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The Need for Policy Coherence
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An Aid Regime at Work
European Aid and Transnational Policy Export
into Nepal and Tanzania

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Abstract

This study set to ask how the European Union – as the major source of development financing and transnational policy export – combines universal norms with the changing nature of its policies towards different regions. Apart from the inside of the EU, there are at least three types of regions that are the targets of policy export: the ‘near abroad’ of Europe (regions East and South of the EU); the regions ‘beyond’ that are ‘associated’ with the EU (i.e. the ACP); and the other regions ‘beyond’ (Asia, Latin America). In the regions ‘beyond’, policy export may seem less intensive, yet remains no less important. It is argued that policy export stems from the very values of the Union and from the character of its borders. The perpetually changing borders of the Union feed policy export to an increasing number of countries and regions.

Corresponding to different regions, the EU has different modalities and methods of policy export. Different methods, in turn, correspond with domestic solutions to combining democracy with inequalities. The idea is that domestic solutions may help to explain and understand how problems are perceived and the solutions transmitted abroad. Three major solutions, liberal, equalitarian and statist correspond with the three major approaches to democracy promotion: persuasion, association and status quo.

A comparison of policy export into two developing countries, Tanzania with an associated status and Nepal without, was conducted to provide further evidence to the matter. The tentative outcomes of the two case countries reveal that the dominant approach remains liberal, whereas status quo reigned when stability raised concern. In the end, three scenarios of the future of European policy export will be presented.

Introduction

This study starts with the notion that the European Union (EU, consisting of the European Community and the Member States) is not only the leading provider of development aid, but also the major source of transnational policy export. The former claim is less interesting, a mere consequence of the simple economics of scale – with its 28 member states, the EU already makes up the world's largest economic unit and can provide aid more than any other unit.

Instead, the latter claim is more challenging, because, as will be argued, policy export stems from the very values of the Union and from the character of its borders. The EU promotes the values upon which it was founded and without which the whole endeavour would collapse. These values include democracy, multilateralism and social responsibility, among others (EU 2003; EU 2006). Democracy, human rights and the rule of law are held as universal, that is, non-violable under any circumstances. Instead, it remains an issue of considerable debate whether social responsibility should resonate beyond the borders of the Union.

Which brings us to my second argument: the borders of the EU are 'dizzy' (Christiansen et al. 2000), perpetually changing and constantly debated and speculated as to who should be let 'in' and who should be kept 'out'. Accordingly, the simultaneous enlargement and exclusion have led to a continuous reconstruction of the 'intermediate' regions around the Union as separate from the 'inside' of the EU and the regions 'beyond'. Both the intermediate regions and the regions 'beyond' are targets of significant policy export. However, since the EU lacks a comprehensive policy towards region-to-region relations, the policy initiatives tend to lack coherence. In particular, there seems to be considerable discrepancy between the universal norms the EU claims to promote, on the one hand, and the changing nature of its policies towards different regions, on the other.

A number of questions can be posed: What is policy export and how was it constructed in the first place in the European foreign policies? How does policy export function within the European development policies? What is the mechanism through which the exported policies and norms are being transmitted into recipient countries and eventually adopted by the recipients of the European aid?

Before addressing these questions, let us first restate the arguments and elaborate them accordingly. So as to restate my first argument, I will claim that the very identity of the EU is based on certain values which draw from the history of Europe. Therefore the European Union is a unique political unit, a species of its own. Unlike an empire, it is not based on conquering or subjugation. Unlike any national state, the EU is not based on any given borders within which a given people claims its nationhood and identity. Instead, the collective identity of the union draws from collective memories and common interests.

Benedict Anderson (1983) has argued that the modern national state is an imagined community. The community is always for large that we could personally know all its members. Yet we do identify ourselves with our national states – to the extent that most of us are ready to die for it, if need be. In other words, the state is but a social construction, yet a powerful one. If states are imagined communities, then the EU, as a union of states, is a double-imagined community.

For the existence and functioning of such an imagined community, not to mention a double-imagined one, the community certainly needs some material backing too, some tangible benefits for the members of the community. The national state offers, at a minimum, protection from anarchy and the ‘war of all against all’ (Hobbes); at a maximum, prosperity and social security – as well as a community for its members to identify themselves with.

