issue less relevant to 2015, but also because addressing climate change was considered a responsibility for developed countries. In the meantime, studies have shown that climate change is already happening, and that this is making the attainment of the MDGs more difficult (UNDP 2007).

44. There is a growing acknowledgment that a process of 'adaption' (McCarthy *et al.*, 2001) is central to sustaining and accelerating MDG progress or 'climate-proofing' the MDGs. Although initially secondary to mitigation, adaptation is now a central strand of national and international climate policy (UNFCCC, 2007a). The question is: what does pro-poor adaptation look like? This has been a central question for Mitchell and Tanner (2008) and is the key question for sustaining and accelerating MDG progress in a hostile climate. They argue that there is a need to consider pro-poor adaptation by types of poverty – chronic and transient – in order to build suitable adaptive processes and adaption options for the poor to pursue different pathways out of poverty and further that pro-poor adaption opportunities are shaped by other social factors such as age, gender, ethnicity and disability. Pro-poor adaptation seeks to assess how climate change may affect routes in and out of chronic poverty. It also seeks to expose opportunities presented by climate change for those in chronic poverty. This could include changes to ecosystems that make them more productive and offer a greater range of environmental assets. Despite food security concerns, transitions to labour intensive biofuel crops may provide new employment options. Opportunities are most likely to emerge through adaptation interventions and institutional strengthening that target the poorest groups, funded by increasing streams of adaptation finance. Challenges emerge from considering whether a lower level of assets puts the chronically poor in a strong position as this enables them to be flexible in their livelihood strategies. Potential testing grounds for this research agenda could include adapting social protection programmes to climate change, building adaptive institutions in fragile states and enhancing opportunities and limiting negative impacts of climate-induced migratory flows.

45. The most important issue is that climate change and the MDGs need to be seen as the same policy arena and to be addressed in an integrated manner. In much of the discourse, each is still treated as separate and often adaptation is seen as 'bolt on' to business as usual although this is increasingly challenged (Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub, 2010; Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; Fankhauser, 2010; UNFCCC, 2007 and World Bank 2009b on adaptation costs; World Bank, 2009a on adaptation finance; Mitchell and Tanner, 2008; 2009). This separation of climate and MDGs is visible in the following:

- Negotiations leading up to the December 2009 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen largely treated financing for climate change adaptation as distinct from

development finance and falling under the purview of Ministers of Environment (Schmidt-Traub, 2009).

- The main practical instruments to advance adaptation planning in Least Developed Countries under the UNFCCC – the National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs) – are generally developed in parallel to national development strategies, poverty reduction strategies and associated medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) that form the basis for providing and programming international development assistance (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008).

46. The integration of climate change and the MDGs at an operational level is essential to coordinate because if adaptation policy is not integrated into countries' expenditure and macroeconomic frameworks, it is difficult for finance ministries and central banks to manage the increased inflow of foreign currencies.

47. A big issue is re-costing the MDGs for 'climate-proofing'. In one of the better-known estimates of adaptation costs (UNDP, 2007), about half of the costs arise from social protection programmes that mitigate the adverse social impacts of climate shocks. Debates on 'what is needed' to cost the MDGs have included:

- the UN Millennium Project (e.g. 2005a; 2005b);
- global 'needs assessments' (e.g. Bahadur *et al.*, 2006; Sachs *et al.*, 2004; UN Millennium Project, 2004; 2005);
- alternative assessments based on CGE modelling (e.g. Bourguignon *et al.*, 2008, Lofgren and Diaz-Bonilla, 2008);
- Numerous country level needs assessments and other estimates and discussions (Atkinson, 2004; Bourguignon *et al.*, 2009; Clemens *et al.*, 2007; Horton *et al.*, 2009; Reddy and Heuty, 2005).

Most recently updates for 'climate-proofing the MDGs' by Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2009:5), who note 'recent estimates of MDG costs show a remarkable degree of convergence' (e.g. Ban *et al.*, 2008; Commission for Africa, 2005; UNMP, 2005). Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010) estimate the costs of "climate resilient" MDGs is about a third higher than the conventional cost of meeting the MDGs – around US\$100 billion per year for the next decade, compared with US\$72 billion per year for the MDGs alone. Extra costs arise from having to provide more development support (for example, extra bed nets against malaria), the same support at a higher cost (for example, more expensive infrastructure) as well as altogether new measures (for example, adaptive capacity building). Climate change can also lead to the prioritisation of certain measures compared to the baseline development plan (for example, disaster management).

48. In 2010, there are scheduled meetings of the UNFCCC in Bonn in June and Mexico City in November; however it may be that smaller groups of countries meeting outside of the official process will have significant influence. The key elements of the 'Copenhagen Accord' begin in some small way to address these issues on financing and integrating climate and MDG policies. For example via:

- The provision of US\$10 billion annually in short-term fast-track financing between 2010-12; it is estimated that Africa will receive 40% of the fast-track fund. The agreement on REDD-plus should also have important benefits for Africa, particularly in the Congo Basin;
- A target of US\$100 billion for adaptation finance in developing countries by 2020;
- The setting up of a 'High Level Panel' on finding innovative sources of finance for climate.

Table 10. Selected examples of current and projected climate-change impacts on industry, settlement and society and their interaction with other processes

Table 11. MDGs 1-7 and climate change relevant poverty impacts

Table 12. Types of pro-poor adaptation

Table 13. MDG resource estimates and climate-proofing costs

Table 14. Existing climate financing mechanisms

49. Climate financing is - of course - a potentially huge source of MDG supporting revenue. Brown (2009) outlines five categories of proposals for climate financing, including the auctioning of assigned amount or emission allowances (rather than giving them out for free to Annex I domestic firms that have to comply with emissions reduction), and the creation of carbon market-based levies, such as the UNFCCC's 2% Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) levy which is used to raise fund for the Kyoto Protocol's Adaption Fund. Other proposals include imposing levies on international maritime transport and on air travel, developing a uniform global tax on CO₂ emissions (with a per capita exemption for least developed countries) and the issuance of bonds on international markets. These proposals are all means on creating new mechanisms to generate new and additional resources for addressing adaption (and some mitigation activities) that are separate and additional to existing ODA. More recently, as noted above, the Copenhagen Accord set out a collective commitment from developed countries to provide new and additional funding of US\$10 billion per year from 2010 to 2012, with the goal of jointly mobilising US\$100 billion by 2020 to help developing countries to avoid high-carbon pathways of development by adopting lower-emitting power sources. Allocation of the funds from this Copenhagen Green Climate Fund is to be balanced between mitigation and adaptation, and funding is to be provided by public and private, bilateral and multilateral sources. Referred to as fast-track or fast-start finance, the funding pledged for the period 2010-2012 is aimed at meeting immediate short-term needs. The intention is for funding for adaptation to be prioritised for most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing states and Africa. This is in alignment with countries most in need of assistance to achieve the MDGs. The Copenhagen Green Climate Fund links climate financing to the MDGs by providing fast-start money to set countries on a low carbon growth path and build resilience to climate pressures. Funds could be used to invest in climate technologies that are responsive to energy, transport and other infrastructure needs of the poor. However, the Accord did not specify which countries would contribute to the fund or how much they would contribute, and there is a concern on the part of developing countries and civil society organisations in particular, that this will not constitute new or indeed additional funding; rather, funds previously allocated to ODA may be relabelled for adaptation, thereby potentially providing increased funds for addressing climate change at the expense of social development and the achievement of the MDGs. It is also not clear when these funds would become available, and this places the 'fast-start' component in jeopardy. Several other financing mechanisms that do not rely on ODA have been proposed for the future. One of these is the UN's Global Green New Deal, an initiative that aims to strengthen the economic recovery of developing countries alongside environmental sustainability. The United Nations Environmental Programme proposes that 1% of global GDP over the period 2009 and 2010 be used as a fiscal stimulus package to build a sustainable 'green' future to revive the world economy while reducing carbon dependency and ecosystem degradation. The 'New Deal' would consist of targeted stimulus spending, changes in domestic policies and changes in international policy structure.

50. The debate around what, if anything can and should succeed the MDGs is still in its very early stages and many fear that talking about this will derail the momentum for the MDGs. There is a lack of

empirical evidence around the impact of the MDGs thus far on which to base any conclusions, and the parameters of what we want the MDGs to do, and for whom, are not yet set. It is also a debate which may prove to be purely theoretical unless strong political momentum develops behind the assertion that there is a need for a successor agreement to the MDGs.

