Parallel Session: Global Governance, SADC and Liberation Movements as Governments in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe

The session was jointly organized by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the University of Bologna and chaired by Mario Zamponi (Bologna). It took place on the same day when the run-off elections in Zimbabwe were held despite all international protests and the appeals even from the SADC organ on security to postpone the second round of presidential elections after Morgan Tsvangirai had pulled out earlier on due to the wave of repression. Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis hence was a focal point of the debates, but seen in the overall context of the structural legacies in the Southern African sub-region and particular the former settler societies.

A first presentation by Henning Melber (Uppsala) highlighted the process “from controlled change to changed control” in the case of Namibia, where global governance in the form of United Nations involvement in the decolonization resulting in Independence in 1990 was a unique case of a “trust betrayed” dating back to the mandate system of the League of Nations. While external constraints and constitutional principles adopted reduced the autonomy of the new government in terms of initiating profound social transformation for the benefit of the formerly colonized majority, the limited space was used for a class-based project rooted in continued structural inequality. The end result was a new political elite with access to the country’s public wealth for the sake of self-enrichment schemes. The lack of delivery eroded over time the political legitimacy of the new government and its liberation gospel. In return, increasingly populist rhetoric seeks to regain the credibility. But there is a biological expiry date to the effectiveness of the liberation narrative, since a growing number of new voters have been born since Independence. This will increase the pressure further. A recent shift in Namibia’s external relations might be an indicator of a new positioning: the Nordic countries, who were among the first Western supporters of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, have all reduced their diplomatic presence and ties – none of them are represented any longer on an ambassadorial level. At the same time, friendly relations were strengthened with countries like China and North Korea. The final question raised was, if the United Nations approach to stop involvement in Namibia with Independence Day might be a sign of benign neglect or the necessary respect for national sovereignty at Independence. Clearly, the democratic notion was not implemented to the full consequences and remains “work in progress”.

Ian Phimister (Sheffield) then presented the case of Zimbabwe and its escalating crisis since 2000 in a historical context. He reminded the audience that already during the early 1980s with the atrocities committed by the Fifth Brigade under direct command of Mugabe the writing was on the wall, when an estimated 20,000 people were murdered in indiscriminate acts of mass violence bordering to genocide. The Operation “clean up” 20 years later displayed continuity in such a mindset, which showed no respect for the ordinary people suffering under the regime of ZANY/PF, which by then had lost all legitimacy among the majority of people. It iks estimated that close to three million people are currently as refugees outside of Zimbabwe, with most of the educated middle class amongst them. The so-called fast track land reform displaced landless rural people even further and privileged the tiny elite among political office bearers and securocrats in the army and police. Phimister pointed to the noteworthy fact that despite the crisis Zimbabwe is anything but a failed state: sections of the (hard currency) economy run by local and a South(ern) African capital in collaboration with international (European and US-based) transnational companies do function and prosper. Similar to the Namibian case, Zimbabwe shows that the authoritarian character bred in midst of the anti-colonial struggle is not very suitable for transformation into democracy but very much resembles feature of the same oppressive mindset fought against under colonial minority rule. Violence had been an integral part of post-colonial Zimbabwe’s social and political realities ever since Independence, as much as electoral fraught went hand in hand with every election as a well-established feature and pattern. A victory of Tsvangirai at the ballot box would only result in another “chimurenga” (war), as under the militarized state ZANU under Mugabe would not abandon power. Western criticism remained largely verbal and little if any actions followed, while recently raising African concerns were so far not followed up. So far, it had been words without action.

In the third and final presentation, Arrigo Pallotti (Bologna) was seeking to explain the passivity of SADC in terms of the political challenges posed by the Zimbabwe regime and the reluctance to interfere. Democracy, good governance and development are part of SADC’s mandate, but already in the mid-1990s the security organ of the sub-regional body was paralyzed by the conflict between Zimbabwe (refusing to vacate the chair) and South Africa. The differences in SADC over the intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo shortly afterwards contributed to a further estrangement on security matters among the SADC members. Since the regional body was mainly perceived as a vehicle for trade and economic competition, the latter weakened policy commitments and positions on good governance. The reluctance to interfere in internal matters of member states was also a result of the established intimate links between the erstwhile liberation movements now executing power as governments. Other reasons for the non-interference included SADC’s strategy to promote Zimbabwe’s economic stabilization by means of dialogue, a resistance to external interference (mainly from the West), political divisions among the member states, a clash of political and economic issues and the fear to be criticized by national constituencies if not backing Mugabe with his anti-imperialist discourse, who had a lot of populist support especially for his land policy. SADC since its existence did not play a constructive role in overcoming the structural legacies, which were discussed in all presentations, and continues to display a democratic deficit as a regional project in both the political as well as social spheres.

The discussion touched upon comparative aspects with other societies, where governments came from a background of warfare against illegitimate rule (such as Vietnam). It was noted that such comparisons could be a useful research endeavor to seek similarities and differences in the trajectories. It might also be worthwhile to gather more insights into the similarities and differences with other countries in the region (such as Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania), which had no track record of armed anti-colonial resistance prior to Independence.  Another complex dealt with issues related to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), originally welcomed as a promising prospect for enhanced democracy and human rights. In the meantime, sobering experiences have frustrated the expectations originally created.

Henning Melber

27/06/2008