Similarly, after two world wars, Europe was desperately in need for peace, prosperity, and a new identity. Forging a community between the former enemies – France, Germany, Italy, and the UK – provided Europe with peace and prosperity. It also provided Europe with a new identity in a world where Europe was losing its colonies and its former hegemonic position.

So far so good, the EU offers peace, prosperity and a collective identity in the world. What Europe, what world? Where does Europe end – and where does the world ‘outside’ begin? Unlike Africa, the Americas, or Australia which are bordered by the seas, Europe is but a western peninsula of the larger Asian continent, lacking a clear border between the two. That is why the European borders remain ‘dizzy’. So as to restate my second argument, I will claim that the perpetually changing borders of the Union feed policy export to ever new countries and regions.

Policy export into new regions

Ever since the constitution of the community, through the Treaty of Rome (1957), the idea of ‘association’ of areas outside the community was adopted. The Treaty defined the position of the French and Belgian overseas possessions in Africa as ‘associated’. It was a kind of kick-start of the European policy export. As distinct from subjugation, the idea of policy export expects that the ‘associated’ have, at least in principle, the possibility to negotiate and even reject.¹ Furthermore, unlike colonisation, association was multilateral in character. At first the option of association was limited to Africa and only concerned trade and aid.

In 1973, the UK joined the community and thereby the policy of association became global (van Reisen 2007). A major innovation in development policies, the Lomé Conventions (from 1975 to 2000) not only linked new geographical areas for association – the Caribbean and Pacific – but also added new policy issues to policy export: in addition to trade and aid, the idea of solidarity and partnership. Although very vague and perhaps patronising, these ideas were, nevertheless, meant to serve the construction of Europe as a soft power in the North-South relations and in the world affairs in general.

In the 1980s, Portugal and Spain - the very first and last colonial empires – joined the European community. Their accession was preceded by a huge aid package to the candidate countries, helping to reform their economies, to build up democratic governance and in all ways make them fit with the membership of the community. This was policy export in full speed.

The subsequent enlargement, during the 1990s, followed the end of the Cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union. The rapid change left the former east Europe free to look for a new identity – and most of them sought for a membership of the European Union as part of their new identity. This time the recipe for policy export was already tested and fully developed during the accession of southern European member states.

The new member states also added to the geographical range of the European policy of association. Spain, in particular, has acted as a bridge between Europe and the Latin American

¹ It can be argued whether the people of the then Belgian and French colonies had any real possibility of rejection. However, van Reisen (2007: 31-33) points out that, from the very beginning, Africans actively sought for a role in the community.

countries. On the other hand, the new southern European member states added to the importance of the Mediterranean countries: partly because they compete with similar products, partly because of migration and other close relations with North African countries. The new member states in the Middle and East Europe, in turn, have closer relations with the post-Soviet countries in Caucasus and Central Asia, where their aid programmes are mainly focused.

In conclusion, there are at least three type of regions that are the targets of policy export, apart from the inside of the EU; (1) the ‘Near Abroad’ of Europe, which is the object (and, hopefully, a subject) of the most intensive policy export (regions East and South of the EU); (2) the regions ‘beyond’ that are ‘associated’ with the EU (the ACP); and (3) the other regions ‘beyond’ (Asia, Latin America). In the regions ‘beyond’, policy export may seem less intensive, yet remains no less important all the same.

The modalities and methods of European policy export

EU’s external relations are based on a ‘dual system’ (Youngs 2004: 28-30). Trade policy is within the Commission’s exclusive competence. In contrast, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established in 1993, is intergovernmental, with decision making by consensus. Development assistance, in turn, incorporates the dual system with part of the ‘European aid’ being channelled through the Commission, but member states retain their sovereignty over their bilateral aid programmes. Accordingly, in terms of actors, issue areas and policy goals, policy export takes place mainly through three modalities (See below Table 1.)

In the issue area of trade policy, the commission has exclusive power to negotiate with third countries. The official policy goal is to integrate developing countries within the world economy. Currently the trade regime is being reformed so that the one-sided benefits enjoyed by the APC countries under the Lomé Conventions will be replaced by regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) so as to fit with the rules of the WTO.²

² The issue area of trade policy will not be discussed in this paper.