51. The MDGs emerged in a relatively benign and fiscally stable period and have been useful in stimulating some level of development and providing benchmarks. However, they have had limitations and any post-2015 architecture should address the key deficiencies of the MDGs to fit the post-crisis context of periodic/multiple-source crises/instability, and fiscal and carbon-constrained world. There are a wide range of initiatives that are seeking to revisit/rethink poverty and development indicators. There is considerable ferment on the understandings of 'development', 'progress', 'poverty' and 'wellbeing'. Evidence of this is most visible in the recent Sarkozy Commission (2009:10), chaired by Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, which has provided one of the latest and strongest signposts of all with its conclusion that there is a need 'to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people's wellbeing' The Sarkozy Commission regards its report as opening a discussion rather than providing the answers. There is also:

- The OECD convened Measuring the Progress of Societies Project – much broader definitions of progress too – focusing on sustainable wellbeing and intra-generational issues (poverty, inequality, etc.) and inter-generational issues (sustainability, vulnerability, etc.);
- The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative on the 'missing dimensions of human development' – dimensions important to poor people but with little or no data – focusing on decent employment, agency and empowerment, physical safety, the ability to go about without shame and psychological and subjective wellbeing;
- The Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) network that focuses on '3-dimensional human wellbeing' build on human development and seeks to link together material, relational and subjective wellbeing, and their interaction;
- The major review of 20 years of the Human Development Report and assessment of the Human Development Indices by the HDRO.

52. Looking ahead EU priorities are: to support greater southern ownership and country-defined targets and assessment; to support a framework that responds to a changed world - such as climate change, economic viability and state fragility; and to support a process that develops the best possible post-2015 framework. The MDGs should be concise and poverty reduction should not be forgotten (European Think-Tanks Group, 2010:16).

53. In terms of the post-2015 framework, a key question is HOW to decide rather than WHAT to decide. The MDGs took ten years - a decade of momentum - and a small group of 'insiders' backed by powerful actors to get off the ground. The context has now changed – there are more middle-income countries and much greater range of funders (emerging economies such as China and 'philanthropists/philanthro-capitalists' such as Gates) and opportunities to raise funds (through alternative/innovative financing mechanisms), and a rise in the importance of the G20; a difficult context post-crisis for aid/public expenditures; risks of climate change to achievement of many MDGs; demographic change; a growing recognition of both the benefits and the challenges posed by technology; etc.

54. If there is to be a framework for after 2015 that is based on a global discussion, its development needs to start soon.

55. What kind of options might the Lula Commission noted in point 28 find on the table? There are broadly three options on the table in terms of post-MDGs as follows:

- Build on the MDG approach – a universal inner core of indicators (extended or trimmed down set of indicators/goals), plus a locally/nationally defined outer core indicators (as originally intended by MDG architects);
- New indicators/targets/architecture/etc – new dimensions, such as measuring causes and solutions to vulnerability, discrimination, exclusion and inequality; new concepts, process and outcome indicators; wellbeing, legal empowerment of the poor, etc; new architecture (finance/climate taxes) and mechanisms (to trigger policy responses); and
- More of the same – the same MDGs and new timeline (or no timeline).

Table 15. Broad options for 'after 2015'

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 What have the MDGs achieved?

56. The MDGs have had a significant impact so far at a global level but national level impacts are less clear and need more exploration. There is strong evidence of MDG impacts at a global level and in many countries (in the recent UNDP study of 30 countries, no fewer than 25 countries had added, expanded or modified indicators and 10 had added local goals), and there is good evidence of MDG impacts on social sector budget allocations.

5.2 What should the 2010 MDG review do?

57. The 2010 MDG review should assess the MDG experience and lessons learnt; build an MDG global action plan, lay the political groundwork for a global commission on 2015 and beyond. Key issues for the 2010-2015 MDG 'big push' are cross-cutting ones, including: national ownership; gender equality and 'de-aiding' (ie the MDGs and development are not only about aid) the MDGs; more focus on a stronger linking of the Rights agenda in the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs; more focus on gender (and the new UN agency), more focus on poor people's adaptation to climate change, and more focus on equity and social justice issues (and the poorest). We urgently need answers to some of the political questions such as: Why is there clear evidence in some countries of national 'ownership' of the MDGs and little in others? Can the global political momentum that led to the MDGs be maintained and renewed in an uncertain world with aid and public expenditure under pressure? The contents of the review should include real-time poverty monitoring systems, clear mechanisms for much greater MDG country-level localization, clarity on global and national roles, and the division of labour.

5.3 How is the context changing further for global development 2010-2020?

58. The MDGs were an approach born of a benign era of relative stability, stronger economic growth and fairly buoyant aid budgets. We now face a very different world. Changes sparked by increased uncertainty and a growing sense of multiple insecurities not only have the potential to impact adversely on levels of poverty, but also there is already emerging evidence that the economic crisis itself is leading to significant changes in the context for development. Looking ahead, what is the 'new normal'? There are new ideas, interests and institutions emerging.

59. Some major 'game changers' looking ahead are:

- Environment - e.g. climate change leading to greater volatility in weather and agricultural production;
- Governance - e.g. changes in global governance;

- Markets - e.g. greater volatility in international markets for finance, fuel and food;
- Demographics - e.g. population growth;
- Technology - e.g. the spread of existing technologies such as biotechnology.

Table 16. Key MDG issues for the 2010-2015

Table 17. Potential changes in 'development' as a result of major global change 2010-2020

60. There are broadly three options on the table in terms of post-MDGs as follows:

- Build on the MDG approach – a universal inner core of indicators (extended or trimmed down set of indicators/goals), plus a locally/nationally defined outer core indicators (as originally intended by MDG architects);
- New indicators/targets/architecture, etc. – new dimensions such as measuring causes and solutions to vulnerability, discrimination, exclusion and inequality; new concepts, process and outcome indicators; wellbeing, legal empowerment of the poor, etc; new architecture (finance/climate taxes) and mechanisms (to trigger policy responses);
- More of the same – the same MDGs and new timeline (or no timeline).

61. This debate around what, if anything can and should succeed the MDGs after 2015 is still in its very early stages and many that fear talking about this will derail the momentum for the MDGs. There is a lack of more detailed empirical evidence around the impact of the MDGs thus far on which to base any conclusions, and the parameters of what we want the MDGs to do, and for whom, are not yet set. It is also a debate which may prove to be purely theoretical unless strong political momentum develops behind the assertion that there is a need for any successor agreement to the MDGs.

62. There is enough time before 2015, but only if there is a concerted effort that includes different constituencies and respected international actors to work together. So, we need a global political process to get us from here to there (wherever 'there' is). In light of the above, there are potentially three gaps that need urgent attention: an alliance gap (building the political constituency, leadership, networks, linking it all up – do we need a co-ordinating secretariat and who would do this?); an evidence gap (on MDG country ownership, the impact of the crisis on key MDG trajectories); and a process gap (how are we going to facilitate the global consultations, voices of the poor revisited – a decade later?).

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The 2010 MDG review should:

- a. Recognise the positive dimension of the MDGs' framework and re-affirm support.
- b. Take stock by assessing the impact, content and monitoring of the MDGs so far and assess the continuing utility of the indicators in a changing world and the need for real-time data (and thus the MDGs as a set of indicators to incentivise pro-poor development).
- c. Develop a credible, funded, five-year plan with clear roles and mechanisms at country level – policies to make the MDGs 'unmissable'.
- d. Develop appropriate mechanisms and tools for measuring "success" and evaluating impact including real-time poverty monitoring systems via the UN GIVAS platform; and systematise

accounting for equity and the poorest groups and gender equality in particular.

- e. Develop clear mechanisms for much greater MDG localisation at country or regional levels with appropriate implementation mechanisms/instruments, for example, in governments' public expenditure planning, in policy formation and implementation, and so on, and promote ownership of the development processes and capacity building.
- f. New forms of vertical and horizontal division of labour: Clarity on global and national roles and the division of labour (who's going to do what? what's the role of different actors? who's funding what? etc).
- g. Think creatively beyond 2015 in terms of financing and implementation: Thinking about the niches of old and new donors; private-public partnerships; moving beyond traditional aid towards up-stream pro-poor policy advocacy.
- h. The review should create a global process for a new development consensus – via the establishment of an independent global commission led by someone like Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The Lula Global Commission on Poverty and Development in a Changing Climate would: Co-ordinate a genuinely global process of roundtables, voices of the poor, blogging, and multimedia communications of critical issues; Convene an international meeting on a 'new development consensus' that would become an evidence-base for what works and how to proceed with global poverty reduction in a changing climate in a much more holistic way; Conduct a Stern-review on the economics or cost of global poverty, and the narrative would be 'it's cheaper to address the causes of poverty now than the cost of its consequences later'.

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Table 1. The lifecycle of an international norm

Dynamic forces	Stage 1: Norm emergence	Stage 2: Norm cascade	Stage 3: Norm Internalisation
Actors	Norm entrepreneurs with organisational platforms	States, international organisations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant Mechanisms	Persuasion	Socialisation, institutionalisation, demonstration	Habit, institutionalisation

Source: Hulme and Fukuda-Parr (2009).