Table 1. Major issue areas, main actors and official European development policy goals

Issue area	Major actors	Official EU policy goals
Terms of trade	Commission	Integration within the world economy
Aid	Commission Member States	Poverty reduction, sustainable development and democracy
Security	Member States	Peace and stability

In the issue area of security, the member states hold their sovereign right of decision-making. The Commission has neither material resources, nor legal competence here. It is true that the Treaty of Nice (2001) reinforced the role of the Political and Security Committee and established the Military Staff of the EU. However, the general rule remains that in matters related with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions always require a unanimous vote.

The issue area of aid incorporates the dual system. Officially the member states have agreed to follow the principles set in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and Amsterdam Treaty (1997) concerning coherence, complementarity, co-ordination, and consistency (the four C's). In practice, however, the co-ordination of aid policies takes place on a voluntary basis.

The aid policies of the member states greatly differ in volume, geographical distribution and content.³ The volume of ODA from the member states varies considerably, even when the twelve new member states are excluded. In 2005, the 'old' fifteen member states contributed, on average, US\$3,700 million (or 0.44 as a per cent of GNI).⁴ Whereas France, Germany and the UK each contributed to over \$10,000 million; Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal each provided less than \$1,000 million.

³ See Hoebink & Stokke (2005).

⁴ In current terms (ibid.). Data from the OECD (2006).

In addition to the huge differences in scale, the allocation of bilateral aid significantly differs from one member state to another. When excluding debt cancellation to Iraq (usually counted as ODA), the top ten recipients of ‘real’ assistance varied immensely between the member states. In this connection, however, it may be well placed to focus on the poverty orientation of the aid. For practical purposes, the poverty orientation of an aid programme can be defined both quantitatively, in terms of aid to poor countries (least developed countries, or LDCs, and other low-income countries, or LICs) and qualitatively, as aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.⁵ The share of ODA to LDCs varied between 80 percent (Portugal) and 20 percent (Austria), with the EU average falling at 39 percent of all aid. There was much less variation in aid proportions destined to LICs, which comes as no surprise given the much larger number of countries in this group. In both cases, aid from the average EU country was consistently more poverty-oriented than the OECD donors’ average.⁶

Similarly, the share of aid to Sub-Saharan Africa varied strongly, from 88 percent (Portugal) to 6 percent (Greece), with the EU average being at 47 percent of total ODA. Since most of the countries in this region belong to the group of LDCs there is strong overlap between the aid policy performances. Let us note, however, that the average EU country allocates almost half (47 percent) of its aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, against the OECD average of 33 percent (OECD 2007).

Insofar as comparative aid data indicates any genuine poverty orientation in European aid policies, the possibility of social responsibility could be confirmed. There are, however, obvious historical and geopolitical reasons for the European countries to strengthen their relations with Africa, particularly for the former colonial powers and the countries of southern Europe. Therefore, we need a better explanation for the differences in development policies.

There is growing evidence in favour of the claim that domestic structures may help explain variation in foreign policy behaviour, particularly in the case of development policies (Stokke 1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Noël & Thérien 1995, 2000; Siitonen 2005). Among the domestic

⁵ Both definitions can be debated. For a discussion on poverty orientation as an aid regime norm, see pp. 78-79 and 83-84 in Siitonen (2005).

⁶ The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD comprises Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, and the 15 ‘old’ EU member states as well as the Commission. OECD aid averages 35% to LDCs and 20% to LICs, against the EU averages of 39% to LDC and 24% to LICs (OECD 2007).

structures that best explain variation are the institutional attributes of the welfare state and a closely related variable, cumulative partisan strength (i.e. the number of years a leftist political party has been in government). Correspondingly, there are three ideal solutions for combining democracy with inequality and poverty: liberal, statist and equalitarian.⁷ In the liberal solution, the state is expected to encourage market and subsidise private welfare schemes (as in Australia, Canada and the US). In the statist solution, the benefits are attached to class and status (with Austria, France, Germany, and Italy as examples). Finally, the equalitarian solution is based on universalism and extends the benefits also to the middle classes (with the Scandinavian countries as primary examples). The idea is that domestic solutions may help in explaining and understanding how problems are perceived and the solutions transmitted abroad. The question is, whether such differences help in explaining variation in the means and ways of policy export.

From an analytical point of view, the methods of policy export can be presented as a continuum of policies, from the least coercive to the most coercive:

1. By **persuasion**, meaning classic diplomacy, promises of aid as well as the threat of withholding aid and other economic sanctions;
2. By **association**, where aid and other benefits are offered on a contractual, stable basis within a multinational framework.
3. By **enforcing the status quo**, including support to the regime through direct and indirect military interventions.

The method of persuasion is the least coercive and contains various means, from technical advice to diplomatic persuasion and pressure to economic rewards and punishments. As such, it comes close to what Liberalism stands for: rational choice by rational actors. The idea is that rational leaders of the states concerned should accept political changes as the cost of rewards that Europe will offer. Europe is only committed to assistance and support for democratic development as long as the conditions are met. Otherwise the method works according to the logic of exclusion: neither promises for additional aid, nor memberships are on offer.

⁷ The solutions correspond to what Esping-Andersen (1990) has named as liberal, corporatist and social democratic welfare-state regimes.

The method of persuasion is being mainly applied to the developing regions that have been excluded from potential association and membership of the EU: developing countries in Asia (excluding the Mediterranean countries) and Latin American countries (excluding the Caribbean countries).

The method of association offers the same means as the method of persuasion plus the possibility of association or membership. It is more coercive in a sense that in addition to pressure and economic punishments, the method also includes the threat of loss of associate or candidature status. The logic of enlargement expects an applicant state not only to change its political system but also to adopt European policies in various areas of social life (environment, education etc.). Elements of this form of policy export are gradually included in associative relations as well. However, since the applicant states are given the equal rights of membership, this method can be considered more equalitarian than liberal. Similarly, the associated states are given a clear commitment for continued assistance and, at least in principle, the option to collectively negotiate on the conditions of assistance.

Whereas membership in the EU is clearly defined, the number of possible candidates for membership remains disputable.⁸ Indeed, “the external borders of the European Union (EU) are becoming increasingly difficult to delineate as it exports policies to states beyond its own membership” (Christiansen *et al.* 2000: 389). The method of association is being used most coercively towards candidate countries such as Croatia and Turkey. It also applies to the ‘Near Abroad’ of the EU: Eastern European countries between the EU and Russia, the Near East and the southern Mediterranean countries.

Furthermore, policy export affects the associated ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. Political conditions were first included in the Lomé IV (1990-2000) convention, which set respect for human rights as the condition for the continuation of the association. The Cotonou convention of 2000 (for the years 2000-2020) added political dialogue and further political conditions (Holland 2002:197; Laakso 2007; see also Grilli 1993).

⁸ For the moment, membership is limited to ‘European’ states, the definition of which, however, remains a politically disputed matter.

The method of enforcing the status quo is the most coercive method and may include various forms of military intervention. In its extreme mode, it encompasses military occupation, political settlement and usually some sort of aid package.⁹ It is most clearly linked with power politics and thereby also to the colonial history of European powers: Historically, colonial domination was justified by a promise to address ‘tropical anarchy’ in southern countries (Sampson 2002). Today, the fear of anarchy is again being used as justification for ‘humanitarian interventions’ in the South. Such interventions may combine peace-keeping operations, humanitarian aid and civilian crisis management, including democratization.

The European Rapid Reaction Force was created by the end of 2003 to intervene in humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. So far the Force has been fully deployed only once outside Europe, to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The current operation in Darfur, Sudan, is likely to be an even larger operation.

All in all, the simultaneous logic of enlargement and exclusion in different parts of the world contribute to the different roles and identities of the EU. The inside of the Union is dominated by democratic peace. Towards the regions ‘outside’ the union, various methods are being used, depending on the status of the region. The ‘intermediate’ regions tend to be the target of more coercive methods; at the same time attention is being paid to the institution building and thereby to prevailing inequalities and poverty in the countries concerned. In contrast, the regions ‘beyond’ are treated either with association or persuasion. The expectation is that in both cases the opening of the market and good governance will take care of poverty and growing inequality. Finally, the most coercive methods, such as cutting all aid or democratization by force, would be applied only to states where stability is at stake and therefore the approach is one of maintaining the status quo. A comparison of different approaches to two recipient countries, one with an associated status and another without, may provide further evidence to the matter.

⁹ Historically, we know at least two cases, Germany and Japan, which were democratized by force (Burnell 2000). The more recent cases, Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq, have proved to be much more challenging and, at least so far, much less successful examples.