Table 2. Countries on/off-track according to national MDG Reports by MDG and region

Target	Target 1c: Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger	Target 2a: Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary	Target 3a: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015	Target 4a: Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five	Target 5a: Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio	Target 5b: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health	Target 6a: Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	Target 6b: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it	Target 6c: Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases	Target 7c: Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation	
Indicator used to assess if target is on track or off track in national MDG report	Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age	Net enrolment ratio in primary education	Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education	Under-five mortality rate	Maternal mortality rate	Contraceptive prevalence rate or	HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 years	Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs	Incidence or death rates associated with	Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source	Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility
Africa											
On-track	11	31	19	19	16	14	20	17	16	18	15
Off-track	28	20	32	32	29	26	17	18	14	12	13
Insuff. data	14	2	2	2	8	13	16	18	23	23	25
Asia											
On-track	14	19	16	15	13	11	12	6	9	13	9
Off-track	10	6	8	7	10	11	8	5	11	5	7
Insuff. data	3	2	3	5	4	5	7	16	7	9	11

Latin America and the Caribbean											
On-track	9	20	15	15	12	11	7	8	8	10	6
Off-track	7	5	5	6	11	8	10	7	6	2	3
Insuff. data	14	5	10	9	7	11	13	15	16	18	21

Sources: UNDP National MDG Reports at: http://www.undp.org/mdg/tracking_countryreports2.shtml and UNDP Monitor summary factsheets at: <http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets.cf>

Table 3. Countries on-track according to national MDG Reports by MDG

Target (indicator)	Which countries are on-track?		
	Africa	Asia	Latin America and the caribbean
Target 1c: Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age	Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia	Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Vietnam	Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Uruguay
Target 2a: Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary Net enrolment ratio in primary education	Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam	Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Venezuela
Target 3a: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education	Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Korea (Republic of), Malaysia, Maldives, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, Vietnam	Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela
Target 4a: Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five Under-five mortality rate	Algeria, Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Tunisia		
Target 5a: Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio Maternal mortality rate	Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Korea (Republic of), Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Vietnam	Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Uruguay
Target 5b: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health Contraceptive prevalence rate	Algeria, Burundi, Cape Verde, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda	Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Korea (Republic of), Maldives, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Vietnam	Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Uruguay
Target 6a: Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS HIV prevalence among population	Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Malawi,	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Korea (Republic of), Lao PDR, Mongolia, Pakistan,	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay

aged 15-24 years	Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia	Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan	
Target 6b: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs	Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia	Bhutan, Cambodia, Korea (Republic of), Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Thailand	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay
Target 6c: Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases Death rates associated with TB	Algeria, Botswana, Cape Verde, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Libya, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Uganda, Zambia	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cuba, Korea (Republic of), Lao PDR, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay
Target 7c: Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source	Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda	Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, , Lao PDR, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam	Belize, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname
Target 7c: Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility	Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda	Bhutan, China, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Thailand	Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador

Sources: UNDP National MDG Reports at: http://www.undp.org/mdg/tracking_countryreports2.shtml and UNDP Monitor summary factsheets at: <http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets.cfm>

Table 4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs?

The strengths of the MDGs	The weaknesses of the MDGs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As a ‘rallying call’ for development actors; • As a common/shared understanding of what development is seeking to achieve (and the placing of poverty reduction at the centre of development rather than GDP growth alone); • Their instrumentality as a set of targets and indicators to guide and motivate development policy decisions, and at the same time – in principle – the accountability that flows from saying you will do something and then measuring if you have done it; • The pressure they have exerted for more data on poverty; • Their legitimacy because they are UN-based, and have an in-built sense of global solidarity and ability to galvanize the international community in development as a joint-project (especially in MDG 8) of all UN Member States, a partnership between donors and recipients, to achieve specific and measurable progress. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Their incomplete/reductionist conceptual basis for defining what is poverty and development as incomplete human development outcomes alone rather than capabilities/opportunities to achieve those outcomes, and inter-related, their lack of pathology (or conceptual rigour) in that they have no unifying theory on the underlying or structural causes of poverty and thus lack a pathology/means for poverty reduction beyond inputs/outcomes; • Their weakness on social justice underpinnings - the MDGs are implicitly inter-generational (note the 25 year timeline 1990-2015; and many of the MDGs are about children) - but there is very limited attention to intra-generational or inter-generational equity and rights issues (such as inequalities, marginalization, vulnerability, and exclusion, nor to ‘procedural rights’ such as participation, non-discrimination and access to information); • A perception that they are a donor-led, reductionist agenda that pays little attention to locally defined and owned (and richer, fuller) definitions of progress and development; • Their overemphasis of material wellbeing - and a lack attention to relational and cognitive aspects of poverty dynamics and how what people feel and think in part determines what they can do and be; • Their potentially distorting impacts – i.e. targeting of the near poor (easier to help and reach) rather than the most poor; • A growing sense that the world has changed – the MDGs were born in a world of relative stability, strong growth and buoyant aid budgets. If vulnerability/resilience becomes the norm (climate adaptation; volatile markets for food and fuel, etc.) we need something more in tune with resilience (for example, social protection; low carbon development/adaptation; voices of the poor in governance to mediate inevitable conflict over resources, etc.).

Table 5. The MDGs and the most important policy actions, institutional reforms, and resourcing issues

Key: Gender, Social protection, Cross-sectoral multipliers

MDG outcomes	Key policy action	Key institutional reform	Key resource issues
<p>Nutrition/hunger</p>	<p>Food Based Approaches - Improvement of food security through greater production and easier access to food (through national input subsidizing schemes, better use of agricultural infrastructure, diversification of land, etc) (UNDP, 2010; Scherr, 2003; UN, 2008);</p> <p>Innovative social protection - CCTs with conditionalities on education/nutrition (particularly for girls and women) (UNDP, 2010; WB, 2006; Barrientos, 2006); National social protection schemes such as pensions in South Africa and Lesotho (Scherr, 2003)</p> <p>Multi-Sectoral Approaches - complimentary actions in the areas of health, women's empowerment, sanitation, and water (Scherr, 2003; Gillespie, 2001).</p> <p>Treatment based approaches - Community based treatment and prevention of malnutrition & hunger (Anthony, 2009; Scherr, 2003)</p> <p>Preventive based approached - aimed to promote women's health/nutrition (and other holistic approaches) as well as focus on prenatal care and children under 2 years of age ('window of opportunity') (Anthony, 2009; UNDP 2010).</p> <p>School feeding and health programmes, CCTs, food based transfers (food for work) –(Save the Children 2005; UNICEF n/d; Burnett 2009; (Government of Kenya 2005; Kabeer et al. n/d; World Bank 2003; UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004) improve the nutrition of students.</p> <p>Political commitment-policy measures must be supported by strong political commitment in</p>	<p>Empowerment of women and others (i.e. health workers) at the community level (Anthony, 2009; UNDP 2010)</p> <p>Ownership of MDGs, government leadership. Strong political leadership is important. UNICEF (2007:54) note that 'in 2004, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi challenged the Government and its partners to join him in charting a road map for universal health care, despite the enormous obstacles that stood in its path'.</p> <p>Installing clear and well defined goals tailored to specific needs: establishment of a comprehensive strategy (Hartmann, 2007; Gill, 2003).</p> <p>Greater intra-governmental cooperation and cross sectoral policies (Mauder, 2007);</p> <p>Interventions by Civil society, and the private sector to increase government accountability and to rally support (food as a human right) (Babu, 2007; Brazil UNDP, 2005; Gill, 2003; Ethiopia UNDO, 2005).</p> <p>Inclusion of important indicators in reporting (such as wasting and stunting), and data collection and appropriate monitoring (Hartmann, 2007; Chhabra, 2004; Fanzo)</p> <p>Community-based management-Community-based approaches and community health workers are often important, as well as community participation and education and agency (UNMP 2005. Community-oriented schools (World Bank 2003; Orlando 2004) are very important, as is community/parental involvement (UNESCO 2000; Orlando 2004; UNMP 2004; UNMP 2005; Save the Children</p>	<p>Funding of agricultural research (von Braun, 2009; Scherr, 2003).</p> <p>Better targeted and better funded national nutrition/hunger schemes (Chhabra, 2004; Gill, 2003)</p> <p>Inability to scale up successful programs (either because of lack of political will or limited resources) (WB, 2006; Fanzo)</p> <p>Coordination among multiple organizational stakeholders (WB, 2006; Mauder, 2007)</p> <p>In terms of government policy higher spending on health, as well as the prioritisation of health in the national budget have been identified as important (UNMP 2005; Mehotra 2000). This entails a high expenditure on health relative to GDP (Roberts et al. 2003).</p> <p>The poor need to be prioritized since they are the most likely to suffer from a lack of health access; public subsidies that go mainly to the poor have substantial effects on health outcomes (Roberts et al. 2003)</p>