Policy export into Nepal and Tanzania

In order to analyse the role of European policy export through aid, it appears fruitful to make the distinction between norm transmission and norm adoption. A norm has been transmitted when the prescriptions embodied in a norm become part of the domestic political discourse; it has been adopted only when the prescriptions have made constitutive effects on the state practices. (Checkel 1999; Siitonen 2005). The question is how different modes of norm transmission concerning democracy and poverty reduction contribute to the adoption of international norms and, thereby, to the possible consolidation of democracy. Two recipient countries of European aid, Nepal and Tanzania, will serve as examples. Nepal represents a non-associated developing country and Tanzania an ACP country. Comparing two countries so different as Nepal and Tanzania would hardly make sense. Instead, the purpose is to compare European policy export into the two countries.

By the size of their populations, Nepal (27 million) and Tanzania (38 million) are middle-sized nations (see Table 2). Population growth is very rapid, however, with the population having almost doubled in both countries during the last two decades. In geographical terms, Nepal is rather small whereas Tanzania is middle-sized. Economically both are relatively small and poor economies and categorised by the UN as least developed countries (LDCs). Human development was ranked low in both countries, around 0.5, which corresponds to a ranking around 150 (out of 177 countries in 2006).

Table 2: Nepal and Tanzania compared, 2004

	Nepal	Tanzania
Population (thousands)	26,591	37,627
GDP (US\$ billions)	6,7	10,9
GDP per capita (US\$)	252	288
Average Life Expectancy	62	46
Adult Literary Rate (%)	49	69
Human development index /Rank	0.527 /138	0.430 /162

Source: UNDP 2006.

As the recipients of ODA, Tanzania is far more successful in attracting foreign aid funds than Nepal. For each Tanzanian, aid accounted for \$39.30 in 2006, whereas the average Nepalese only received \$15.80. The European Union accounted for over half (53.7%) of all the ODA to Tanzania from the OECD area over the years 2001-2005. The UK (15%) and the Netherlands (7%) contributed most, with Japan (6%) as the third largest donor. During the same period, Nepal received almost half (41%) of all ODA from the Commission and the member states. Japan (18%), Germany (12%) and the UK (12%) were among the leading donors. Accordingly, the EU can be said to be the leading source of development aid in both countries.¹⁰

Tanzanian democratization is a major example of the aid regime at work. The common understanding is that already before any donor state or international organisation formally set democracy as a condition for future aid, the government was prepared to lead the country to multi-party democracy. In 1992, after almost three decades of a single-party authoritarian rule, the ruling party CCM (*Chama cha Mapinduzi*) readily accepted that it was time to introduce pluralist democracy in the country. Since then, three multi-party elections were held (in 1995, 2000 and 2005). In the mainland Tanzania, the elections were considered peaceful and relatively fair and free. So far, the leading party CCM has managed to gain a clear majority in all the votes. (Hossain *et al.* 2003: 84 ff.) In terms of the European policy export, everything looks more or less fine and well in Tanzanian politics and the country is again a donor darling.

In contrast, the autonomous island state of Zanzibar, which was united with mainland Tanganyika in 1963 to become the United Republic of Tanzania, offers a different view to the policy export. The major opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF) has consistently refused to recognize election results. After mass demonstrations and violence in 2001 that led to over 20 people dead and emigration to the neighbouring Kenya, the EU cancelled aid to Zanzibar. Aid was, however, again resumed after an agreement between CCM and CUF was brokered in 2001. It is likely that the fear of the Islamists taking the power in an independent Zanzibar seems to have effected the decision. Still, the political situation remains fragile.

¹⁰ Figures calculated from the data in OECD (2007).

As an associated country since 1969, Tanzania is a signatory state of the Cotonou Convention. The EU is represented by the Commission and the member states. During the 1980s, the donor countries pushed hard to convince the Tanzanian government to accept an agreement with the World Bank and to give up its policy of socialism and self-reliance. Under pressure, and conscious of the economic setbacks and the related growing discrepancy between socialist policies and actual practices, the government accepted the agreement and started liberalising the economy. This experience was a major lesson for the elites, who found themselves increasingly dependent on foreign assistance. It also gives a clue to why the elites were so ready to introduce multi-party democracy.

The Nepalese democratization began 1990 as a classical bottom-up revolt against the traditional ruling elite that lost much of its credibility. The process, however, turned into political instability and civil war in 1996 and has resulted in more than 13,000 deaths in ten years. The conflict reached the level of civil war although it was consistently called a 'Maoist revolt' by both the government and the donors. Most donors, however, see the conflict in Nepal as being inherently political in nature. The Maoists have been successful in incorporating the striking inequalities and the cause of ethnic minorities into their struggle (Hossain *et al.* 2007). The war has only recently ended.

After February 2005, when the King of Nepal dissolved his government and resumed absolute power, most donors remained in the country but declined to make new commitments. With a cease-fire and the formation of an interim government in early 2007 consisting of the old parties and the Maoists, Nepal has a new opportunity for democracy. The donors, however, have taken a reserved attitude and continue to try to keep stability and the status quo.

The comparison of policy export into Nepal and Tanzania yields following tentative outcomes. In the case of top-down democratization, as in the mainland Tanzania, the European approach to norm transmission was liberal at the best. Except for some technical aid, no serious attempt was made towards institution building, which could respond to the prevailing poverty and growing inequality that can threaten the consolidation of democracy. A further problem of democratization is the almost total lack of organised bottom-up opposition (except in Zanzibar). In the case of bottom-up democratization, as in Zanzibar and Nepal, the European approach focused mainly on stability and thereby only strengthened the status quo. In both

examples, the ‘bottom-up’ represents the ‘wrong’ type of political forces (the Islamists in Zanzibar, the Maoists in Nepal); both of these, however, successfully raise the issue of inequality. Therefore, although democracy as a norm has been fairly successfully transmitted, the possibility of norm adoption depends on how the problems caused by growing inequalities can be solved.

The dilemma is that one cannot have democracy without organised opposition – but one can hardly have democracy if the opposition turns into violence. In both cases, the European democracy assistance mainly supports the status quo. It is true that part of the so-called democracy assistance goes to the development of media, NGOs and local governments as well. However, at least in Nepal and Tanzania, only the media has so far been able to disturb the status quo.

The future of European policy export

I will end with three scenarios for the future European policy export:

1. Policy export only needs some small fixing and it will soon prove its efficiency in attaining the policy goals.
2. Policy export does not work, because it is arrogant and based on a post-colonial set-up.
3. Policy export for democracy may work, but we need to think about it all over and find new modalities and tools.

The first scenario is realist in a way, because so much prestige and resources have already been invested into the European policy export that Europe would not easily stop it or change its major modalities. Europe wants to be a power to be taken into account in the world affairs.¹¹ Its primary means are those of soft power: trade, aid, and crisis management – the only muscles it has. Once the integration process within Europe is ready, the resources will be increasingly used to external policies.

The second scenario is critical. From the very beginning, policy export was a colonial exercise, aiming to keep the imperial connections alive through association. Until 1975, the

¹¹ See, e.g., Laporte (2007).

European aid was nothing but French post-colonial African policy carried out in the name of Europe.¹² Once the UK joined the community, there was a conflict between the French regional focus on Africa and the British global focus. The outcome was a compromise, the ACP, which is neither a region, nor a region in the making, but an odd collection of three post-colonial sub-regions.¹³ Besides, the European democracy promotion has been “high on rhetoric, low on delivery“.¹⁴ Globalization, regionalization and the new actors, such as the AU, China and India, will offer alternatives that will end the European monopoly over the ACP area: no monopoly, no policy export.

I will call the third scenario constructivist. It begins by questioning the mechanisms of policy export: even when it follows from the identity of Europe and the logic of integration, that alone does not yet make it a necessity. An identity is a social construction and can be reshaped. Just like Europe found a new identity after the WWII, it can find another now that the Cold War is over and the integration process comes close to ready. Europe is rich with experiences in democratization and social responsibility towards its own peripheries.¹⁵ Instead of only supporting the status quo, Europe could find a role in supporting those on the bottom, giving a voice to the poor and underprivileged. After all, a democratic world would be safer for the Europeans as well.

¹² It has been claimed that, at least in the beginning, association only meant the multilateralization of the French policies in Africa. See van Reisen (2007), 34-36.

¹³ Particularly, the Africans would have preferred to keep Africa as one, but the ACP cuts the continent between the Mediterranean countries and the sub-Saharan countries.

¹⁴ Crawford (2007)

¹⁵ See, a.o., Seers (1979).

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