	<p>order to ensure that they have an effect (UNMP 2005; Orlando 2004; Burnett 2009; Global Monitoring Report 2007). Political commitment at all levels of society is considered essential for social mobilisation at the start of the program or project and for future sustainability and that the integration of nutritional goals in development programs in general is a clear manifestation of genuine awareness and political commitment (Gillespie & Haddad, 2001:23).</p>	2005; Jiminez & Sawada 1998).	
Health	<p>Performance based financing (motivating and empowering health providers by financing results rather than inputs: paying-for-performance) is an effective policy action for improving health outcomes (El-Saharty et al., 2009; Levine, & Eichler, 2009; Regalia and Castro, 2009; Rusa et al., 2009; Eichler et al., 2009). Performance subsidies (subsidies given based on health results rather than inputs) are also effective (Jacobs et al., 2009)</p> <p>CCTs (in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam the provision of pensions for elderly, work for cash for parent's and child benefits have directed attention to children's health and others needs (ILO, 2008), food based transfers (Food-based transfers in Bangladesh and Gambia led to improved maternal and healthcare and nutrition and reduced malnutrition (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006).</p> <p>National scale-up plans (e.g. for HIV testing) and national training programmes proved effective in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, India, and Kazakhstan. Led to increased rates of HIV/AIDS testing and declines in HIV/AIDS transmission rates (UNDG 2009; Leach et al., 2005; Agarwal 2007)</p>	<p>NGO-government partnerships. NGOs are often in a better position to impose user fees in a way which lead to cost recovery with community participation. Such complementarity between NGO and government involvement is evident in the National TB Control Programme in Bangladesh (Ullah et al., 2006). Such collaboration may involve the government contracting out NGOs to reach the poor effectively, or joint ownership (Gillespie & Haddad, 2001; Gwatkin et al., 2005).</p> <p>Women's education, the autonomy of women (in society), and women's participation is noted by Roberts et al. (2003) and Gillespie & Haddad (2001) in particular as being very significant for all health outcomes, and especially the MDG regarding maternal mortality rates</p>	<p>In terms of government policy higher spending on health, as well as the prioritisation of health in the national budget have been identified as important (UNMP, 2005; Mehotra, 2000). This entails a high expenditure on health relative to GDP (Roberts et al., 2003).</p> <p>The poor need to be prioritized since they are the most likely to suffer from a lack of health access; public subsidies that go mainly to the poor have substantial effects on health outcomes (Roberts et al., 2003)</p>
Education	Eliminating school fees to ensure	Decentralised education model;	Provision of schools in rural

	<p>free universal and compulsory primary education (Betcherman et al. 2004; DFID 2005; Ejieh 2009; Government of Kenya 2005; Hartley 2008; ODI 2003; Orlando 2004; Save the Children 2005; UNESCO 2000; UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004; World Bank 2003)</p> <p>Scholarship programmes for girls, such as the Female Secondary School Stipend Programme in Bangladesh (Barrientos & Holmes; 2006; UNMP 2004; World Bank 2003)</p> <p>Social safety nets, conditional cash transfers (Cash for education program in Bangladesh (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)) and unconditional cash or food transfers (school feeding and health programmes) have been highly effective in improving education measures in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Betcherman et al. 2004; Devereux 2006; DFID, 2005; UNICEF 2005; World Bank 2003; Olken et al. 2008; Orlando 2004; UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004).</p> <p>Gender-sensitive and inclusive policies (for disabled and disadvantaged children) (UNESCO 2005)</p>	<p>autonomy of schools if coupled with good management (bottom-up processes of education planning and curriculum development, school based management such as EDUCO in El Salvador). (UNESCO, 2005; Educational Research and Data Centre 2007; Orlando 2004; UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004; Jiminez & Sawada 1998; Hanushek 1995)</p> <p>Community/parental involvement in schools increases the likelihood of children attending school (UNESCO 2000; Orlando 2004; UNMP 2004; UNMP 2005; Save the Children 2005; Jiminez & Sawada 1998)</p> <p>NGO- government partnerships have also been very effective as NGOs may often understand the local conditions better- BRAC in Bangladesh has been effective in targeting poor girls in rural areas (Educational Research and Data Centre, 2007)</p>	<p>areas, to increase access for pupils. Reducing the traditional distance of schools, particularly for girls has significant effects (UNESCO 2000; Betcherman et al., 2004; UNMP, 2004; UNMP 2005; Orland, 2004). Good infrastructure of schools, with sanitation facilities (UNESCO 2005; Betcherman et al. 2004; Burnett 2009)</p> <p>Focus on education quality with resources for learning increase attendance. Relevant content of education, good teachers (training and better salaries for teachers), and a sound language policy for instruction (UNESCO 2005; Orlando 2004; UNMP 2004)</p> <p>Using community resources and community workers, and training local teachers, is seen as a key factor across education MDGs for success (Educational Research and Data Centre, 2007)</p>
Cross-MDGs	<p>Innovative social protection - CCTs with conditionalities on education/nutrition/health (particularly for girls and women) (UNDP, 2010; WB, 2006; Barrientos, 2006); National social protection schemes such as pensions in South Africa and Lesotho (Scherr, 2003)</p> <p>Political commitment at all levels of society is considered essential for social mobilisation at the start of the program or project and for future sustainability and that the integration of nutritional goals in development programs in general is a clear manifestation of genuine awareness and political commitment (Gillespie & Haddad, 2001:23)</p>	<p>NGO-government partnerships. NGOs are often in a better position to impose user fees in a way which lead to cost recovery with community participation. Such collaboration may involve the government contracting out NGOs to reach the poor effectively, or joint ownership (Gillespie & Haddad, 2001; Gwatkin et al. 2005).</p> <p>Women's education, the autonomy of women (in society), and women's participation is noted by Roberts et al. (2003) and Gillespie & Haddad (2001) in particular as being very significant for health and education outcomes</p>	<p>Pro-poor public spending (targeting), increased resources (especially for people at high risk need (Burnett 2009; World Bank 2003), good management (good management of the health and education systems is imperative (Pandey 2007) as is accountability of providers (Malhotra et al. 2005; UN 2007; Pandey 2007; Roberts et al. 2003)</p>

Source: Sumner (2010).

Table 6. Studies on the effectiveness of social protection for hunger/nutrition and health-related MDG outcomes

Type of social protection	Africa	Asia	Latin America
Cash transfers and benefits	<p>Better nutrition is leading a reduction in stunting among children. Immunization rates have improved (Kamerman & Gabel, 2006)</p> <p>Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Zambia: transfers to children affected by HIV has led to children receiving medical attention and improved diet (Help Age, IDS, Save the Children, 2005)</p> <p>- Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, and Ethiopia: Reduced the overall incidences of illness among children in Malawi; Improved diversity of diet and increased intake of protein fats. Helped in reducing illness, improved nutrition status, increased access to health care and food, improved maternal welfare among poor (Yablonski J & O'Donnel, M, 2009)</p> <p>-Somalia, Darfur, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Niger: Positive impact on children's health. Vaccination amongst children is more prevalent, basic needs of children have been fulfilled (World Vision, 2008)</p> <p>- South Africa: Children's health has improved and they have access to basic needs (Barrientos & DeJong, 2004)</p>	<p>Better nutrition is leading a reduction in stunting among children. Immunisation rates have improved and there have been reductions in child labour (Kamerman & Gabel, 2006)</p> <p>- Bangladesh: Children's health has improved and they have access to basic needs (Barrientos A & DeJong J, 2004)</p> <p>-Mongolia: Better health facilities through improved food basket (UNICEF, 2007)</p> <p>-South Asia: children have access to health facilities; Stunting among children has reduced; Families have access to better nutrition and health (Barrientos Armando & Dejong J, 2006)</p>	<p>Better nutrition is leading a reduction in stunting among children. Immunization rates have improved (Kamerman Sheila & Gabel Shirley, 2006). Children have access to health and education facilities; Stunting among children has reduced; Families have access to better nutrition and health (Barrientos & Dejong, 2006)</p> <p>-Brazil, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Columbia: conditional cash transfers have had a positive impact on children's health and nutritional level; a reduction in child labour (Rawling L & Rubio G, 2003)</p> <p>-Brazil, Nicaragua, Mexico:- an increase in nutrition, immunization and growth rates (Lund et al., 2008)</p> <p>-Brazil, Mexico: Improved nutritional status has resulted from social pensions in Brazil. In Mexico the 'Oportunidas' has improved child health, increased enrolment for girls (Thomas, 2005)</p> <p>-Brazil: reduced poverty rate by 5% and severity of poverty by 19%. Reduction in stunting among children, decline in infant mortality, reduction in incidence of illness (Yablonski & O'Donnel, 2009)</p> <p>-Brazil: Conditional Cash Transfer (2001)improved household dietary diversity and reduced stunting (Bassett, 2008)</p> <p>-Chile: Conditional Cash Transfer-the level of education and health amongst children have increased. Children have access to health facilities and nutritious food (Borzutzky, 2009)</p> <p>-Colombia: CCT led to higher quality foods diet, increased health care service use, reduced diarrhoea incidence (Bassett, 2008)</p>

			<p>- Mexico, Columbia, Nicaragua, Brazil: Cash transfer programmes have proven effective in reducing the overall incidences of illness among children in Mexico and Colombia. Improved diversity of diet and increasing intake of protein, fats. Cash transfer helped in reducing illness, improved nutrition status, increased access to health care and food, improved maternal welfare among poor.</p> <p>-Mexico, Brazil, Chile: Children's health has improved and they have access to basic needs (Barrientos & DeJong; 2004)</p> <p>-Mexico: CCT improved health services, nutrition and health education, reduced stunting and also anaemia (Bassett, 2008)</p> <p>-Mexico: CCT improved nutrition and reduced child illness incidence (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)</p> <p>-Nicaragua: CCT (cash for human development) has caused a rise in immunisation rates and improvements in nutrition (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006); CCT has reduced stunting (Bassett; 2008)</p> <p>-Peru: Conditional cash transfers have meant a reduction in child labour, a 30% increase in children under 1 year receiving vaccination, and a 200% increase in health visits for children under 5 years and higher rate among children in the 5-14 age group (Jones & Villar, 2006)</p>
Social Pensions, work for cash for parent's and child benefits	<p>-Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, Lesotho and the United Republic of Tanzania: Directed attention to children's health (ILO, 2008)</p> <p>-Kenya, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho: stunting amongst children has declined, and improvements in health and increased dietary variety (UNICEF,</p>	<p>-Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam: Provision of pensions for elderly, work for cash for parent's and child benefits have directed attention to children's health and others needs (ILO, 2008)</p>	

	<p>2007)</p> <p>-Malawi: Increased health status and a decrease in malnutrition (UNICEF, 2006)</p> <p>-South Africa: Social pensions have improved health and nutrition amongst children especially female children (Duflo, 2003)</p> <p>-Senegal, Mali, Congo, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gambia, Cameroon, Liberia, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Mali, Chad, Cape Verde: Children have access to health facilities. Stunting amongst children has reduced. Basic needs of children are taken care off. Pension has improved the health of older people (UNICEF, 2009)</p> <p>- South Africa, Zambia: Improved nutritional status has resulted from social pensions in South Africa; Unconditional cash transfer in Zambia has resulted in better nutrition and a reduction in child labour (Thomas, 2005)</p>		
Child Support Grant	<p>-South Africa: Improved children's health, nutrition and thus school readiness. Children have access to nutritious food. Household with social grants have lower prevalence of hunger amongst children (Leatt & Budlender, 2006)</p> <p>- South Africa: Child Support Grant in South Africa has reached large number children in short span (Lund et al., 2008)</p>		
Elimination of user fee	<p>-Uganda, Zambia, South Africa, Kenya, Burundi, Congo: Uganda- the elimination of user fee led to an 8% and 11.5% reduction in the probability of deprivation in health for adults and children. Kenya- reduction in user fee led to an increase in 70%. Congo Burundi, Kenya, South Africa- significant rise in access to health and education due to child benefit program and elimination of user fee</p>	<p>-Cambodia: rise in access to health due to child benefit program and elimination of user fee (Notton & Buligescu, 2008)</p>	

	(Notton & Buligescu, 2008)		
Food based transfers	-Gambia: improved maternal and healthcare and nutrition (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)	-Bangladesh: food for work schemes reduced malnutrition (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)	-Argentina has seen the delivering of food through neighbourhood mothers' committees (Gwatkin et al. 2005)
National scale up plans	- Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia: Joint Technical Missions- catalysed national policy and programme decisions and led to the development of national scale-up plans. Increased HIV testing in Zambia (UNDG 2009)	-Kazakhstan: up and improving the quality of prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission Programmes has reduced HIV transmission rates (UNDG 2009) -India: Joint Technical Missions- catalysed national policy and programme decisions and led to the development of national scale-up plans (UNDG 2009)	
National training programmes	-Namibia: My Future is My Choice (a national life skills based HIV-prevention training programme using peer education) has probably led to a sharp decline in prevalence of HIV (UNDG 2009)		
Performance-based financing	-Rwanda: , fiscal decentralisation, community health insurance, and performance based financing (El-Saharty et al.,2009)		-Haiti: performance-based incentives led to increased immunisation, better post and prenatal care, and increased assisted deliveries (Eichler et al., 2009) -Nicaragua: combining demand and supply-side incentives has improved health services and outcomes of poor households, especially preventive care and vaccination rates (Regalia & Castro, 2009)
Proxy means testing			-Colombia, Mexico - increased health access (Gwatkin et al., 2005)
Other			-Paraguay: Investing in People (a programme that tries to make the budget process more accessible and transparent to civil society) has seen the increase of quantity and quality of budgetary funds for social welfare (UNDG 2009)

Source: Sumner (2010).

Table 7. Studies on the effectiveness of social protection for education MDG outcomes

Type of social protection	Africa	Asia	Latin America
<p>Cash transfers (unconditional-UCT, and conditional- CCT), social pensions</p>	<p>-CCTs, UCTs have had positive impacts on school enrolment rates, grade retention (Kamerma n & Gabel, 2006)</p> <p>-Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia: CCTs, and social pensions led to greater participation in school due to improved health (Yablonski & O’Donnel, 2009)</p> <p>-Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia: cash transfer has had a positive impact on children’s education (Miriam, 2008)</p> <p>- Kenya, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho: social pension and cash transfer have led to an improvement in health leading to retention in school, and an increase in school attendance (UNICEF, 2007)</p> <p>-Malawi: UCT led to an increase in school enrolment, attendance and completion rates of children, increased health status(UNICEF, 2006)</p> <p>-Senegal, Mali, Congo, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gambia, Cameroon Liberia, Gabon, Burkina Faso Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Mali, Chad, Cape Verde: CCTs, UCTs, cash transfers, social pensions have meant that children have access to health and education facilities (UNICEF, 2009)</p> <p>-Somalia, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Niger: Pensions, CCTs and child benefits have increased enrolment rate among children, child labour has reduced, children have access to dietary variety and better health facilities (World Vision, 2008)</p>	<p>-CCTs, and UCTs, have had positive impacts on school enrolment rates, grade retention (Kamerma n & Gabel, 2006)</p> <p>- Afghanistan: Pensions and CCTs have increased enrolment rate among children, child labour has reduced, children have access to dietary variety and better health facilities (World Vision, 2008)</p> <p>-Bangladesh: Cash for education program (2002) led to a rise in school enrolment rate and nearly full attendance, with improvements in long-term opportunities for children (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)</p> <p>-Bangladesh: CCTs, UCTs, Cash transfers have increased education enrolment among children, retention in school has improved. Children’s health has improved (Barrientos & DeJong, 2004; Thomas, 2005)</p> <p>-South Asia: CCTs have increased access to health and education facilities for children (Barrientos & Dejong, 2006)</p> <p>-Mongolia: UCTs led to an increase in school enrolment rates (UNICEF, 2007)</p>	<p>-CCTs and UCTs, have had positive impacts on school enrolment rates, grade retention (Kamerma n & Gabel, 2006; World Bank 2003; Barrientos & Dejong, 2006)</p> <p>-Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador: CCTs have caused reduction in child labour, access to education for children, enrolment has improved, after school activities has reduced dropout rate (Tabatabatai, 2006)</p> <p>-Brazil, Nicaragua: CCTs. The Bolsa Escola in Brazil and RPS in Nicaragua has had dramatic effect on school enrolment and attendance, reduced repetition rates and improved performance. Raised awareness on girls education (Lund, Noble, & Wright, 2008)</p> <p>-Brazil: Bolsa Escola, CCTs have had a positive impact on education of children. Reduction in children engaged in labour, reduced dropout rates (Janvry, Finan, & Sadoulet, n/d; UNMP 2005; Yap Yoon-Tien et al., 2002; Barrientos & Holmes, 2006; Devereux 2006; Orlando 2004; Ravallion 2003; UNMP 2005; Miriam; 2008)</p> <p>- Brazil, Mexico, Honduras Nicaragua, Columbia: CCTs have had a positive impact on children’s health, education and nutritional level. Reduction in child labour, increased school enrolment (Rawling & Rubin, 2003; Thomas, 2005; Yablonski & O’Donnel, 2009; Barrientos &DeJong, 2004)</p> <p>-Chile: Solidario, CCT provides family subsidy for children has increased level of education as well as retention rates (Borzutzky, 2009; Barrientos &DeJong, 2004; Miriam, 2008)</p>

	<p>-South Africa, Zambia: CCTs and social pensions have improved health, increased enrolment in school especially for the girl child (Thomas, 2005; Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)</p> <p>-South Africa: CCTs, UCTs, and social pensions. Education enrolment among children, retention in school has improved. Improved children's health, nutrition and thus school readiness. Children have access to nutritious food (Barrientos & DeJong, 2004; Leatt & Budlender, n/d)</p> <p>-Zambia: Pilot cash transfer scheme Kalomo district (2004) improved nutrition and school attendance by children in beneficiary households (Barrientos & Holmes 2006; Devereux 2006)</p>		<p>- Colombia: Familias en Acción (2001/2), CCTs raised school attendance by 13% in urban sector and 5% in rural sector (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)</p> <p>-Mexico: Oportunidades (2002), CCTs improved enrolment rates for girls for boys, stronger impact on secondary school enrolments (Barrientos & Holmes 2006; Betcherman et al. 2004; Clemens 2004; Devereux 2006; DFID 2005; Orlando 2004; Ravallion 2003; UNICEF 2005; UNMP 2005)</p> <p>-Honduras: PRAF, a Household Allowance Program in Honduras, gave conditional cash transfers for education and health, and were effective (Orlando 2004)</p> <p>-Nicaragua: Red de Protección Social (2002), CCTs have caused enrolments to have risen by 22 percentage points (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006; Orlando 2004; UNMP 2005)</p> <p>-Peru: CCTs have caused a 20% increase in school enrolment (Jones, Vargas & Villar, 2006)</p>
Child benefits	<p>-Child benefits have had positive impacts on school enrolment rates, grade retention (Kamerma & Gabel, 2006)</p> <p>-Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia Kenya, Namibia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Zambia: cash transfers for children have reduced absenteeism (Help Age, IDS, Save the Children, 2005)</p> <p>-Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, Lesotho and Tanzania (United Republic of): child benefits have had a positive impact on school attendance, and increased enrolment of girl child in the school (ILO, 2008)</p> <p>-Congo, Burundi, Kenya, South Africa: child benefits have led to a significant rise in access to health and education (Notton &</p>	<p>-Child benefits have had positive impacts on school enrolment rates, grade retention (Kamerma & Gabel, 2006)</p> <p>- Afghanistan: child benefits have increased enrolment rate among children, child labour has reduced, children have access to dietary variety and better health facilities (World Vision, 2008)</p> <p>-Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam: child benefits have had a positive impact on school attendance, and increased enrolment of girl child in the school (ILO, 2008)</p> <p>-Bangladesh: child benefits. have increased education enrolment among children, retention in school has improved. Children's health has improved (Barrientos & DeJong, 2004)</p>	<p>- Child benefits have had positive impacts on school enrolment rates, grade retention (Kamerma & Gabel, 2006; World Bank 2003)</p> <p>-Brazil, Nicaragua: child benefits. The Bolsa Escola in Brazil and RPS in Nicaragua has had dramatic effect on school enrolment and attendance, reduced repetition rates and improved performance. Raised awareness on girls education (Lund, Noble, & Wright, 2008)</p> <p>-Mexico, Brazil, Chile: child benefits transfers have increased education enrolment among children, retention in school has improved. Children's health has improved (Barrientos & DeJong, 2004)</p>

	<p>Buligescu, 2008)</p> <p>-Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia: child benefits led to greater participation in school due to improved health (Yablonski & O'Donnel, 2009)</p> <p>-Malawi: child benefits led to an increase in school enrolment, attendance and completion rates of children, increased health status (UNICEF, 2006)</p> <p>-Somalia, Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Niger: Child benefits have increased enrolment rate among children, child labour has reduced, children have access to dietary variety and better health facilities (World Vision, 2008)</p> <p>-South Africa, Zambia: child benefits have improved health, increased enrolment in school especially for the girl child (Thomas, 2005; Barrientos & DeJong, 2004; Leatt & Budlender, n/d)</p>	<p>-Mongolia: child benefits led to an increase in school enrolment rates (UNICEF, 2007)</p>	
<p>Elimination of school fees, school waivers, stipends</p>	<p>-Ghana: the Alliance for Community Action runs a Girls' Education Credit Scheme to enable parents to pay for textbooks and tuition which has improved education measures (UNESCO 2000)</p> <p>-Kenya; Government abolished school fees which has led to a dramatic rise in the number of children going to school (DFID 2005; Government of Kenya 2005; Hartley 2008; UNMP 2004)</p> <p>-Malawi: eliminating school fees and abolishing compulsory uniforms has increased enrolment (UNESCO 2000; UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004)</p> <p>-Tanzania: elimination of school fees boosted enrolment (UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004)</p>	<p>-Bangladesh: Female Secondary School Stipend Programme (1994), UCT, led to a strong increase in enrolments at secondary school (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006; UNMP 2004)</p> <p>-Bangladesh, Cambodia: scholarship programmes for girls in secondary education that have encouraged access (Burnett, 2009)</p> <p>-Bangladesh, Indonesia: scholarships have increased secondary school enrolment (World Bank 2003)</p> <p>-Cambodia: Priority Action Programme (2000), fee waiver for school fees increased enrolment at both primary and secondary levels of education (Barrientos & Holmes, 2006)</p>	<p>-Colombia, PACES voucher program has improved education results (Clemens; 2004; UNMP 2005; King et al. 1998)</p> <p>-Chile: 'Secondary School for All' increased enrolment; Full School Day Initiative also increased enrolment (UNICEF 2005)</p>

	-Uganda: Education Sector Investment Programme, primary enrolments increased significantly (ODI 2003; Orlando 2004; UNESCO 2000; UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004)		
Food based transfers	-Cameroon, Morocco, Niger: School feeding programmes, combined with take home rations, have increased girls' enrolment by 50% (Save the Children, 2005; UNMP 2004; World Food Programme 2001) -Mozambique: School feeding programme has provided 378,000 learners with school meals, supports access to education (Devereux 2006) -Kenya: Government of Kenya introduced School Feeding Programme, improves school attendance and performance (Government of Kenya 2005; Save the Children, 2005; UNMP 2004)	-Bangladesh: Food for Education has encouraged school attendance (Betcherman, 2004; Orlando 2004; Ravallion 2003; World Bank 2003; UNMP 2005) -Bangladesh: Priority Action Campaign, provision of school meals and healthcare, measures to improve teacher training has improved education outcomes (Burnett, 2009) - Tamil Nadu (India): school feeding programmes and increased attendance and retention (UNMP 2004) - Pakistan: School feeding programmes, combined with take home rations, have increased girls' enrolment by 50% (Save the Children, 2005; World Food Programme 2001; UNMP 2004)	Jamaica: school feeding programmes and increased attendance and retention (UNMP 2004)
Provision of schools	-Egypt: provision of schools in local communities boosted enrolment (UNMP 2005)	-Bangladesh, BRAC has opened schools with high girls' enrolment in the poorest rural communities (UNESCO 2000; UNMP 2005) -Pakistan: Baluchistan Mobile Female Teaching Training Programme has increased access (UNESCO 2000; UNMP 2005) - Indonesia: provision of schools in local communities boosted enrolment (UNMP 2005)	-Quetta, Pakistan: private schools subsidies increased enrolment rates of girls and boys (Kim et al. 1998)
Health treatment	Kenya: school-based mass treatment of children for hookworm reduced student absenteeism by one-quarter (Miguel and Kremer 2003; UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004; Miguel & Kremmer 2004)	- India: iron supplementation and de-worming medicine to pre-school students decreased absenteeism 7 percent among 4- to 6-year-old children (UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004)	-Bolivia: Integrated Child Development Project, Improved physical, intellectual and social development of children (UNMP 2005)

<p>Improving primary school effectiveness</p>	<p>-Botswana: Primary Education Improvement Project, training teachers has improved education quality (UNMP 2004) -Kenya: interactive radio teaching improving learning for those in remote areas (Hanushek; 1995) - Namibia: Basic Education Teacher Diploma, training teachers has improved education quality (UNMP 2004)</p>	<p>-India: Rajasthan Training Program, training teachers has improved education quality (UNMP 2004) -Thailand: interactive radio teaching improving learning for those in remote areas (Hanushek, 1995)</p>	<p>-Brazil: Boletim da Escola, an annual school report card helps the community, the government, and the school adopt a shared vision of universal primary education (UNMP 2005; UNMP 2004) - El Salvador, EDUCO Program, lower teacher absenteeism, more textbooks, and lower teacher-to-pupil ratios (UNMP 2005; Jiminez & Sawada 1998) - Honduras, PROHECO, dropout and repetition rates are declining (UNMP 2005) -Nicaragua: interactive radio teaching improving learning for those in remote areas (Hanushek, 1995) - Venezuela: Radio interactive mathematics for basic education has improved learning (UNMP 2005)</p>
<p>Women's health</p>	<p>-Botswana: The Diphilana initiative, range of social sectors—health, education and social welfare—can be integrated to provide an imaginative response to the issue of schoolgirl pregnancy (UNMP 2005; Unterhalter et al., n/d) -Botswana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia: Changing policies to permit married and pregnant adolescents to attend school can also promote girls' attendance (UNESCO 2004)</p>		

Source: Sumner (2010).

Table 8. Initial mapping of major drivers and the changing context for ‘development’

Drivers	Characteristics	Implications
Economic – e.g. International markets - trade and capital flows, global value-chains	Volatility in global markets – food, fuel and finance. Aid volumes under threat and likely to come from more diverse sources/less conditionality/new conditionality. Global value chains with fewer links, more contracting in advance, and more impersonal dealings.	Growth threatened by volatile prices and recessions in western markets. Countries may lack expertise to manage trade and investment flow volatility.
Demographic – e.g. Population growth and differentiated demographic transitions and evolution of age structures and labour markets	South-central Asia will need to accommodate 759 million more people in 2050. However, the most striking evolution remains Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with a 100% increase of the population by 2050: nearly 1.8 billion people in 2050, more than the double of the 2010 population. In 2050, SSA population could exceed the Chinese population, and hence, will have one fifth of the world population. South Central Asia and Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) will have dramatic increases in labour supply. In contrast, East Asia (EA) will have a sharp decrease labour supply. SSA will carry on bearing the burden of a large inactive population for at least another decade. EA will soon have to deal with an age structure much less supportive of economic growth.	Greater conflict over resources. Faster rates of economic growth will be necessary to meet labour market expansions.
Environment – climate change and water scarcity amongst other issues	Changes in rainfall and rises in sea levels, with major consequences for natural life on the planet and increased variation in climate (cyclones, droughts, etc.). Of the changes predicted, those with the most widespread effects arise with rainfall. Patterns will alter, with different areas becoming wetter or drier. Some relatively well-populated areas already with semi-arid climates are likely to become drier. Water scarcity in such cases will be exacerbated. The seasonality of rainfall may become more pronounced, with greater potential for flooding in the wet season and for droughts in the dry. Rising sea levels threaten coastal areas with higher tides, storm surges, flooding of low-lying coastal areas. Some low-lying coastal areas, most notably river deltas, may become uninhabitable. Changed climates are in turn likely to affect ecosystems. In some cases this may mean that insects as disease vectors spread to previously unaffected areas (i.e. Malaria). Water scarcity will get worse due to economic growth and population will increase the demand for water, increasing the	Increased variations in agricultural production in response to more variable weather. More frequent storms and tidal surges will probably harm the poor more than others, since the poor often live in places with least protection and limited resilience to extreme weather — such as low-lying areas or unstable slopes liable to collapse when soaked by storms. More people living on even poorer resources or mass migration. Migration from one rural area to another can potentially lead to conflicts over land access with existing residents, especially where the latter have been using the resources extensively and claim rights over large areas. Migration out of areas with declining resources may also be to urban areas, throwing up the large encampments of environmental refugees living in extreme poverty on the margins of urban life. For health, both quality and quantity of

	likelihood of additional areas facing acute scarcity of water. And climate change as described above will change rainfall patterns, make them more erratic, and reduce storage in glaciers. While overall water supplies may not fall, uneven distribution through space and time will make for more scarcity.	water are essential issues. Contaminated water increases the likelihood of enteric disease and parasites, with young children most at risk. Lack of water means that washing is likely to be minimal with consequent potential for the spread of enteric diseases. In more humid areas, the rural poor may be affected by water scarcity in irrigation systems.
Technology - The spread of existing technologies - biotechnology and transgenics, and vaccine technology and new(er) technologies – industrial biofuel technologies, and information, communication technologies (ICTs).	Expansion and pirating of bio-tech. Large investments and ‘rolling out’ of vaccines. Increase in industrial production of bio-fuels for large-scale usage. Increase in range and spread of ICTs	Biotechnology optimists also advocate that it is the rural farmers and poor who will benefit the most from higher yields, lower risks, and larger outputs which will control the growth of food prices. Sceptics argue that it is the poor who suffer the most because biotechnology exacerbates trends towards industrialisation of agriculture, erosion of the diversity of agro eco systems and undermining farmers’ rights. Debates on Biofuel technology and its impact on the rural poor are fraught. ICTs have a range of impacts on the poor in terms of access to information, impacts on livelihoods and so on but cost is somewhat of a barrier.
Global governance	New policy discourses and narratives: the evolution of the aid effectiveness and ownership discourses. New actors and roles: New donors such as China and the Philanthropic Foundations, new roles for the EU following enlargement and NEPAD. New contexts and institutions: The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and reforms in IMF voting rights.	More aid and more diverse aid. There will be large increases in aid from various sources and a greater diversity and new types of aid. More voice for national governments internationally. Potentially more voice for the rural poor but this depends on national governance structures.

Source: Based on review in Sumner and Tiwari (2009).

Table 9. The global economic crisis: What happened? What didn’t?

What has happened in the crisis in developing countries?	What has not happened?
Slowdown in growth rates	But no overall developing country recession
Fall in export volumes	But very variable.
Fall in export unit values	But main problem is <i>rising</i> commodity prices
Reductions in FDI and repatriation of portfolio investment	No country-specific crises of the sort seen in the 1990s.
Banking problems in emerging markets.	Banking systems have held up well.
Falls in remittances affecting poorer countries	Too early to draw a definitive conclusion
Sovereign debt increasing	Could become a major issue
Trade credit expected to fall	Clear evidence of this problem hard to find.
Aid flows expected to fall	Some have cut, but no generalised fall.

Source: Humphrey and Sumner (2009).

Table 10. Selected examples of current and projected climate-change impacts on industry, settlement and society and their interaction with other processes

Climate driven phenomena	Evidence for current impact/vulnerability	Other processes/stresses	Projected future impact/vulnerability	Zones, groups affected
a. Changes in extremes				
Tropical cyclones, storm surge	Flood and wind casualties and damage; economic losses; transport, tourism; infrastructure (e.g. energy, transport); insurance	Land use/population density in flood-prone areas; flood defences; institutional capacities.	Increased vulnerability in storm-prone coastal areas; possible effects on settlements, health, tourism, economic and transportation systems.	Coastal areas, settlements and activities; regions and populations with limited capacities and resources; fixed infrastructure; insurance sector.
Extreme rainfall, riverine floods	Erosion/landslides; land flooding; settlements; transportation systems; infrastructure	Similar to coastal storms plus drainage infrastructure.	Similar to coastal storms plus drainage infrastructure.	Similar to coastal storms.
Heat- or cold-waves	Effects on human health; social stability; requirements for energy, water and other services (e.g. water or food storage); infrastructure (e.g. energy transportation)	Building design and internal temperature control; social contexts; institutional capacities.	Increased vulnerabilities in some regions and populations; health effects; changes in energy requirements.	Mid-latitude areas: elderly, very young and/or very poor.
Drought	Water availability; livelihoods, energy generation, migration, transportation in water bodies	Water systems; competing water uses; energy demand; water demand constraints.	Water-resource challenges in affected areas; shifts in locations of population and economic activities; add. investments in water supply.	Semi-arid and arid regions; poor areas and populations; areas with human-induced water scarcity.
b. Changes in means				
Temperature	Energy demands and costs; urban air quality; thawing of permafrost soils; tourism and recreation; retail consumption; livelihoods; loss of melt water	Demographic and economic changes; land-use changes; technological innovations; air pollution; institutional capacities.	Shifts in energy demand; worsening of air quality; impacts on settlements and livelihoods depending on melt water; threats to settlements/infrastructure from thawing permafrost soils in some regions.	Very diverse, but greater vulnerabilities in places and populations with more limited capacities and resources for adaptation.
Precipitation	Agricultural livelihoods; saline intrusion; water infrastructures; tourism; energy supplies	Competition from other regions/sectors; water resource allocation.	Depending on the region, vulnerabilities in some areas to effects of precipitation increases (e.g. flooding but could be positive) and in some areas to decreases.	Poor regions and populations.
Sea-level rise	Coastal land uses; flood risk, water logging; water infrastructure	Trends in coastal development, settlements and land uses.	Long-term increases in vulnerabilities of low-lying coastal areas.	Same as above.

Source: IPCC (2007).

Table 11. MDGs 1-7 and climate change relevant poverty impacts

Millennium Development Goals	Climate change relevant poverty impacts
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Climate change is likely to impact on poor people's livelihoods and food security by: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Reducing poor people's livelihood assets 3. Altering path and rate of economic growth 4. Undermining food security
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Destruction of schools/other assets by extreme events 6. Loss of livelihoods – reduced school attendance 7. Disaster-related migration of families
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	Reduced agricultural productivity/disasters can: Burden women's health; Limit women's time to participate in decision-making/income generation activities; Reduce livelihood assets for women
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Goal 5: Improve maternal health Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	Climate change-induced extreme weather events are likely to result in higher prevalence of vector- and water-borne diseases, declining food security and decreased availability of potable water
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Climate change will directly impact on natural resources, ecosystems and the earth's natural cycles. This is predicted to reduce the quality and quantity of natural resources and ecosystems.

Source: Urban and Sumner (2010).

Table 12. Types of pro-poor adaptation

Type of Adaptation	Poverty Category			
	Chronic Poor		Transient Poor	
	Always Poor	Usually Poor	Cyclical Poor	Occasionally Poor
Autonomous adaptation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict, crime, sex work • Selling of last assets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intra-community transfers/charity • Sending children to work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seasonal migration • Working multiple jobs, longer hours 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diversify livelihoods • Investment in social capital/ assets
Market-based adaptation		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote micro-finance, micro-insurance • Cattle insurance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weather-indexed insurance • Promote microfinance, micro-insurance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote micro-finance, micro-insurance • Selling assets
Policy driven adaptation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assisted migration • Cash transfers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community restocking schemes • Subsidised seed banks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ecosystem rehabilitation • Improved climate information (Seasonal forecasting) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social insurance programmes (health, crop, employment) • Irrigation schemes/ urban service provision

Source: Mitchell and Tanner (2009).

Table 13. MDG Resource estimates and climate-proofing costs

MDG costs by sector (\$bn p.a. for 2010-20)	ODA needs for MDGs	
	Cost 2010-20	of which ODA
Agriculture & nutrition	11.4	8.0
Nutrition & school feeding	5.7	4.0
Education	11.9	8.3
Health	40.0	28.0
Infrastructure	43.3	23.7
Statistics	0.4	0.3
SUB-TOTAL: MDG COST	112.7	72.3
Additional 'climate-proofing'		
	Coastal protection	0.8
	Disaster response	12.0
	Ecosystem management	not assessed
SUB-TOTAL: additional cost	12.8	12.8
GRAND TOTAL	125.5	85.1

Source: Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2009).

Table 14. Existing climate financing mechanisms

Financing Mechanism	How it works	Type of funding	Considerations for development/accelerating attainment of MDGs
Existing Finance Mechanisms – Mitigation			
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)	CDM (Article 12, Kyoto Protocol) allows countries with emission-reduction/limitation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement emission-reduction projects in developing countries. These projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, equivalent to one tonne of CO ₂ , which can be counted towards meeting emission reduction/limitation targets.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Carbon market ▪ Financed through CER issuance fees, start up donations from Annex I countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promotes investment in low carbon technologies in developing countries; potential to create new industries and employment ('green' jobs) and stimulates investment for mitigation only but also used to generate additional revenue for adaption (Adaptation Fund) ▪ Benefits of CDM not evenly distributed; majority of projects in larger emerging economies ▪ Barriers for poor countries: complex project approval process requires institutional capacity; high transaction costs ▪ Carbon offsetting can be seen as perpetuating reliance on carbon and unsustainable lifestyles in developed countries
Joint Implementation	Similar to CDM; allows for investment in emission reduction projects in other developed countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Carbon market 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Does not extend to developing countries so no direct benefit for MDGs; potential for raising further

			revenue for adaption
Emissions Trading (e.g. EU Emissions Trading Scheme)	Annex B Parties with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have accepted targets for limiting or reducing emissions over the period 2008 – 2012. Countries that have emission units to spare – emissions permitted them but not ‘used’ – can sell this excess capacity to countries that are over their targets (Article 17, Kyoto Protocol).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Carbon market ▪ Cap and trade system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Aim is to ‘cap’ emissions to bring about a global reduction in emissions; strategy suitable for developed countries but least developed countries tend to have low emissions ▪ No direct benefit for attainment of MDGs; benefit is global and long-term but potential for raising additional revenue for adaption through auctioning of emissions allowances or levies
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)	<p>The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) promotes scaled-up financing for deployment, transfer of low-carbon technologies with potential for long-term emissions savings.</p> <p>The Strategic Climate Fund (STC) is an umbrella framework for three targeted programs with dedicated funding to pilot approaches:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Scaling up Renewable Energy Programme in low income countries (SREP) b. Forest Investment Programme (FIP) c. Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Both are multilateral trust funds (ODA) ▪ Administered by World Bank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The CIFs have been criticised by civil society groups for creating parallel structures outside the ongoing multilateral framework for climate change negotiations and within a process dominated by G8 countries (climate funds update). ▪ Much of investment from CTF has been in middle income rather than low income countries e.g. Mexico, Egypt, Turkey ▪ SREP has a particular focus on low income countries which could assist in attaining MDGs ▪ PPCR provides funding for adaptation; PPCR has been criticized because funding for developing country adaptation is largely through (concessional) loans (Muller 2008).
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)	Assists developing countries in efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) by increasing their capacity to participate in a future REDD system (Readiness Fund) and providing incentives for verifiable reductions in emissions (Carbon Fund).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Multilateral fund (ODA) ▪ Administered by World Bank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Some concern that REDD objective must be balanced with the need to take into account the rights of indigenous people to avoid negatively impacting their socio-economic development
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund	GEEREF will invest globally in energy efficiency and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Public-private partnership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Designed to leverage public

(GEEREF)	renewable energy projects in developing countries and economies in transition. Sub-funds with a regional focus will provide the project financing.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Administered by European Commission 	<p>funds (ODA)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential to promote low carbon technologies
Existing Finance Mechanisms – Adaptation			
Adaptation Fund (AF)	The Adaptation Fund was established by the governing body of the Kyoto Protocol in 2007 to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries that are parties to the Protocol.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multilateral Fund Financed by a 2% levy on CDM proceeds Administered by Adaptation Fund Board 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activities likely to share traditional development objectives LDCs and Small Island Developing States are explicitly represented on Board and in decision-making Potential for alignment with MDGs but does not use ODA Uncertainty about scale of resources to be raised through 2% levy on CER trading; depends on size of market and prices
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)	The SCCF was established under the Climate Convention to finance the implementation of long-term adaptation measures that increase the resilience of national development sectors to the impacts of climate change.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multilateral fund (ODA) Administered by GEF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activities likely to share traditional development objectives Some concern that SCCF has disproportionately funded projects in countries with relatively low rates of poverty (Mitchell, Anderson and Huq, 2008)
Least Developed Countries Fund for Climate Change (LDCF)	The LDCF was established to finance the special needs of LDCs under the Climate Convention; gives priority to adaptation and the National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multilateral fund (ODA) Administered by GEF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aimed directly at some of the world's poorest countries Activities likely to be aligned with traditional development objectives and MDGs
Existing Finance Mechanisms – General			
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund	GEF Trust Fund is the common funding resource of the GEF; climate change is one of six focal areas. Funds for Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) sourced by Fund.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multilateral fund (ODA) Administered by GEF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> General fund that supports both mitigation and adaptation activities.

Source: Mitchell (2010).

Table 15. Broad options for 'after 2015'

	More of the same	Build on MDG approach	Something more radical?
Idea/narrative	Extend the deadline – say to 2025.	Build on progress made with the MDGs.	'One-world' - beyond aid to climate or financial taxes/global 'new deal'.
Indicators	Existing MDGs with minimal changes.	MDG 'inner core' or universal indicators + locally defined 'outer core' indicators.	More broadly defined equity and wellbeing; climate adaptation, etc.
Architecture	Existing architecture – donor/recipient relationship, etc.	Existing architecture – donor/recipient relationship, etc.	Certain levels of deprivation trigger co-ordinated response

Table 16. Key MDG issues for 2010-2015

	Localising and adapt the MDGs	'De-aiding' the MDGs – think of the MDGs beyond aid	Focusing policy on equity and thinking cross sectorally
What?	Adapt the MDGs at country level in terms of indicators and targets; to climate change and a post-crisis, to more uncertain world.	Resources matter but an earlier over-emphasis on resource issues alone has led to neglect of important non-resource questions.	Make stronger links between the equity and rights agenda in the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs
Why?	Localisation is an essential pre-requisite to policy adoption in budget and national strategies.	Policy actions and institutional reforms can be equally or more important to progress and innovative finance is emerging in health, climate, etc.	Most countries making progress are focusing on cross-cutting issues such as gender empowerment, linking up health, education and nutrition and viewing the MDGs as a 'package'; concern the poorest are being left behind.
How?	Facilitation of national processes to adapt the MDGs to local circumstances; Learning from the many countries who have done so already.	Review of evidence on what works in similar context across policy actions, institutional reform and resource issues.	Focus policy on equity and the poorest as per the Millennium Declaration; Greater concentration on gender and the new UN agency to support this; Increasing emphasis on poor people's adaptation to climate change

Table 17. Potential changes in ‘development’ as a result of major global changes 2010-2020

Domain	Potential changes
Shifting ideas in development	<p>The means of development – the Washington Consensus has been declared dead (again) in terms of the primacy of markets and international openness; there is a dispersal of intellectual authority but the vacuum left is not yet being filled by alternatives other than perhaps a ‘Beijing Consensus’ (i.e. state-led, strategic global integration; strong social policy)?</p> <p>The ends of development – There is a questioning of what is ‘progress’ or what is a ‘good society’ – is growth progress? What values matter? Is redistribution back (again)? How can we go on without putting environment at centre of development?</p>
Shifting interests in development	<p>There is the decline of US/Western power/hegemony and shifting economic power to the BRICs and China in particular illustrated in the shift from the G8 to G20 and likely to accelerate given debt trends in the North; and IFI governance reform is on table (again);</p> <p>There are a series of ‘moral crises’. For example, who pays for climate change adaption and mitigation; and the cost of the crisis bailout versus undelivered aid promises (notably the ‘missing’ US\$20bn/year promised at Gleneagles in 2005).</p>
Shifting institutions in development	<p>There is some sense that this is the end of a relatively stable era and the future may be living with greater uncertainty as the norm.</p> <p>There is some sense that development is not only about ‘developing countries’; development is more global and there are ‘common interests’ but at the same time ‘developing countries’ are a much smaller group of countries due to the emergence of a number of ‘emerging economies’ at the same time as the existence of a number of ‘fragile’ countries;</p>

Source: Sumner (2010).



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This policy paper is funded by BMZ.



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